After 26 days, and almost 350 million e-mail messages, only 28 sales resulted -- a conversion rate of well under 0.00001%. Of these, all but one were for male-enhancement products and the average purchase price was close to $100. Taken together, these conversions would have resulted in revenues of $2,731.88 -- a bit over $100 a day for the measurement period or $140 per day for periods when the campaign was active. However, our study interposed on only a small fraction of the overall Storm network -- we estimate roughly 1.5 percent based on the fraction of worker bots we proxy. Thus, the total daily revenue attributable to Storm's pharmacy campaign is likely closer to $7000 (or $9500 during periods of campaign activity). By the same logic, we estimate that Storm self-propagation campaigns can produce between 3500 and 8500 new bots per day.

Under the assumption that our measurements are representative over time (an admittedly dangerous assumption when dealing with such small samples), we can extrapolate that, were it sent continuously at the same rate, Storm-generated pharmaceutical spam would produce roughly 3.5 million dollars of revenue in a year. This number could be even higher if spam-advertised pharmacies experience repeat business. A bit less than "millions of dollars every day," but certainly a healthy enterprise.

Of course, the authors point out that it's dangerous to make these sorts of generalizations:

We would be the first to admit that these results represent a single data point and are not necessarily representative of spam as a whole. Different campaigns, using different tactics and marketing different products will undoubtedly produce different outcomes. Indeed, we caution strongly against researchers using the conversion rates we have measured for these Storm-based campaigns to justify assumptions in any other context.

Spam is all about economics. When sending junk mail costs a dollar in paper, list rental, and postage, a marketer needs a reasonable conversion rate to make the campaign worthwhile. When sending junk mail is almost free, a one in ten million conversion rate is acceptable.

News articles.

In any case, if you do pentests, think about all the RECENT cases where you break in to a major corporation through:

• a Solaris system with Internet-exposed telnet with a guessable password OR a telnet vulnerability (circa 1994!)
• an exposed VPN appliance with a manufacturer's administrator password
• a router with default "enable" password
• or, something else entirely - but something that rivals the above example in its unparalleled, unbelievable, abysmal, deep idiocy.

Indeed, many of my pentesting friends still report plenty of such cases (one was also featured in the presentation mentioned above). Whenever I hear about it from a pentester, I always ask:

Do you think "somebody bad" had already passed through the hole you just discovered?

Maybe an hour ago, a day ago - or a year ago?!

I cannot see how the answer can be "no."

Even though pentesters usually don't focus on forensics (no time for this), it is not uncommon to notice "your predecessor's" intrusion traces while you break through systems, "plant flags", change screen backgrounds [for the admins to notice that you've been there...], etc.

Let's think what this situation really means? Here are the choices I see:

1. Nobody discovered the hole - a law of large  numbers (aka "dumb luck") have "shielded" the company from an incident. Yes, Virginia, dumb luck IS a security strategy for some companies... AND it works for them.
2. It was discovered, but not used/abused by the attacker - maybe he was busy hacking other systems, or saved this for later and never came back due to his ADD. Congratulation, you win! The immense power of dumb luck wrapped you in a protective "security" blanket ... again :-)
3. It was discovered; the attacker went in, looked around and compromised a few others systems, but found nothing of interest (no low hanging fruits)  - and he was not a bot herder. Again, you win. Next time you are in Vegas, bet on "00."
4. It was discovered; the attacker went in and deployed a bot on "your" system - given how many botnets are there, this situation is clearly acceptable to many organizations. In this case, dumb luck strategy, apparently, still work: so they use your box to spam and phish somebody else ... big deal!
5. It was discovered; the attacker went in and stole all your credit card information (it is now for sale) - even in this case, the user of "the dumb luck strategy" still "wins" (in some perverse sense)! Unless and until the stolen information IS tracked back to you OR a friendly neighborhood PCI auditor come and jams a broomstick up your ..., you can still continue to be stupid at your leisure and ignore basic security practices.
6. It was discovered; the attacker went in and stole your CEO's Inbox, including the email related to his affair (it is now on CNN) - now, in this case, you lose AND it is time to stop being stupid! Welcome to the "0wned world." Time to launch (relaunch?) your security program and get serious.

What does this teach us about RISK? The lesson here is important:

• For a security professional, an Internet-exposed system with "root/root" is an obvious HUGE risk!
• For your boss's boss's boss, it is NOT!

This is exactly why I think that the most critical problem in security today is METRICS. Metrics that a) work AND mean something to decision makers and b) can be clearly communicated to said decision makers [BTW, a) and b) are two separate problems.] Metrics that cover not only threats and vulnerabilities we face, but also the effectiveness of security countermeasures we deploy. Metrics you can act on - and ones your boss (and his boss) will act on. Metrics that lead to correct decisions about which risks to accept, which to  mitigate (all while knowing with what efficiency such mitigation occurs) and which to transfer.

Until that time, the dreaded "C-word" (compliance) will trump "the other C-word" (common sense) as a driver for security ... and we will continue to live in the "0wned world."

Possibly related posts:

• Risk vs Risk 

HANSEI - WHAT IS “RELENTLESS REFLECTION?” - And why we’re talking about it in the context of Risk Analysis.

Recall from yesterday’s post about how I got to thinking about the concept of Hansei-Kaizen, “relentless reflection” and “continuous improvement” and how we might apply that to risk management.  It’s a concept born of Toyota and is, in some way, the foundation for “Lean” production.

Call me biased, but I think that Hansei - the act of ‘relentless reflection’ made structured is the analytical function.  And I hate to debate (post-mortem) the father of Toyota quality success when he says that Hansei is the “check” in Plan/Do/Check/Act, but I think that Hansei also applies to the “Plan” of the P/D/C/A or Deming cycle.

You’ll recall the P/D/C/A cycle can be thought of even as an implementation of Scientific Method, in that it is Observation & Hypothesis Creation (P), Experiment (D), Analysis (Check), and Act (Revise/New Hypothesis, etc…).  Well then as such, the Hypothesis creation involves creating a model or creating an expected outcome for data using the currently accepted model.

So in our industry there is an opportunity for Relentless Reflection in both the Observation and Hypothesis (Plan) creation steps, and the Check step.  We create an estimate for control strength, or probable losses in the context of risk- then we go to Experiment step.  That hypothesis can be put it into production, have an audit, have a penetration test, whatever, in the context of the Do step.  BTW - using Hansei/Analytics in Plan is one way that strong analytical functions can really make penetration testing more useful - as a means to test the estimates and inputs into a model.  It’s Penetration Testing 2.0!  (<- tongue fully in cheek, yes)

Those who are versed in the reasons to merge Six Sigma and Lean together are probably already seeing where I’m going with this today.  But before you think that a simple DMAIC function is all that is needed to create proper “Hansei”, let me encourage you to keep reading.

Now if the analytical function can said to be “reflection”, why must it be relentless?

One word.  Change. There are essentially four separate “landscapes” or sources of change that we face (more on those tomorrow).  But anyone who has tried to manage system compliance, log management or policy exceptions knows that change is possibly the most difficult thing we security professionals must manage.  And when you think about it, there aren’t too many other business functions like information security where significant visibility and insight about the environment is needed for “complete” information (get bullish on Log Management is my recommendation).

HANSEI STEPS ADAPTED TO INFORMATION SECURITY

This is one of those quality control concepts that we can mangle adopt.  At Toyota, Hansei-Kaizen includes the following basic steps:

1. Initial problem perception
2. Clarify the problem
3. Locate area/point of cause
4. Investigate root cause (using an ask why 5 times approach)
5. Countermeasure
6. Evaluate
7. Standardize

Now it’s important to note that part of this includes the concept of Go See For Yourself, called “Gemba“.  Gemba can be translated as “the actual place” or “the place where virtue or truth is found.” At Toyota this might mean going to the shop floor to see the issue at hand in the production line.  But for us, that’s a problem because we live in the virtual world.  There’s usually not much use in hanging out in the wiring closets to try to see the problems.

But if you combine the concept of Gemba with the concept of “Nemawashi” –the process of discussing problems and potential solutions with all those affected- we can forge a similar concept using risk analysis.  That is discussing the issue and the risk associated with an issue (what some people would call “risk management”) with the business/LOB/data owner and let them accept authority and the risk decision.  We, the risk analyst, our goal is simply to perform items 1-5 (presenting countermeasure options that include transferring or accepting risk).  By going to the line of business and involving them, responsibility is shared.  Also, if you structure organizational behavior right, personal risk is transferred!

This sort of approach is also in harmony with concepts like “mutual ownership of problems,” or “genchi genbutsu,” (solving problems at the source instead of behind desks), and the “kaizen mind,” (an unending sense of crisis behind the company’s constant drive to improve).

One of the criticisms I have with the way most people try to implement DMAIC into “Lean”

REQUIREMENTS

Now to get this done, I really see three significant requirements.

1.)  A change in political structure.

2.)  Models that provide consistent, defensible analysis.

3.)  A Quantitative approach.  This means using actual units of measurement (not just amorphous percents, ordinal scales, etc.)  for risk and it’s subsequent factors.  Sure there are times when Q&D qualitative approaches are acceptable, but policy should be to have quantitative analysis whenever and wherever possible.

That last item - the quantitative approach - is really quite important.  And the reasons why will be discussed further in tomorrow’s post:

“What should we be reflecting about? & What is needed for reflection?”

P.S.  Your comments and suggestions, as always, are welcome.

P.P.S  Those who may be familiar with Lean/SixSigma/Kaizen sorts of mashups may be thinking - “hey, an Analytical step is built into SixSigma”.  Well, yes there is some prevision for analytical functions based on statistics, but I find SixSigma geared towards creating a State of Knowledge about operational processes, not towards creating a State of Wisdom for CISO’s around security & risks “big questions”.  In otherwords, the analytical function in DMAIC is in the context of Kaizen, and a different step than “reflective” analytics.

First, let me disclose something - my frantic efforts with the Paint allow me to proudly proclaim: I am a certified, trusted "Good Guy":

Good guys, let me tell you, do not need any controls placed on them; they are "trusted." Don't you have to trust somebody? Why not trust a sysadmin, for example?

So, what about controls? Ah, glad that you asked! "Controls" are for the bad guys; they are in place to prevent the bad guys from doing "an unspeakable evil" (tm) :-) on you. On the other hand, good guys are doing "the right thing" every time - why monitor them? It goes without saying that nobody ever moves between these groups, especially, not from "good guys" to "bad guys."

As I am rambling about this, many of my security-minded readers are wondering "what is Anton up to? Isn't it kind of OBVIOUS that controls are for everybody?" Controls know no good/bad! For example, a network control, say a NIPS, will block malicious web access due to a typo in a URL (by - gasp! - a good guy) or due to determined malicious hacking.

I think a few of my readers have watched one too many "Batman" movies and have acquired the dark side of the "IT hero" mentality." How about getting an "IT employee" mentality? If your boss is an idiot (and Terry's managers definitely seem pretty far gone in that direction...), than your "heroic duty" is to let them impale themselves on a sword of their idiocy, not to commit crimes (even if cybercrimes) to prevent that idiocy. Really, go find another job if you do not like the environment; good admins are needed in many places. For example, if your boss insists on posting all VPN passwords for all users publicly out of his sheer and unfathomable stupidity, it is your duty to tell him that it is "a very bad idea" - and not to change all passwords and not let him see it. "Doing you job" despite your boss and despite the law just doesn't work...

In other words, I want a banker making policy decisions at a bank, not a sysadmin. If a banker makes a wrong decision, his will suffer. If he is an idiot, he will most likely make the wrong decision. However, it is NOT the admin's decision to make - he does not "own" the business.  BTW, the fact that it is a city, not a bank, and it is taxpayer funded, does not change it.

Am I "anti-admin" for saying that admins should not run the business?  Am I "anti-admin" for saying controls (at least logging/auditing) on administrator activities are needed?  You call it "anti-admin", I call it common sense!!  Pray tell me, what makes admins float above accountability, control and  IT governance?

Please also read what Randy Smith said about this issue; a lot of good thoughts that I agree with.

Now I would like to respond to specific comments from my readers:

"What rankles your readers is how blithely you imply this problem has a simple or effective solution. It doesn't, all the processes or tools you advocate can do is speed up the time it takes to detect the lock-out, but not actually prevent it - i.e. they are ineffective at tackling the primary problem."

That is correct; the rogue admin problem has NO simple solution. You might prevent some (few, really) things, you might log some of them and then figure what happened, but there is no simple solution (it goes without saying that "just trust them" is NOT a solution...)

"We all know companies run without sane risk management all the time and are rarely held accountable in America. What makes you think anyone is "screwed"?"

Well, this is a good point; maybe I let my idealistic side take over. But, come on, just the fact that bad IT governance is somewhat common, doesn't make it right!

"Now ask yourself who is "screwed" by one person at a small company having all access and no accountability on a network. That's how I run my home network. Big deal."

Nobody is. I addressed it here. The risk is acceptable for smaller environments, usually. I don't have an overseeing body set up to control my home passwords :-)

"You seem to forget that sometimes the management just has to trust somebody. "

Addressed above.

"Chuvakin, you're a tool. Given the recent idiocy of the releasing of the VPN names and codes, it obviously shows that any sort of detest that Childs had against his superiors at the city were justified."

The fact that his bosses are idiots (which seems fairly well established!) does not make him right!

Bad boss + admin out of control =/= right :-)

"This is not a private organization. His superiors don't own the company and are NOT entitled to the data. We are, the taxpayers. And as a California taxpayer I fully support someone with the paranoia and technical skill of Terry Childs over a group of bureaucrats who release secure information to the public."

Properly evaluating this statement requires a law degree. Thus, no comment. Bureaucrats suck, but rogue admins are not a solution to that. Really!

"The guy was doing his job and doing it incredibly well, and keeping it out of the hands of those who, given their most recent choices, would bring potential disaster to the city."

He was NOT, unless crime is part of his job :-) Also, see comments on "IT heroes" above. If your boss is an idiot AND you don't like it, quit.

"Anton Chuvakin seems to think that all admins should be kept underneath management's boot at all times. [...]  Managers can't and don't understand what we do, and thus eventually come to the conclusion that we can't be trusted with our own knowledge. [...] Perhaps it's human nature to fear what you don't know or understand -- and that's why management can develop a fear of their own employees."

You say 'fear of employees', I say "insider risk management." You say "trust employees", I say "trust but [be able to] verify (=log)"

"his blog leads the casual reader to infer that their businesses are in danger of being hijacked by disgruntled Sys Admins and that isn’t the case." (from here)

Eh, not all businesses, but some businesses - definitely (hmm, see Terry Childs story or other published insider attack cases, all the way back to Omega Engineering case and maybe all the way back to ancient history)

"I despise people like Terry Childs, but despise Chicken Little’s like Anton Chuvakin even more." (from here)

You say  I am 'chicken little', I say "if your boss ignores insider risk management, he is stupid and deserves his business to fail."  I also add "if you think admins are 'above the law', you have a good chance of 'turning rogue' yourself AND then ending in jail."

Finally, this and my other posts about the case are inspired by on the media reporting; I possess no "insider knowledge" on this case  whatsoever.

Possibly related posts:

• "On Doomsaying (Terry Childs case)"
• "So ... Am I? Maybe I Am!"

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