The sky is falling! Trip Chowdhry, the analyst with Global Equities Research who claimed Red Hat was ‘rubbish and the entire LAMP stack is potty, too’ published some eye-opening predictions, predominantly negative, about tech business in Silicon Valley. Now Chowdhry claims that “almost every VC funded open-source company is struggling and will run out of money within the next six months.” (Probably not the most unbiased guy about open source) Matt Asay argues that organizations in general are struggling, but open-source companies are not that high on the list. (But are they high on the VC “axe” list??) He notes Alfresco, Pentaho and JasperSoft are some of the players with ‘millions in the bank and growing revenue.’ Asay also says Chowdhry has a responsibility to do real due diligence and not create myths. Take that, Chicken Little! (img from Disney-Clipart)

We’re not as far behind as we thought we were. Google presented the results of a study they conducted about how IPv6- capable “ordinary users” are at the RIPE meeting in Dubai a few weeks ago. Turns out Apple Macs drive IPv6 penetration in the US. Fifty-two percent of all IPv6 users in the U.S. own a Mac and use 6to4 (creating IPv6 addresses from an IPv4 address and tunneling packets) – making the US fifth in the list of countries using IPv6. Russia and France took first and second place with .76 and .65 percent IPv6-enabled traffic . The US is at .45 percent. Worldwide, 0.238 percent of Google users’ systems are IPv6-enabled and prefer to use IPv6 over IPv4.

Obama’s win = Google’s win? Apparently Google CEO Eric Schmidt and President-Elect Obama are very good buddies and “this terrifies Microsoft”. Now competitors are more on guard against Google’s growing empire and popularity. Although Schmidt was mentioned as a possible candidate for the country’s new national CTO position, he said he would not accept the post if asked. I guess that’s one less thing Microsoft has to worry about.

District Court Holds that Running Hash Values on Computer Is A Search: The case is United States v. Crist, 2008 WL 4682806 (M.D.Pa. October 22 2008) (Kane, C.J.). It's a child pornography case involving a warrantless search that raises a very interesting and important question of first impression: Is running a hash a Fourth Amendment search? (For background on what a "hash" is and why it matters, see here).

First, the facts. Crist is behind on his rent payments, and his landlord starts to evict him by hiring Sell to remove Crist's belongings and throw them away. Sell comes a cross Crist's computer, and he hands over the computer to his friend Hipple who he knows is looking for a computer. Hipple starts to look through the files, and he comes across child pornography: Hipple freaks out and calls the police. The police then conduct a warrantless forensic examination of the computer:

In the forensic examination, Agent Buckwash used the following procedure. First, Agent Buckwash created an "MD5 hash value" of Crist's hard drive. An MD5 hash value is a unique alphanumeric representation of the data, a sort of "fingerprint" or "digital DNA." When creating the hash value, Agent Buckwash used a "software write protect" in order to ensure that "nothing can be written to that hard drive." Supp. Tr. 88. Next, he ran a virus scan, during which he identified three relatively innocuous viruses. After that, he created an "image," or exact copy, of all the data on Crist's hard drive.

Agent Buckwash then opened up the image (not the actual hard drive) in a software program called EnCase, which is the principal tool in the analysis. He explained that EnCase does not access the hard drive in the traditional manner, i.e., through the computer's operating system. Rather, EnCase "reads the hard drive itself." Supp. Tr. 102. In other words, it reads every file-bit by bit, cluster by cluster-and creates a index of the files contained on the hard drive. EnCase can, therefore, bypass user-defined passwords, "break down complex file structures for examination," and recover "deleted" files as long as those files have not been written over. Supp. Tr. 102-03.

Once in EnCase, Agent Buckwash ran a "hash value and signature analysis on all of the files on the hard drive." Supp. Tr. 89. In doing so, he was able to "ingerprint" each file in the computer. Once he generated hash values of the files, he compared those hash values to the hash values of files that are known or suspected to contain child pornography. Agent Buckwash discovered five videos containing known child pornography. Attachment 5. He discovered 171 videos containing suspected child pornography.

One of the interesting questions here is whether the search that resulted was within the scope of Hipple's private search; different courts have approached this question differently. But for now the most interesting question is whether running the hash was a Fourth Amendment search. The Court concluded that it was, and that the evidence of child pornography discovered had to be suppressed:

The Government argues that no search occurred in running the EnCase program because the agents "didn't look at any files, they simply accessed the computer." 2d Supp. Tr. 16. The Court rejects this view and finds that the "running of hash values" is a search protected by the Fourth Amendment.

Computers are composed of many compartments, among them a "hard drive," which in turn is composed of many "platters," or disks. To derive the hash values of Crist's computer, the Government physically removed the hard drive from the computer, created a duplicate image of the hard drive without physically invading it, and applied the EnCase program to each compartment, disk, file, folder, and bit.2d Supp. Tr. 18-19. By subjecting the entire computer to a hash value analysis-every file, internet history, picture, and "buddy list" became available for Government review. Such examination constitutes a search.

I think this is generally a correct result: See my article Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 531 (2005), for the details. Still, given the lack of analysis here it's somewhat hard to know what to make of the decision. Which stage was the search — the creating the duplicate? The running of the hash? It's not really clear. I don't think it matters very much to this case, because the agent who got the positive hit on the hashes didn't then get a warrant. Instead, he immediately switched over to the EnCase "gallery view" function to see the images, which seems to be to be undoudtedly a search. Still, it's a really interesting question.

In the paper, we propose a simple solution: take-down companies should share their raw, unverified feeds of phishing URLs with their competitors. Each company can examine the raw feed, pick out the websites impersonating their clients, and focus on removing these sites.

Since we presented our findings to the Anti-Phishing Working Group eCrime Researchers Summit, we have received considerable feedback from take-down companies. Take-down companies attending the APWG meeting understood that sharing would help speed up response times, but expressed reservations at sharing their feeds unless they were duly compensated. Eric Olsen of Cyveillance (another company offering take-down services) has written a comprehensive rebuttal of our recommendations. He argues that competition between take-down companies drives investment in efforts to detect more websites. Mandated sharing of phishing URL feeds, in his view, would undermine these detection efforts and cause take-down companies such as Cyveillance to exit the business.

I do have some sympathy for the objections raised by the take-down companies. As we state in the paper, free-riding (where one company relies on another to invest in detection so they don’t have to) is a concern for any sharing regime. Academic research studying other areas of information security (e.g., here and here), however, has shown that free-riding is unlikely to be so rampant as to drive all the best take-down companies out of offering service, as Mr. Olsen suggests.

While we can quibble over the extent of the threat from free free-riding, it should not detract from the conclusions we draw over the need for greater sharing. In our view, it would be unwise and irresponsible to accept the current status quo of keeping phishing URL feeds completely private. After all, competition without sharing has approximately doubled the lifetimes of phishing websites! The solution, then, is to devise a sharing mechanism that gives take-down companies the incentive to keep detecting more phishing URLs.

Here is our stab at devising a suitable sharing mechanism. We propose the creation of a members-only sharing club with compensation for net contributors paid for by net receivers. Take-down companies submit real-time copies of their entire feeds to a trusted third party (for the sake of argument, let’s assume that the APWG takes on this role). The APWG collates the individual feeds, marks the source of each submission (i.e., which take-down company) along with a timestamp. The APWG makes the amalgamated feed available immediately to all members. The members pick out phishing URLs impersonating their own clients, while ignoring the rest. Crucially, the expensive task of verifying phishing URLs and initiating take-down continues to be performed by the take-down company.

Periodically, the combined feed is audited to determine the reciprocity of contributions. Take-down companies provide a list of their clients to the auditor. The auditor then computes the number of phishing websites impersonating each take-down company’s clients that are missed by the takedown company but identified by others. The auditor also tallies the time difference for phishing websites that are identified by others first.

For example, suppose bank A1 has hired take-down company A to remove phishing sites on its behalf, and bank B1 has hired take-down company B. Suppose 500 phishing sites impersonate A1, and that A identifies 400 while B identifies an additional 100 sites missed by A. Likewise, suppose another 500 phishing sites impersonate bank B1, and that B identifies 300 while A identifies an additional 200 sites missed by B. B has received a net of 100 useful phishing sites more from A than B has given to A. Consequently, B should pay A a previously-agreed ‘finder’s fee’ for identifying these extra 100 websites.

The ‘finder’s fee’ provides additional incentive for take-down companies to invest in better phishing website detection. Designed properly, such a sharing club can overcome the potential for free-riding that companies such as Cyveillance fret about, while increasing sharing to shorten phishing website lifetimes.

Some subtleties must be mentioned, however. If the finder’s fee is big enough, some companies may be tempted to cheat to minimize their payout. For instance, underperforming take-down companies could claim to have independently discovered missing data from their feed shortly after collecting it from the shared feed. This can be mitigated by adding a credible threat of detection — inserting a few dubious fake phishing URLs that only appear in the shared feed. If the company claims to have ‘independently’ rediscovered these URLs, then they will be caught cheating. Another issue is that the auditing system does incur some overhead, which could be avoided if sharing was made unconditional.

To sum up, we recognize that many take-down companies will be reticent to share. However, we feel that sharing is too important to the goal of tackling phishing to brush aside because of a few inevitable complications. For the good of protecting consumers, the anti-phishing industry should learn to co-operate!

Conventional wisdom holds that terrorism is inherently political, and that people become terrorists for political reasons. This is the "strategic" model of terrorism, and it's basically an economic model. It posits that people resort to terrorism when they believe -- rightly or wrongly -- that terrorism is worth it; that is, when they believe the political gains of terrorism minus the political costs are greater than if they engaged in some other, more peaceful form of protest. It's assumed, for example, that people join Hamas to achieve a Palestinian state; that people join the PKK to attain a Kurdish national homeland; and that people join al-Qaida to, among other things, get the United States out of the Persian Gulf.

If you believe this model, the way to fight terrorism is to change that equation, and that's what most experts advocate. Governments tend to minimize the political gains of terrorism through a no-concessions policy; the international community tends to recommend reducing the political grievances of terrorists via appeasement, in hopes of getting them to renounce violence. Both advocate policies to provide effective nonviolent alternatives, like free elections.

Historically, none of these solutions has worked with any regularity. Max Abrahms, a predoctoral fellow at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation, has studied dozens of terrorist groups from all over the world. He argues that the model is wrong. In a paper published this year in International Security that -- sadly -- doesn't have the title "Seven Habits of Highly Ineffective Terrorists," he discusses, well, seven habits of highly ineffective terrorists. These seven tendencies are seen in terrorist organizations all over the world, and they directly contradict the theory that terrorists are political maximizers:

Terrorists, he writes, (1) attack civilians, a policy that has a lousy track record of convincing those civilians to give the terrorists what they want; (2) treat terrorism as a first resort, not a last resort, failing to embrace nonviolent alternatives like elections; (3) don't compromise with their target country, even when those compromises are in their best interest politically; (4) have protean political platforms, which regularly, and sometimes radically, change; (5) often engage in anonymous attacks, which precludes the target countries making political concessions to them; (6) regularly attack other terrorist groups with the same political platform; and (7) resist disbanding, even when they consistently fail to achieve their political objectives or when their stated political objectives have been achieved.

Abrahms has an alternative model to explain all this: People turn to terrorism for social solidarity. He theorizes that people join terrorist organizations worldwide in order to be part of a community, much like the reason inner-city youths join gangs in the United States.

The evidence supports this. Individual terrorists often have no prior involvement with a group's political agenda, and often join multiple terrorist groups with incompatible platforms. Individuals who join terrorist groups are frequently not oppressed in any way, and often can't describe the political goals of their organizations. People who join terrorist groups most often have friends or relatives who are members of the group, and the great majority of terrorist are socially isolated: unmarried young men or widowed women who weren't working prior to joining. These things are true for members of terrorist groups as diverse as the IRA and al-Qaida.

For example, several of the 9/11 hijackers planned to fight in Chechnya, but they didn't have the right paperwork so they attacked America instead. The mujahedeen had no idea whom they would attack after the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, so they sat around until they came up with a new enemy: America. Pakistani terrorists regularly defect to another terrorist group with a totally different political platform. Many new al-Qaida members say, unconvincingly, that they decided to become a jihadist after reading an extreme, anti-American blog, or after converting to Islam, sometimes just a few weeks before. These people know little about politics or Islam, and they frankly don't even seem to care much about learning more. The blogs they turn to don't have a lot of substance in these areas, even though more informative blogs do exist.

All of this explains the seven habits. It's not that they're ineffective; it's that they have a different goal. They might not be effective politically, but they are effective socially: They all help preserve the group's existence and cohesion.

This kind of analysis isn't just theoretical; it has practical implications for counterterrorism. Not only can we now better understand who is likely to become a terrorist, we can engage in strategies specifically designed to weaken the social bonds within terrorist organizations. Driving a wedge between group members -- commuting prison sentences in exchange for actionable intelligence, planting more double agents within terrorist groups -- will go a long way to weakening the social bonds within those groups.

We also need to pay more attention to the socially marginalized than to the politically downtrodden, like unassimilated communities in Western countries. We need to support vibrant, benign communities and organizations as alternative ways for potential terrorists to get the social cohesion they need. And finally, we need to minimize collateral damage in our counterterrorism operations, as well as clamping down on bigotry and hate crimes, which just creates more dislocation and social isolation, and the inevitable calls for revenge.

This essay previously appeared on Wired.com.

Conventional wisdom holds that terrorism is inherently political, and that people become terrorists for political reasons. This is the "strategic" model of terrorism, and it's basically an economic model. It posits that people resort to terrorism when they believe -- rightly or wrongly -- that terrorism is worth it; that is, when they believe the political gains of terrorism minus the political costs are greater than if they engaged in some other, more peaceful form of protest. It's assumed, for example, that people join Hamas to achieve a Palestinian state; that people join the PKK to attain a Kurdish national homeland; and that people join al-Qaida to, among other things, get the United States out of the Persian Gulf.

If you believe this model, the way to fight terrorism is to change that equation, and that's what most experts advocate. Governments tend to minimize the political gains of terrorism through a no-concessions policy; the international community tends to recommend reducing the political grievances of terrorists via appeasement, in hopes of getting them to renounce violence. Both advocate policies to provide effective nonviolent alternatives, like free elections.

Historically, none of these solutions has worked with any regularity. Max Abrahms, a predoctoral fellow at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation, has studied dozens of terrorist groups from all over the world. He argues that the model is wrong. In a paper (.pdf) published this year in International Security that -- sadly -- doesn't have the title "Seven Habits of Highly Ineffective Terrorists," he discusses, well, seven habits of highly ineffective terrorists. These seven tendencies are seen in terrorist organizations all over the world, and they directly contradict the theory that terrorists are political maximizers:

Terrorists, he writes, (1) attack civilians, a policy that has a lousy track record of convincing those civilians to give the terrorists what they want; (2) treat terrorism as a first resort, not a last resort, failing to embrace nonviolent alternatives like elections; (3) don't compromise with their target country, even when those compromises are in their best interest politically; (4) have protean political platforms, which regularly, and sometimes radically, change; (5) often engage in anonymous attacks, which precludes the target countries making political concessions to them; (6) regularly attack other terrorist groups with the same political platform; and (7) resist disbanding, even when they consistently fail to achieve their political objectives or when their stated political objectives have been achieved.

Abrahms has an alternative model to explain all this: People turn to terrorism for social solidarity. He theorizes that people join terrorist organizations worldwide in order to be part of a community, much like the reason inner-city youths join gangs in the United States.

The evidence supports this. Individual terrorists often have no prior involvement with a group's political agenda, and often join multiple terrorist groups with incompatible platforms. Individuals who join terrorist groups are frequently not oppressed in any way, and often can't describe the political goals of their organizations. People who join terrorist groups most often have friends or relatives who are members of the group, and the great majority of terrorist are socially isolated: unmarried young men or widowed women who weren't working prior to joining. These things are true for members of terrorist groups as diverse as the IRA and al-Qaida.

For example, several of the 9/11 hijackers planned to fight in Chechnya, but they didn't have the right paperwork so they attacked America instead. The mujahedeen had no idea whom they would attack after the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, so they sat around until they came up with a new enemy: America. Pakistani terrorists regularly defect to another terrorist group with a totally different political platform. Many new al-Qaida members say, unconvincingly, that they decided to become a jihadist after reading an extreme, anti-American blog, or after converting to Islam, sometimes just a few weeks before. These people know little about politics or Islam, and they frankly don't even seem to care much about learning more. The blogs they turn to don't have a lot of substance in these areas, even though more informative blogs do exist.

All of this explains the seven habits. It's not that they're ineffective; it's that they have a different goal. They might not be effective politically, but they are effective socially: They all help preserve the group's existence and cohesion.

This kind of analysis isn't just theoretical; it has practical implications for counterterrorism. Not only can we now better understand who is likely to become a terrorist, we can engage in strategies specifically designed to weaken the social bonds within terrorist organizations. Driving a wedge between group members -- commuting prison sentences in exchange for actionable intelligence, planting more double agents within terrorist groups -- will go a long way to weakening the social bonds within those groups.

We also need to pay more attention to the socially marginalized than to the politically downtrodden, like unassimilated communities in Western countries. We need to support vibrant, benign communities and organizations as alternative ways for potential terrorists to get the social cohesion they need. And finally, we need to minimize collateral damage in our counterterrorism operations, as well as clamping down on bigotry and hate crimes, which just creates more dislocation and social isolation, and the inevitable calls for revenge.

---

Bruce Schneier is Chief Security Technology Officer of BT, and author of Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World.

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