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  <channel>
    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: bloomberg]]></title>
    <link>http://www.securityratty.com/tag/bloomberg</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Sun, 06 Aug 2006 23:41:00 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Automation Gone Wrong]]></title>
      <link>http://www.securityratty.com/article/7c236cd455cc9d0b2eb9da846ba03f97</link>
      <guid>http://www.securityratty.com/article/7c236cd455cc9d0b2eb9da846ba03f97</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Weve talked about the changing nature of the data center and the critical role that even more automation from virtual machine movement to runbook tools to auto-remediation and more will have in trying...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img style="border-top-width: 0px; border-left-width: 0px; border-bottom-width: 0px; margin: 0px 10px 10px 0px; border-right-width: 0px" src="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/09/swn-2007-united-brand.gif" border="0" alt="swn_2007_united_brand" width="189" height="20" align="left" /> We’ve talked about the changing nature of the data center and the critical role that even more automation – from <a href="http://www.bladewatch.com/2008/09/10/data-centers-need-to-be-made-lite/" target="_blank">virtual machine movement</a> to runbook tools to auto-remediation and more – will have in trying to manage data center operations in real-time. But it’s always a balancing act. How “smart” can automated processes really be? What really should be automated versus requiring some level of human scrutiny and decision-making?</p>
<p>Well here’s a story where the tradeoff for speed and efficiency caused a massive stock dump erroneously.</p>
<p><img style="border-right: 0px; border-top: 0px; margin: 0px; border-left: 0px; border-bottom: 0px" src="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/09/sentinel-article-blog.jpg" border="0" alt="Sentinel_article_blog" width="368" height="420" /></p>
<p>Apparently, many traders use <a href="http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/09/six-year-old-st.html" target="_blank">automation software that trolls the Web</a> for news stories and then, depending on what it finds, executes stock trades automatically. It was <a href="http://aviationblog.dallasnews.com/archives/2008/09/dow-jones-kicks-them-when-they.html" target="_blank">United Airline’s bad luck that an old article about its 2002 bankruptcy</a>-court filing showed up on Google’s news service and somehow made it to the list of most popular stories. In one of a series of mistakes here, the story had no date on it – which means Google’s algorithm for assessing popularity didn’t have a way to exclude it as an “old” story – OR (because there are conflicting accounts) the South Florida Sun-Sentinel actually put “today’s” date on the page that the story appeared on. This got <a href="http://www.networkworld.com/community/node/32424" target="_blank">picked up by the Income Security Advisors newsletter</a> and sent over to Bloomberg News as a one-line brief. Plus there’s the inevitable conspiracy theory that people manipulated the web traffic for this story to adversely affect UAL. Regardless, on Monday afternoon, the <a href="http://www.editorsweblog.org/multimedia/2008/09/us_united_airlines_stock_plummets_after.php" target="_blank">stock plunged 76%</a> in less than a day.</p>
<p>But the real problem here is the <a href="http://exchanges.nyse.com/archives/2008/09/we_robots.php" target="_blank">growing use of automated programs</a> to trigger stock trades without any human interaction – instead based on news headlines and earnings data. According to the Wall Street Journal, these automated programs were responsible for a very surprising <a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122100794359017593.html?mod=djemMM">25% of NYSE trades</a> in the last week of August.</p>
<p>I’m sure we’ll hear more as the lawyers are now involved trying to figure out who should get the blame.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 17:00:04 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/stock">stock</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/trigger stock trades">trigger stock trades</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/automation">automation</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/story">story</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/executes stock trades">executes stock trades</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/web traffic">web traffic</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/wall street journal">wall street journal</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/googles news service">googles news service</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/virtual machine movement">virtual machine movement</category>
      <source url="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/automation-gone-wrong/09/2008">Automation Gone Wrong</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Reputation Damage & Measurement]]></title>
      <link>http://www.securityratty.com/article/d9577961443ca1c3cd93223077fbca5f</link>
      <guid>http://www.securityratty.com/article/d9577961443ca1c3cd93223077fbca5f</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Reputation damage can be one of the most difficult concepts to build measurements around. In fact, it can be difficult to develop the actual metrics for the measurements, as well. Damage to things...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Reputation damage can be one of the most difficult concepts to build measurements around.  In fact, it can be difficult to develop the actual metrics for the measurements, as well.  Damage to things like &#8220;corporate reputation&#8221; and &#8220;goodwill&#8221; and &#8220;brand equity&#8221; can be difficult to wrap even reasonable dollar estimates around (When I use FAIR, I really only care to use one metric when describing loss magnitudes - the almighty currency).</p>
<p>Complicating factors is the impact (or lack thereof) of incidents on stock price.  Many researchers who identify themselves with the <strong><a href="http://www.amazon.com/New-School-Information-Security/dp/0321502787">New School of Information Security</a></strong> (yours truly included) want to immediately look at stock price as a bell-weather metric for incident impact.  I think this stems from our days of slinging FUD, back when we could scream &#8220;Buy a firewall or we&#8217;ll have an incident and you&#8217;ll be on the front page of the paper and the stock price will go down!&#8221;  But these days notable incidents seem to suggest that the impact on stock price for an incident is short lived.  <em><strong>With qualifications, of course.</strong></em></p>
<p>So what would/should we make of this from <a href="http://www.money.co.uk/article/1001229-12-million-wiped-off-helphire-stock-after-malicious-gmail-sent-to-clients.htm">Money.co.uk</a>?</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><strong>£12million ($24m) Wiped off Helphire Stock after Malicious Email Sent to Clients</strong></p>
<blockquote><p>Car hire firm Helphire have taken Google to court after a malicious email sent from a Gmail account saw their shares plummet £12million in a single day.</p>
<p>The Bath-based business who specialise in providing replacement cars to &#8216;no-fault&#8217; drivers involved in accidents on behalf of car insurance companies, initiated legal proceedings against the search engine giant as part of their attempt to find out who is responsible for sending the defamatory mailing.</p>
<p>Google are now known to have complied with the court order and have controversially supplied details of the email account and ISP used by the meddler.</p>
<p>Written under the psudoname Peter Franks, the 1200 word email is know to have been sent from a gmail account that was opened specifically for this purpose and closed a few minutes after the damage had been done&#8230;</p>
<p>&#8230;The misdemeanour couldn’t have come at a worse time for the struggling firm who have undergone a £45million rights issue and seen a 75% drop in the value of their stock already this year.</p></blockquote>
<p>That last paragraph, for me, explains some of the difficulty in tying reputation damage to stock decreases.  It&#8217;s like when you read the headlines from Bloomberg about why the days stocks (or commodity) prices are up or down.  You know, the &#8220;Oil closes $3 higher on news that a notable South American dictator has a rather unpleasant boil in a very uncomfortable area&#8221; type of headlines.  You really do have to question the causality and correlation.  So in the Helphire case above - is this new drop in stock really because of the email sent?  If so, should we view that $24mil number as an independent data point to describe this sort of attack on reputation, or is the magnitude aggravated due to the long-term trend of stock price?</p>
<p>Even when we have &#8220;Objective Data&#8221; (an in-joke for Adam S.) like this decline in stock price, it is really difficult to provide any sort of precise estimate or measurement - about the future, present or past.  The best we can do is use ranges, distributions, that are reasonable based on evidence and observation.</p>
<p>So it&#8217;s worth filing away this sort of datum for future use - while dutifully acknowledging the qualifiers we might place around it.</p>
<p>So the questions I ask here - what should we make of this new information, and how should we view the $24million drop - they&#8217;re not rhetorical.  I am very interested in your views and welcome your comments!</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 22 Aug 2008 10:33:56 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/stock">stock</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/helphire stock">helphire stock</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/reputation damage">reputation damage</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/reputation">reputation</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/stock price">stock price</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/damage">damage</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/email">email</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/email account">email account</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/malicious email">malicious email</category>
      <source url="http://riskmanagementinsight.com/riskanalysis/?p=387">Reputation Damage &amp; Measurement</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Wee-Fi: Topless Meetings; Projects-Fi; Boston Launch; Rural-Fi; Chrysler-Fi; Wi-Fi Chip-Fi]]></title>
      <link>http://www.securityratty.com/article/2cf6893a95bd49d4a43a00deeaa5a76f</link>
      <guid>http://www.securityratty.com/article/2cf6893a95bd49d4a43a00deeaa5a76f</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[No laptops allowed: So-called topless (nice sexy term for &quot;laptop-less&quot;) meetings are coming into vogue? It's hard to tell if it's a trend, but to judge by conferences I've attended, no one pays...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img src="http://wifinetnews.com/images/weefi.jpg" align="right" border="0" hspace="5" /><a href="http://www.sltrib.com/ci_8753164"><strong>No laptops allowed:</strong></a> So-called topless (nice sexy term for "laptop-less") meetings are coming into vogue? It's hard to tell if it's a trend, but to judge by conferences I've attended, no one pays attention to anything any more. Banning laptops might be an advantage to promoting shorter meetings--people will be jonesing so hard for their 'top that they'll cut to the chase.</p>

<p><a href="http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/03/28/low-income-residents-get-high-speed-access/%23more-1022"><strong>Internet Archive offers fiber-based service to public housing project:</strong></a> Forget Wi-Fi. How about 100 Mbps to each apartment in a 260-unit project (Valencia Gardens)? That's Brewster Kahle, Internet pioneer and all-around good guy, written large. His efforts intend to put high-speed service into 2,500 units, mostly by the end of the year. The project ties into city-owned fiber, and is routed through the archive's high-speed NOC. With this project and <a href="http://wifinetnews.com/archives/008108.html"><strong>the Meraki Free the Net mesh effort</strong></a>, San Francisco could move out of the status of a developing nation in terms of widespread broadband access.</p>

<p><a href="http://openairboston.net/pilot/index.html"><strong>Boston Wi-Fi project launches:</strong></a> The first pilot project under the direction of Openairboston launched today, with a square mile in Roxbury and Dorchester, passing about 8,000 homes. Service is free for 30 days, then $10 per month thereafter.</p>

<p><a href="http://gigaom.com/2008/03/28/broadband-in-the-boonies-gets-a-boost-new-service-coming/"><strong>Open Range Communications gets $267m loan for rural broadband:</strong></a> The funds are intended to push service into an extraordinary 518 rural areas across 17 states. They've raised $100m privately, too, GigaOm reports. They won't deploy just one set of technology, but will sublet spectrum and use a satellite range for ground service, Om Malik writes.</p>

<p><a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/19/AR2008031903447.html"><strong>Chrysler will put Wi-Fi into cars:</strong></a> Bloomberg News reports that Chrysler intends later this year to offer dealer-installed cellular Internet links in cars. The Chrysler chief for this effort misuses the term Wi-Fi, though, as it's cell data with car drivers required to obtain a cell subscription. The service will move to factory-installed after 2008. There's not much detail on what drivers and passengers will be able to use the service for in this brief article.</p>

<p><a href="http://www.businesswire.com/portal/site/google/?ndmViewId=news_view&amp;newsId=20080331005957&amp;newsLang=en"><strong>Wi-Fi chip shipments dectupled in five years; revenue quintupled:</strong></a> ABI Research notes that 440m Wi-Fi chipsets will ship in 2008, 10 times greater than in 2003. However, revenue is just 5 times higher, which shows how even with more advanced chips in the mix, the race to the bottom continues. Broadcom was the leading vendor in ABI's analysis.</p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 31 Mar 2008 11:53:51 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/wi-fi">wi-fi</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/chrysler">chrysler</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/440m wi-fi chipsets">440m wi-fi chipsets</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/service">service</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/ground service">ground service</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/pilot project">pilot project</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/project">project</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/term wi-fi">term wi-fi</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/push service">push service</category>
      <source url="http://wifinetnews.com/archives/008247.html">Wee-Fi: Topless Meetings; Projects-Fi; Boston Launch; Rural-Fi; Chrysler-Fi; Wi-Fi Chip-Fi</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Harvard University warns graduate students about web hack]]></title>
      <link>http://www.securityratty.com/article/f8e9f01475e7c7289079631255a005d1</link>
      <guid>http://www.securityratty.com/article/f8e9f01475e7c7289079631255a005d1</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: Security Breach

Date Reported
3/12/08

Organization
Harvard University

Contractor/Consultant/Branch
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences

Victims
applicants for admission and...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: <a href="http://technorati.com/tag/security+breach" rel="tag">Security Breach</a><br><br>
<img src="http://breachblog.com/images/95781-88451/harvard.jpg" align="right" height="108" width="109"><span style="font-weight: bold;">Date Reported: </span><br>3/12/08<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Organization: </span><br><a href="http://www.harvard.edu/">Harvard University</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Contractor/Consultant/Branch:</span><br><a href="http://www.gsas.harvard.edu/">Graduate School of Arts and Sciences</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Victims:</span><br>"applicants for admission and housing"<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Number Affected:</span><br>~10,000<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Types of Data:</span><br>"name, Social Security number, date of birth, address, e-mail address, phone numbers, test scores, previous school attended, and school records"<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Breach Description:</span><br>"A Harvard Graduate School of Arts and Sciences (GSAS) Web server that contained summaries of GSAS applicant data for entry to the Fall 2007 academic year, summaries of GSAS housing applicant data for the 2007-08 and 2006-07 academic years, and administrator information was hacked by an outsider and compromised in a way that the data on the server could have been viewed or copied."<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Reference URLs:</span><br><a href="http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/2008/03.13/99-hacked.html">Harvard University Gazette</a> <br><a href="http://www.boston.com/news/education/higher/articles/2008/03/13/harvard_student_applicant_files_breached/">The Boston Globe</a> <br><a href="http://news.bostonherald.com/business/technology/general/view.bg?articleid=1080025&amp;srvc=home&amp;position=also">The Boston Herald</a> <br><a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&amp;sid=a.kZmE2KEB.o&amp;refer=home">Bloomberg</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Report Credit:</span><br>Robert Mitchell and Joe Wrinn, Harvard University Gazette<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Response:</span><br>From the online sources cited above:<br><br>Harvard University notified students at the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences yesterday that their personal information may have been compromised when a hacker hijacked the school's server last month.<br><br>The GSAS site was taken down from Feb. 17 until Feb. 21 in order to investigate the incident and to improve security.<br><br>The University’s initial examination did not reveal the full extent of the hack. As the investigation continued, it became apparent that some sensitive applicant data, including Social Security numbers, could potentially have been accessed.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Without knowing all of the details, it seems like this was a poor incident response.</span><br><br>The University has informed the GSAS community, and has apologized for the error.<br><br>At Harvard’s expense, identity theft recovery services are being made available to the people who might be potentially affected.<br><br>Guarding against hacking is a constant battle as hackers continue to challenge and occasionally breach security systems. Harvard has taken and will continue to take steps to protect its servers as well as possible.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Yes, but this is absolutely no excuse.&nbsp; "Harvard has taken and will continue to take steps to protect its servers"?&nbsp; This is a problem.&nbsp; We don't aim to protect servers, we aim to protect information.</span><br style="font-style: italic;"><br>“Protecting personal information is something Harvard takes seriously, and we are truly sorry for the inconvenience and concern this incident may cause,” said Margot N. Gill, administrative dean of the GSAS.<br><br>“We are notifying and apologizing to the affected individuals and making identity theft recovery services available to them at our expense. Please be assured that we are taking steps to do what we can to prevent future incidents of this kind.”<br><br>The server contained summaries of data from approximately 10,000 applicants for admission and housing that were used by GSAS administrators during the admissions process and to match students with housing.<br><br>There were approximately 6,600 summaries from admissions candidates from the United States consisting of each applicant’s name, Social Security number, date of birth, address, e-mail address, phone numbers, test scores, previous school attended, and school records.<br><br>The remainder of the admissions data did not involve Social Security numbers. There were approximately 500 summaries of housing application data that included Harvard University ID numbers. A small number of housing application summaries (13) contained information about personal health issues such as food allergies.<br><br>Dan Moriarty, Harvard's chief information officer, said the college had strengthened its security system.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Had?&nbsp; How?</span><br><br>"This is really a cautionary tale for anyone in higher education," he said.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] This is really a cautionary tale for people that do not secure confidential personal information properly.&nbsp; Higher education or not.</span><br style="font-style: italic;"><br>``This is really unprofessional, of course, and we're quite upset that something like this would happen at Harvard, of all places,'' said Patrick Hamm, a spokesman for Harvard's Graduate Student Council.<br><br>Harvard discovered the attack Feb. 16 after information from 19 graduate student-housing applications appeared on an Internet site called Pirate Bay that hosts anonymous information, said Daniel Moriarty, the university's chief information officer.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Unreal.&nbsp; The school was not even aware of the breach when it occurred of even shortly after it occurred.</span><br><br>Kyle Brown, president of the Graduate Student Council, said the university's delay in realizing the extent of the hacking was troubling to him. <br><br>`No One Was Really Aware' <br><br>``No one was really aware of the scope,'' said Brown, 21. ``That, in of itself, may indicate a problem with the way Harvard goes about securing information. When someone breaks in, we need to know exactly what was compromised, soon.''<br><br>Because the University could not rule out the possibility that all of the information on this server was copied and distributed more broadly, notifications are being sent to all persons who may have been affected by this incident.<br><br>In situations where applicants’ Social Security numbers or Harvard University ID numbers may have been accessed, the notifications provide contact information for free use of the services provided by Kroll Inc.<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Commentary:</span><br>My first thought was actually a question.&nbsp; Why was this information accessible on or through a web server?&nbsp; I assume that the web server was compromised and through it a back end database was accessible.&nbsp; So fine, this leads me to a more questions.&nbsp; #1, Did the school conduct regular risk and vulnerability assessments and/or penetration tests on servers that collect, process or store confidential information?&nbsp; Unlikely in this case.&nbsp; #2, Why did the school not detect the breach as (or shortly after) it occurred?&nbsp; Information security cannot protect everything, but we can certainly be alerted when something is amiss.<br><br>Judging only from what I have read about this breach, I would have expected much more.<br><br>Lawd knows Hawvahd ain't cheap ya know.<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Past Breaches:</span><br>Unknown<br><br>
<script src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/%7Es/breachblog?i=http://breachblog.com/2008/03/14/harvard.aspx%E2%80%9D%20type=" text="" javascript="" charset="utf-8"></script>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 13 Mar 2008 21:25:51 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/university">university</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/harvard university">harvard university</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/harvard university gazette">harvard university gazette</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/harvard">harvard</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/gsas administrators">gsas administrators</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/gsas">gsas</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/information">information</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/personal information">personal information</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/gsas site">gsas site</category>
      <source url="http://breachblog.com/2008/03/14/harvard.aspx">Harvard University warns graduate students about web hack</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Cashing in on employee theft, or honest whistleblower?]]></title>
      <link>http://www.securityratty.com/article/6220385518c92bd41671151d57327dcd</link>
      <guid>http://www.securityratty.com/article/6220385518c92bd41671151d57327dcd</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: Security Breach

Date Reported
2/22/08

Organization
LGT Group - The Wealth and Asset Management Group of the Princely House of Liechtenstein
English Version
German Version
French...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: <a href="http://technorati.com/tag/security+breach" rel="tag">Security Breach</a><br><br>
<img src="http://breachblog.com/images/95781-88451/lgt.jpg" align="right" height="67" width="71"><font size="2"><span style="font-weight: bold;">Date Reported: </span><br>2/22/08<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Organization: </span><br>LGT Group - The Wealth and Asset Management Group of the Princely House of Liechtenstein<br><a target="_blank" href="http://www.lgt.com/en/index.html">English Version</a> <br><a target="_blank" href="http://www.lgt.com/de/index.html">German Version</a> <br><a target="_blank" href="http://www.lgt.com/fr/index.html">French Version</a> <br><a target="_blank" href="http://www.lgt.com/it/index.html">Italian Version</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Contractor/Consultant/Branch:</span><br>LGT Treuhand AG<br>(LGT Trust Ltd in English)<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Victims:</span><br>Clients of LGT Trust (prior to 2002)<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Number Affected:</span><br>~1,400*<br><br><font size="1">*there may be an additional 4,527 beneficiaries affected.</font><br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Types of Data:</span><br>Confidential bank account information.<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Breach Description:</span><br>Confidential customer information was stolen from LGT Trust in 2002 by a former employee of the company.&nbsp; As a result of this breach, Heinrich Kieber was convicted of "serious fraud, dangerous threats, unlawful compulsion, and suppression of documents."&nbsp; Now it appears that German authorities paid Mr. Kieber "as much as 5 million euros ($7.4 million)" for information about German account holders for the purpose of investigating tax evaders.&nbsp; Other countries that are interested in the information allegedly stolen by Mr. Kieber include the United Kingdom (U.K.), the United States (U.S.), Australia and others.&nbsp; Mr. Kieber now has a new identity (possibly as part of the arrangement with Germany) and his whereabouts are unknown.<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Reference URL:</span><br><a target="_blank" href="http://www.lgt.com/export/sites/inta_lgtcom/_news/attachments/080224_LGT_Media_Release_en.pdf">LGT Group Media Communique dated 2/24/08</a> <br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Highly recommended interesting read</span><br><a target="_blank" href="http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,23276025-601,00.html">The Australian online news story</a> <br><a target="_blank" href="http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601085&amp;sid=atBBrvCnsT6w&amp;refer=europe">Bloomberg.com online news story</a> <br><a target="_blank" href="http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/uk-authorities-have-liechtenstein-tax/story.aspx?guid=%7BC132E3BB-306E-46C9-B4D0-37F2CBD5C4A2%7D">MarketWatch online news story</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Report Credit:</span><br>Chad Thomas, Bloomberg.com<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Response:</span><br>From the online sources cited above:<br><br>For LGT Group, all the facts now point - despite contradictory statements form sources said to be close to the German intelligence service - to the fact that the data material illegally disclosed to the German authorities is limited, in as far as LGT is concerned, to the client data stolen from LGT Treuhand in 2002.<br><br>Even though other rumors have been circulated about the occurrences, LGT Group is assuming on the basis of numerous indications that the person, who illegally passed the data on to the German intelligence service, is the same former employee of LGT Treuhand who stole the data in 2002.<br><br>Apparently, the stolen data material has also been illegally disclosed, directly or indirectly, to other authorities.&nbsp; According to reports in the media, the previously convicted offender was paid a sum of several millions for the information and was provided with a new identity.<br><br>this is a possibility that law firms were interposed as intermediaries.&nbsp; LGT will now re-register its report of a criminal offence committed by a person unknown directly against the convicted data thief.<br><br>approximately 1,400 client relationships with LGT Treuhand, which were established before the end of 2002.&nbsp; The largest proportion, about 600 clients, are resident in Germany.&nbsp; The figure circulated in the media of 4,527 sets of data represents the number of beneficiaries of all the foundations<br><br>it has become increasingly clear that the so-called "informant" of the BND German intelligence service is indeed the same convicted data thief who illegally disclosed the client data in 2002<br><br>Acting on the information, German authorities raided the home of one of the country's most high-profile executives, the chief executive of Deutsche Post AG, alleging he evaded paying about E1 million in taxes.<br><br>The government, which paid as much as 5 million euros ($7.4 million) for information on German account holders in Liechtenstein on a disk provided by an informant to the Federal Intelligence Service, or BND, will share this information with other countries, the finance ministry said today.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] You mean to tell me that its possible (and acceptable) to steal confidential corporate information and sell it for big bucks?&nbsp; German authorities paid over $12,000 per record (7,400,000/600)!&nbsp; The question is, is this an informant or a data thief cashing in?</span><br><br>U.K. tax collectors, after initially turning up their nose at an informant's offer to sell them confidential data from a Liechtenstein bank, have now paid up and have information on about 100 wealthy British subjects<br><br>they were persuaded to pay the informant around 100,000 pounds only after Berlin tax officials launched in recent weeks a high-profile crackdown on Germans with money said to be stowed away in Liechtenstein<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] The UK got a deal.&nbsp; They only paid ~$2,000 per record.</span><br><br>Australian authorities have been given details of Australian clients of Liechtensteinische Landesbank (LL<img src="http://breachblog.com/emoticons/cool.png" border="0" />, according to reports in the Wall Street Journal and Guardian newspapers.<br><br>"The Australian Tax Office does not pay for information about tax schemes," an ATO spokeswoman said. "Nonetheless, we have a good flow of information from people concerned about fairness and equity in the tax system."<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] The best deal of all.&nbsp; Australia got the stolen information for free!</span><br><br>The former employee, who was convicted of the data theft, is a Liechtenstein citizen named Heinrich Kieber (HK).<br><br>He was active from October 1999 as an external employee of an IT-company, and from April 2001 to November 2002 as an employee of LGT Treuhand.&nbsp; At the time of his recruitment and during his employment with LGT Treuhand, he had not been previously convicted of a crime.&nbsp; However, as would become known later, an arrest warrant had been issued against HK, which was not accessible for examination during the standard checks carried out on new employees.<br><br>This arrest warrant was linked to a real estate deal in Spain in 1996, which HK had allegedly financed with uncovered checks, and was issued by the Spanish criminal prosecution authorities in 1997, firstly at national and subsequently at international level.<br><br>It has been reported that he (Heinrich Kieber)&nbsp; has been given a new identity and is living in Australia.<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Commentary:</span><br>This is a very intriguing story and one that will take a while to shake out.&nbsp; I am a little torn by the series of events, and struggle with the ethics of it all.&nbsp; I don't think Heinrich Kieber is any kind of hero by any means.&nbsp; I think he is a common thief that just received a huge payday. <br><br>A couple of questions to think about:<br></font><ul><li><font size="2">Do you think Heinrich Kieber is lucky criminal, or do you think he is an honest "informant" and "whistleblower"?&nbsp; <br></font></li><li><font size="2">If he were truly an honest guy, why would he shop the confidential information around like he did and not give it freely?</font></li><li>Do you think this story will encourage other insiders to follow suit?<br></li></ul><font size="2"><br>On one hand authorities catch criminals, which is great!&nbsp; On the other hand, we just enabled (and in some circles encouraged) insider criminal activity and potentially employee fraud.&nbsp; Read the <a target="_blank" href="http://www.lgt.com/export/sites/inta_lgtcom/_news/attachments/080224_LGT_Media_Release_en.pdf">LGT Group Media Communique</a>, it is very interesting stuff. <br><br>Past Breaches:<br>Unknown</font><br><br>
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      <pubDate>Mon, 25 Feb 2008 11:03:19 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/confidential">confidential</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/confidential data">confidential data</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/kieber">kieber</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/named heinrich kieber">named heinrich kieber</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/lgt">lgt</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/lgt trust">lgt trust</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/data">data</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/confidential information">confidential information</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/information">information</category>
      <source url="http://breachblog.com/2008/02/25/lgt.aspx">Cashing in on employee theft, or honest whistleblower?</source>
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    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Locked Call Boxes and Banned Geiger Counters]]></title>
      <link>http://www.securityratty.com/article/251135e013a350fa030edda5ad7d7e66</link>
      <guid>http://www.securityratty.com/article/251135e013a350fa030edda5ad7d7e66</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[According to Fire Engineering magazine, one reason for the slow response to the Great Chicago Fire of 1871 was that fire alarms were kept locked to prevent false alarms: Q: Prior to 1870, street...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>According to <i>Fire Engineering</i> magazine, one reason for the slow response to the Great Chicago Fire of 1871 was that <a href="http://www.fireengineering.com/articles/article_display.html?id=136064">fire alarms were kept locked</a> to prevent false alarms:</p>

<blockquote>Q: Prior to 1870, street corner fire alarm pull boxes were kept locked. Why were they kept locked and how did a person gain access to 'pull the box?'

<p>A: They were kept locked due to false alarms. Nearby shopkeepers or beat cops carried the keys.</blockquote></p>

<p><a href="http://www.amazon.com/Great-Chicago-Fire-Illinois/dp/155853265X/">Here's</a> Robert Cromie, writing in <i>The Great Chicago Fire</i> (Thomas Nelson: 1994), page 33:</p>

<blockquote>William Lee, the O'Leary's neighbor, rushed into Goll's drugstore, and gasped out a request for the key to the alarm box.  The new boxes were attached to the walls of stores or other convenient locations.  To prevent false alarms and crank calls, the boxes were locked, and the keys given to trustworthy citizens nearby.

<p>What happened when Lee made his request is not clear.  Only one fact emerges from the confusion:  No alarm was registered from any box in the vicinity of the fire until it was too late to do any good.</blockquote></p>

<p>Apparently, Lee said that Goll refused to give him the key because he'd already seen a fire engine go past; Goll said he actually did pull the alarm, twice, but if so it must not have worked.</p>

<p>(There's more about what sounds like a really bad communications failure, but it's a little too hard for me to read on the Amazon website.)</p>

<p><a href="http://urbanlegends.about.com/od/pockettales/a/firefighters.htm">Here's more</a>:</p>

<blockquote>But did you know that the fire burned for over half an hour before an alarm was ever sounded? Alarm boxes were actually kept locked in those days, to prevent false alarms!

<p>When the first alarm box was finally opened and the lever pulled, the alarm somehow did not get through. The fire dispatcher was playing a guitar for a couple of girls at the time and he kept on serenely strumming, completely unawares. After the fire had been growing and blazing for nearly an hour a watchman screamed at the dispatcher to sound an alarm, which he did, and the first three engines, two hose wagons, and two hook and ladders were sent out -- but in the wrong direction!</p>

<p>At first the dispatcher refused to sound another alarm, hoping to avoid further confusion.</blockquote></p>

<p>Compare this with a proposed law in New York City that will require people to <a href="http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/01/08/a-license-to-check-for-wmds/">get a license</a> before they can buy chemical, biological, or radiological attack detectors:</p>

<blockquote>The legislation — which was proposed by the Bloomberg administration and would be the first of its kind in the nation — would empower the police commissioner to decide whether to grant a free five-year permit to individuals and companies seeking to "possess or deploy such detectors." Common smoke alarms and carbon monoxide detectors would not be covered by the law, the Police Department said. Violations of the law would be considered a misdemeanor. 

<p>Why does the administration think such a law is necessary? <a href="http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/administration/counter_terrorism_co.shtml">Richard A. Falkenrath</a>, the Police Department’s deputy commissioner for counterterrorism, told the Council’s Public Safety Committee at a hearing today, "Our mutual goal is to prevent false alarms and unnecessary public concern by making sure that we know where these detectors are located and that they conform to standards of quality and reliability."</p>

<p>The law would also require anyone using such a detector -- regardless of whether they have obtained the required permit -- to notify the Police Department if the detector alerted them to a biological, chemical or radiological agent. “In this way, emergency response personnel will be able to assess threats and take appropriate action based on the maximum information available,” Dr. Falkenrath said.</blockquote></p>

<p>False positives are a problem with any detection system, and certainly putting Geiger counters in the hands of everyone will mean a lot of amateurs calling false alarms into the police.  But the way to handle that isn't to ban Geiger counters.  (Just as the way to deal with false fire alarms 100 yeras ago wasn't to lock the alarm boxes.)  The way to deal with it is by 1) putting a system in place to quickly separate the real alarms from the false alarms, and 2) prosecuting those who maliciously sound false alarms.</p><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=9tUPPZD"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=9tUPPZD" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=cfskOpD"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=cfskOpD" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=SxU8TsD"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=SxU8TsD" border="0"></img></a>
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      <pubDate>Fri, 18 Jan 2008 04:44:31 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/boxes">boxes</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/false fire alarms">false fire alarms</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/fire">fire</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/fire alarms">fire alarms</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/false alarms">false alarms</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/prevent false alarms">prevent false alarms</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/alarm boxes">alarm boxes</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/alarm">alarm</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/chicago fire">chicago fire</category>
      <source url="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/01/locked_fire_box.html">Locked Call Boxes and Banned Geiger Counters</source>
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      <title><![CDATA[A downside to being a Billionaire]]></title>
      <link>http://www.securityratty.com/article/d4b02ee119f372cc4722b1e0f50eb642</link>
      <guid>http://www.securityratty.com/article/d4b02ee119f372cc4722b1e0f50eb642</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I guess the grass isn't always greener on the other side. Even if the other side is you having a couple billion dollars. I dug into the archives for this post by Ed Dickson, which described how NYC...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="http://bp2.blogger.com/_jCJICLQ1WVs/RuMWgzaiV9I/AAAAAAAAARM/s1WbfS3cqEA/s320/michael_bloomberg.jpg"><img style="margin: 0pt 10px 10px 0pt; float: left; cursor: pointer; width: 200px;" src="http://bp2.blogger.com/_jCJICLQ1WVs/RuMWgzaiV9I/AAAAAAAAARM/s1WbfS3cqEA/s320/michael_bloomberg.jpg" alt="" border="0" /></a><br />I guess the grass isn't always greener on the other side. Even if the other side is you having a couple billion dollars. I dug into the archives for this post by Ed Dickson, which described how <a href="http://fraudwar.blogspot.com/2007/10/how-was-mayor-bloombergs-bofa-account.html">NYC Mayor Bloomberg was victimized twice</a>, almost simultaneously, by thieves trying to get at his multi-billion dollar wallet.<br /><br />Check out Ed's post for the details, but let's take a quick look at what we can learn from these attacks. The first was a pretty standard check counterfeiting attack. Not much you can do about that. If someone gets a copy of your check, with the routing number and account number, then they can produce a likeness that could be accepted by any number of merchants out there.<br /><br />The banks invest a lot in anti-counterfeiting marks on the checks, but in the end it's up to the merchant and your bank as to whether they will accept the fake. Most of the time they won't, but other times they may. That's why it's so important for you to keep on top of your finances and check your balances daily. Then you'll know if unauthorized charges are showing up. This is discussed in detail in Step 6 of <a href="http://www.securitymike.com/">Security Mike's Guide to Internet Security</a>.<br /><br />The second attack involved the criminal logging into Mr. Mayor's bank account and transferring money to a 3rd party financial institution. How did someone get his login and password? Who knows? It could have been anything. This is another example where staying on top of your account balances would have shown a weird transfer and you could have investigated it.<br /><br />I'm sure Bloomberg has people to look into this. That's how they found the issues and with a high profile victim like the Mayor, the banks and law enforcement will work hard to bring the perpetrators to justice.  It makes for good PR. I'm sure the bank also returned the money right where they found it, and no one but the criminals are any worse for wear.<br /><br />So I guess the grass is greener after all for the Billionaires out there. If it's not, you certainly can afford a lot of spray paint, sod or whatever else you want to use to make your grass seem greener.<div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/SecurityMike?a=xLYP6pC"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/SecurityMike?i=xLYP6pC" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/SecurityMike?a=3caoD7c"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/SecurityMike?i=3caoD7c" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/SecurityMike?a=JnZvmdc"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/SecurityMike?i=JnZvmdc" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/SecurityMike/~4/194579717" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 03 Dec 2007 12:51:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/account">account</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/bank account">bank account</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/pretty standard check">pretty standard check</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/check">check</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/nyc mayor bloomberg">nyc mayor bloomberg</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/bloomberg">bloomberg</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/mayor">mayor</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/bank">bank</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/greener">greener</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/SecurityMike/~3/194579717/downside-to-being-billionaire.html">A downside to being a Billionaire</source>
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      <title><![CDATA[Do you use Bloomberg for Risk Measurement?]]></title>
      <link>http://www.securityratty.com/article/9f5b342c779060f94e34913f60ec58c8</link>
      <guid>http://www.securityratty.com/article/9f5b342c779060f94e34913f60ec58c8</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Bloomberg is holding a Market Risk Seminar this month. But before the details, here are my comments

I've attended Bloomberg seminars before and there is usually a sales pitch somewhere. Looking at...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<strong>Bloomberg</strong> is holding a <strong>Market Risk Seminar </strong>this month. But before the details, here are my comments.<br /><br />I've attended Bloomberg seminars before and there is usually a sales pitch somewhere. Looking at the event's lineup of speakers, 4 out of 5 speakers are from Bloomberg (an Algo risk solution is embedded in Bloomberg). Although the topics may sound relevant, they're just intro material to Bloomberg functionalities and add-on services. For those looking for risk management solutions for their organization and looking to comply with Basel II, Bloomberg will present itself as a viable option in this seminar. Bloomberg would more likely say: "Since you are already Bloomberg users, why not leverage on your subscription and use our built-in risk solutions (at an added cost of course)?"<br /><br /><p>Generally, practitioners I know would trust Bloomberg in a majority of the <em>raw</em> figures that they give out. But when it comes to <em>calculations</em>, some would take them with a <em>grain of salt</em>. Personally, I find the risk solutions of Bloomberg to be less than adequate for the following reasons:</p><ul><li>Limited instrument coverage</li><li>Not flexible</li><li>Lack of transparency (Black Box)</li></ul><p>But of course, it would never hurt to sit in a Bloomberg seminar and learn best practice (if ever they are presented) and to discover some new things that our <em>beloved</em> system has to offer.</p><p>And now for the seminar details.</p><p><strong>Topics</strong>: </p><ul><li>Importance of Market Risk Management</li><li>Risk measures for fixed income securities and derivatives</li><li>Reliable data for your risk management systems</li><li>Market risk management in alignment with Basel Accord</li><li>Algo Risk on Bloomberg - a pre-integrated, real time market risk solution</li></ul><p><strong>Speakers</strong>:</p><ul><li>Nestor A. Espenilla, Jr. - Deputy Governor, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas</li><li>Seet Kok Leong - Head of Algo Risk (Asia Pacific), Algorithmics</li><li>Jiten Bhanap - Product Specialist, Bloomberg L.P.</li><li>Ivan Koh - Regional Data Solutions Manager, Bloomberg L.P.</li><li>Neo Siang Noi - Trading Systems Sales Specialist, Bloomberg L.P.</li></ul><p><strong>Date</strong>:</p><p align="center">15 August 2006</p><p><strong>Venue</strong>:</p><p align="center">Makati Shangri-la Manila, Ayala Avenue corner Makati Avenue, Makati City 1200, Philippines</p><p><strong>Time</strong>:</p><p align="center">9:30am - 2:00 pm</p><p><strong>Registration</strong>:</p><p align="center">BU<go> on Bloomberg</go></p><p align="center">email: <a href="mailto:awang@bloomberg.net">awang@bloomberg.net</a></p><p align="center">tel: +63 2 849 7100 loc. 4794</p><br />*Lunch will be served<br /><br />Tags: <a href="http://technorati.com/tag/finance" tag="ref">finance</a> <a href="http://technorati.com/tag/derivatives" tag="ref">derivatives</a> <a href="http://technorati.com/tag/market+risk" tag="ref">market risk</a> <a href="http://technorati.com/tag/risk+management" tag="ref">risk management</a> <a href="http://technorati.com/tag/bloomberg" tag="ref">bloomberg</a> <a href="http://technorati.com/tag/seminars" tag="ref">seminars</a> <a href="http://technorati.com/tag/courses" tag="ref">courses</a><br /><br /><br /><p></p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sun, 06 Aug 2006 23:41:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/bloomberg">bloomberg</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/bloomberg users">bloomberg users</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/trust bloomberg">trust bloomberg</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/bloomberg seminar">bloomberg seminar</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/bloomberg seminars">bloomberg seminars</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/bloomberg functionalities">bloomberg functionalities</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/details">details</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/seminar details">seminar details</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/seminar">seminar</category>
      <source url="http://rmquant.blogspot.com/2006/08/do-you-use-bloomberg-for-risk.html">Do you use Bloomberg for Risk Measurement?</source>
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