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    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: cars]]></title>
    <link>http://www.securityratty.com/tag/cars</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Wed, 18 Jun 2008 09:13:26 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Game on!]]></title>
      <link>http://www.securityratty.com/article/811075c6e59d5ec00b606569ae49ba5d</link>
      <guid>http://www.securityratty.com/article/811075c6e59d5ec00b606569ae49ba5d</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[In my last blog, we looked at increasing complexity on the part of both the good guys who are building legitimate businesses and on the part of the bad guys who are building a dark network of sorts...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In my last blog, we looked at  increasing complexity on the part of both the &ldquo;good&rdquo; guys who are building  legitimate businesses and on the part of the &ldquo;bad guys&rdquo; who are building a  &ldquo;dark network&rdquo; of sorts that is remarkably like the first.&nbsp; Today, I&rsquo;d like to dig into that and look at  a system for explaining this; and I thought I&rsquo;d use the phrase we used playing  street hockey in my youth in <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canada">Canada</a> when the cars cleared the road, and  the game got serious again: <B>game on!</b>...</p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 04 Nov 2008 21:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/game">game</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/bad guys">bad guys</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/guys">guys</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/dark network">dark network</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/street hockey">street hockey</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/system">system</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/youth">youth</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/complexity">complexity</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/cars">cars</category>
      <source url="http://www.rsa.com/blog/blog_entry.aspx?id=1380">Game on!</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Movie-Plot Threat: Terrorists Using Twitter]]></title>
      <link>http://www.securityratty.com/article/31ccaa1220f62cfe9008fd043b4179f8</link>
      <guid>http://www.securityratty.com/article/31ccaa1220f62cfe9008fd043b4179f8</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[No , really . ( Commentary here
This is just ridiculous. Of course the bad guys will use all the communications tools available to the rest of us. They have to communicate, after all. They'll also use...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://www.computerweekly.com/Articles/2008/10/28/232944/terrorists-could-use-twitter-for-attacks-says-us-intelligence.htm">No<a/>, <a href="http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/mobile.pdf"> really</a>.  (<a href="http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2008/10/twitter.html">Commentary</a> <a href="http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/10/terrorist-cell.html">here</a>.)</p>

<p>This is just ridiculous.  Of course the bad guys will use all the communications tools available to the rest of us. They have to communicate, after all.  They'll also use cars, water faucets, and all-you-can-eat buffet lunches.  So what?</p>

<p>This commentary is dead on:</p>

<blockquote>Steven Aftergood, a veteran intelligence analyst at the Federation of the American Scientists, doesn't dismiss the Army presentation out of hand. But nor does he think it's tackling a terribly seriously threat. "Red-teaming exercises to anticipate adversary operations are fundamental. But they need to be informed by a sense of what's realistic and important and what's not," he tells Danger Room. "If we have time to worry about 'Twitter threats' then we're in good shape. I mean, it's important to keep some sense of proportion."</blockquote><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=XrBFM"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=XrBFM" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=If9PM"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=If9PM" border="0"></img></a>
</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 30 Oct 2008 04:51:13 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/veteran intelligence analyst">veteran intelligence analyst</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/all-you-can-eat buffet lunches">all-you-can-eat buffet lunches</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/bad guys">bad guys</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/tells danger">tells danger</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/commentary">commentary</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/army presentation">army presentation</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/adversary operations">adversary operations</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/twitter threats">twitter threats</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/water faucets">water faucets</category>
      <source url="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/10/movie-plot_thre_1.html">Movie-Plot Threat: Terrorists Using Twitter</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Interop NY: IT Roundtable]]></title>
      <link>http://www.securityratty.com/article/4137ad5ff76308605c9861b27c7d0404</link>
      <guid>http://www.securityratty.com/article/4137ad5ff76308605c9861b27c7d0404</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[This session is a bit different than the usual sessions at Interop. It provides insights from three CIOs in three different industries
Moderator: Jim Metzler, Vice President, Ashton, Metzler &amp;...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This session is a bit different than the usual sessions at Interop. It provides insights from three CIOs in three different industries.</p>
<ul>
<li>Moderator: Jim Metzler, Vice President, Ashton, Metzler &amp; Associates</li>
<li>Rowan Snyder, CIO, KPMG</li>
<li>David Michael, CIO, United Business Media Group</li>
<li>Joanna Young, Chief Information Officer, Corporate Information Systems &amp; Enterprise Services, Liberty Mutual</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Jim: Is the CIO a technical job anymore? For example, inside Liberty there are business projects with an IT component.</strong></p>
<p><strong>Joanna:</strong> We are organized to partner with internal business clients or vendors who provide objectives and business requirements. We strive to figure out the smallest amount of an IT investment we can make to get this to work.</p>
<p><strong>Rowan:</strong> We have both. Part of the dilemma is that the thing that sells the best is fear. I don&#8217;t want to use that to get business.</p>
<p><strong>Joanna:</strong> One good example is security from an application perspective. It&#8217;s hard to talk about security investments in business terms. We put it into terms like &#8220;this is what it will cost us if we DON&#8217;T do this.&#8221; For example, a solution for spam required us to do research into what it was costing us overall. Once we put it together, the business was all for it. You have to put your business hat on and think &#8220;how can I make this important for a businessperson?&#8221; If you can&#8217;t, you may need to ask yourself why you&#8217;re pushing services on them that they may not need.</p>
<p><strong>Jim: Can you give us insight into business-IT alignment? What about governance?</strong></p>
<p><strong>Rowan:</strong> Governance is the hardest part of IT. It&#8217;s not like the technology is easy. If it&#8217;s a business project with an IT component, I don&#8217;t usually get involved. It comes down to overall budget. The infrastructure we own and let people know exactly what it will cost to do it. We are a distributed IT firm, there are multiple groups. This is the most distributed and risk-prone organization I&#8217;ve worked in. It can be difficult for the business to exert control. It demonstrates risk, in security, compliance, methodologies, etc.</p>
<p><strong>Joanna:</strong> Governance has become a word that nobody wants to use. It suddenly implies that IT is the holder of all the money and they are the ones that get to decide. We stopped using that word and position IT as a strategic business partner.</p>
<p><strong>David:</strong> We have a highly decentralized IT set-up. We have about 600 globally and around 40 in the headquarters. We have 10 CIOs for each division, and within each division it is decentralized. We try to run each unit as autonomous. This is a close alignment with IT and business. However, then the problem of how do you have commonality between divisions and collaboration?</p>
<p><strong>Jim: How can you minimize risk in distributed environment using standards and procedures?</strong></p>
<p><strong>David:</strong> The reality is it can be impractical for an organization. You end up with a patchwork of platforms and technologies. We have to accept that we&#8217;ll have multiple solutions. We can attempt to push a standard, but overall have a much more relaxed approach to manage everything. There is a lot of equality between divisions in what they can choose to purchase.</p>
<p><strong>Joanna:</strong> Standards are easier to apply the further down the staff you are. The most important thing with any of this is to understand why you are making the decisions. If there is a process and pros and cons are identified, there is a clear record of why decisions were made.</p>
<p><strong>Audience Poll: Everyone raised their hand that MORE standards were needed</strong>.</p>
<p><strong>Audience Question: Are there inefficiencies in the data center in terms of energy and green IT? What are you doing about it?</strong></p>
<p><strong>Joanna:</strong> Everyone focuses on cars for carbon footprints. But, it&#8217;s really buildings&#8230;and then data centers. The data center has the same importance as any other efficiency. They need to be running as cheaply as possible. Corporations have a responsibility to make sure they are energy efficient.</p>
<p><strong>Rowan:</strong> We recently did a carbon footprint analysis, and found that half of carbon comes from electricity, with half of that from the data center.</p>
<p><strong>David:</strong> Every company does have a responsibility to look at its carbon emission globally. Consider international travel, flying, etc. As much as possible, we are not building data centers. We are using other people&#8217;s data centers in an effort to get out of the data center business.</p>
<p><strong>Audience Question: How do you balance the good from standards with agile development and possible roadblocks?</strong></p>
<p><strong>Joanna:</strong> Luckily agile development is under the CIO&#8217;s control. You can see the lifecycle and savings that occur. When I look, I check what the standards are that I&#8217;m measuring by.</p>
<p><strong>Jim: Does web 2.0 have any business meaning in your environment? If so, what are you doing about it?</strong></p>
<p><strong>Joanna:</strong> I&#8217;ve been in IT for 20 years. It&#8217;s another component to business IT investment, and has to be presented as such. As IT professionals we have a responsibility to identify what Web 2.0 is, and then translate to see if there is anything the company should be doing with it. Monitor it based on your current portfolio, and consider its impact.</p>
<p><strong>David:</strong> It&#8217;s pretty important to our business as a media company. I don&#8217;t think it means one thing, it&#8217;s a term people use to talk about the web and what&#8217;s going on online. From mobile, to ajax, cloud computing or mashups - you can draw multiple conclusions. More and more business is being done online. We have a lot of growth opportunities online.</p>
<p><strong>Rowan:</strong> Compliance, security, and privacy issues just explode with Web 2.0.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 17 Sep 2008 15:45:01 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/business">business</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/terms">terms</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/data center business">data center business</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/data center">data center</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/business terms">business terms</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/business projects">business projects</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/business-it alignment">business-it alignment</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/internal business clients">internal business clients</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/business hat">business hat</category>
      <source url="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/interop-ny-it-roundtable/09/2008">Interop NY: IT Roundtable</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Assets Good Until Reached For]]></title>
      <link>http://www.securityratty.com/article/b4259e9d1ccfa754480b062e7acb4e32</link>
      <guid>http://www.securityratty.com/article/b4259e9d1ccfa754480b062e7acb4e32</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[A few months back Minyanville wondered whether this subprime mess would end up as a cancer or a car crash. Guess we know the answer now. The question is - should we be at all surprised? Some smart...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><span style="white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">A few months back </span></span><a href="http://www.minyanville.com/articles/football-bears-bulls-Credit-equities-fannie/index/a/18769"><span style="font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">Minyanville</span></span></a><span style="white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;"> wondered whether this subprime mess would end up as a cancer or a car crash. Guess we know the answer now. The question is - should we be at all surprised?

Some smart folks have been warning for a long time. Warren Buffett famously called derivatives financial weapons of mass destruction.</span></span></p><div><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">Charlie Munger, as he is wont to do, went a bit further (from 2004):</span></span></div><div><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;"><br /></span></span></div><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="color: #222222; line-height: 20px; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">I think a good litmus test of the mental and moral quality at any large institution [with significant derivatives exposure] would be to ask them, &quot;Do you really understand your derivatives book?&quot; Anyone who says yes is either crazy or lying.</span></span></p></blockquote><div><span style="white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">
</span></span><div><span style="white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">They have many other statements in the same direction, based on their own experience from buying companies that used deriviatives where they were unable to to unwind the books and figure out who owed who. At the last Berkshire Hathaway annual meeting someone asked Charlie Munger what we could learn from past blow ups about the present crisis</span></span></div><div><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;"><br /></span></span></div><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 20px; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">It was a particularly foolish mess. We talked about an idiot in the credit delivery grocery business, Webvan. Internet based delivery service for groceries -- that was smarter than what happened in mortgage business. I wish we had those Webvan people back.</span></span></p></blockquote><div><div><span style="white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">
What can we learn from all this?
<br /></span></span></div><div><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">Well Dan Geer launched a revolution with his </span></span><a href="http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/risks/20.06.html"><span style="font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">famous speech</span></span></a><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;"> about risk management. He got the big picture part right on the security industry evolving into more risk management practices, however the examples we assumed that were right at the time, the financial industry are proving wrong. For one thing you can&#39;t manage a risk if you don&#39;t know the assets (back to Charlie Munger, emphasis added):</span></span></div><div><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;"><br /></span></span></div></div></div><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 20px; "><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 20px; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">It is crazy to allow things to get too big to fail, run with knavery. As an industry, there is a crazy culture of greed and overreaching and overconfidence trading algorithms. It is demented to allow derivative trading such that clearance risks are embedded in system. Assets are all “good until reached for” on balance sheets. We had $400m of that at general re, </span></span><span style="font-weight: bold; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">“good until reached for”</span></span><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 20px; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">. In drug business you must prove it is good. It is a crazy culture, and to some extent an evil culture. Accounting people really failed us. Accounting standards ought to be dealt with like engineering standards.</span></span></span></p></blockquote><div><div><div><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">So, yes it is about risk management, but if you build too many abstractions on top of your assets through derivative accounting and such you may find you don&#39;t have any assets when you need them. Don&#39;t fall in love with your abstractions, </span></span><a href="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/04/security-rules.html"><span style="font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">manage your assets</span></span></a><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">.</span></span></div><div><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">There are some clear lessons for us in Information Security, err I mean Information Risk Management.</span></span></div><div><span style="font-size: 12px; white-space: pre-wrap; "><span style="white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">
</span></span><span style="font-style: italic; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">Margin of safety</span></span><span style="white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">
Its our job to manage risk, but this doesn&#39;t mean that we have to build layers and layer of abstraction on top of it. It also means that we help to design, build, deploy, and operate systems with margins of safety. Understanding the failure modes and accounting for this in design. Developers (because they are supposed to) and architects (because they haven&#39;t been properly trained) focus on functional requirements, building features, but on security not so much. There are many ways to improve security in a system and they are all inadequate by themselves, but we can help find </span></span></span><a href="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2007/06/cost_effective_.html"><span style="font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">cost effective improvements</span></span></a><span style="white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">. </span></span></div><div><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="font-size: 12px; white-space: pre-wrap; "><span style="font-style: italic; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">Don&#39;t fall in love with abstractions</span></span><span style="white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">
</span></span></span></div><div><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">If you have a 100,000 dekstops or 100,000 servers it hard to manage. You will need to automate and to do that you need to abstract, but you should also realize that its a drawing on a whiteboard not reality. You need </span></span><a href="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2005/12/the_road_to_ass.html"><span style="font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">abstraction assurance</span></span></a><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">.&#160;</span></span></div><div><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;"><br /></span></span></div><div><a href="https://financialcryptography.com/"><span style="font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">Ian Grigg</span></span></a><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;"> </span></span><a href="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/09/if-a-tree-falls-in-someone-elses-silo.html#comments"><span style="font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">commented</span></span></a><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;"> on an earlier post</span></span></div><div><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;"><br /></span></span></div></div></div><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 19px; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">There are distinct parallels between phishing / retail payments, and the bigger investment mess. In both cases, banks would argue these are core business. In both cases, they have applied risk-based security models, and accepted some loss. In both cases, they have the ability to apply substantial experience to the monitoring, allocating and absorbing risks and losses.</span></span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 19px; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;"><br /></span></span><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 19px; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">In both cases, they watched and did nothing as the risks started from low, and migrated upwards. Are we at the point where regulation has killed the ability of banks to apply their (arguable) one core skill, to whit, risk-based analysis? Are banks that far out of banking that they no longer have it?</span></span></p></blockquote><div><div><div><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">So you have to remember that top down and bottom up need to be combined.</span></span></div><div><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="font-size: 12px; line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; "><span style="font-style: italic; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">Design for failure</span></span></span></div><div><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">Dan Geer has also told the story that he sat in a large bank&#39;s risk management training, and the trainer said &quot;you may wonder why this works so well. it works because there is zero ambiguity over who owns what risk.&quot; Dan&#39;s thought was - &quot;in my field we have nothing but ambiguity.&quot; Turns out the second part was right, we have nothing but ambiguity over who owns what risk; unfortunately the financial people have much more ambiguity than they thought! So we do have a lesson here after all, and it this - when the thing you thought was true isn&#39;t, the failure mode is very ugly. </span></span><a href="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2006/01/design_for_fail.html"><span style="font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">Design for failure - a</span></span></a><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">dd layers of protection. </span></span><span style="font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="font-size: 12px; white-space: pre-wrap; "><span style="font-style: italic; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">Keep it simple.</span></span></span></div><div><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">They have some smart engineers at Google to be sure, but even they had </span></span><a href="http://www.identityblog.com/?p=1011"><span style="font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">incredibly basic errors in their SSO</span></span></a><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">. I have seen other obvious fails like people signing WS-Security messages, and the recipient checks for a signature but not if they trust the signer! There are so many ways to shoot yourself in the foot in a loosely coupled systems, and we have so many abstractions layered on top of each other, part of the mantra of protecting assets has to be keeping it simple.</span></span></div><div><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">So that is my list, to do all these things it requires that Infosec get in the game, understand the use cases, understand the business value (it should be abundantly clear that you can&#39;t simply rely on &quot;business people&quot; to be &quot;business experts&quot;), and that you not lose sight of the asset amidst all the abstraction. Finally, the systems we build security on are very primitive, a firewall and SSL are fine, a seatbelt was fine in 1935 and its still fine today, but there are lots of other safety controls in cars. ABS, airbags, traction control, they all protect the assets far better than in 1935, that&#39;s what we need to build.</span></span></div><div><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">Anyone can make bad assumptions (assume you know who owns what risk) and its easy to make bad abstractions (the firewall protects the information system), but when you combine bad assumptions with bad abstractions you&#39;ll get assets that are good until reached for sooner or later</span></span></div></div></div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 15 Sep 2008 05:41:43 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/risk management">risk management</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/information risk management">information risk management</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/risk management practices">risk management practices</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/risk">risk</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/assets">assets</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/industry">industry</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/people">people</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/business people">business people</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/security industry">security industry</category>
      <source url="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/09/assets-good-until-reached-for.html">Assets Good Until Reached For</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Streaming SQL Approaches Insist in Ignoring Causality by PatternStorm]]></title>
      <link>http://www.securityratty.com/article/46fcc325a183e0e5f0b350bcc9aeb6b5</link>
      <guid>http://www.securityratty.com/article/46fcc325a183e0e5f0b350bcc9aeb6b5</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[The following excellent discussion is reposted from Streaming SQL approaches insist in ignoring causality by PatternStorm
The recent paper Towards a Streaming SQL Standard by Oracle and Streambase...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote><p>The following excellent discussion is reposted from <a href="http://www.thecepblog.com/wp-admin/#p452">Streaming SQL approaches insist in ignoring causality</a> by PatternStorm.</p></blockquote>
<p>The recent paper &#8220;<a href="http://www.cs.brown.edu/%7Eugur/streamsql.pdf" target="_blank">Towards a Streaming SQL Standard</a>&#8221; by Oracle and Streambase unifies and generalizes two different execution models of Streaming SQL: Oracle&#8217;s and StreamBase&#8217;s.</p>
<p>While it&#8217;s true that the generalization succeeds in overcoming the unability of both execution models of producing correct results for astonishing simple queries (showing evidence of the actual limitations of these two Streaming SQL languages) it is also true that the generalization is closer to being overly complex than natural and intuitive.</p>
<p>The root cause behind the actual limitations of these two Streaming SQL languages is that their execution models &#8220;hardcode&#8221; the way events can be related to each other: in the Oracle case events are partially ordered by timestamp, in the StreamBase case events are totally ordered by time of arrival. These design decisions (natural in a stream oriented lamguage) have strong implications on what queries can be answered correctly, particularly when these queries involve joins of derived streams.</p>
<p>The generalization, of course, mainly consists in providing a new operator that allows the user to establish custom ordering relationships among the events (the SPREAD operator), which is good news but takes us to the fundamental issue: event processing cannot be reduced to stream processing, that is, to the processing of events that are totally or partially ordered by a pre-defined relationship (as Oracle and StreamBase actual implementations do), on the contrary, no particular ordering can be assumed because the user needs to be able to order the events in different ways in order to solve different problems. This is what event processing is about and the paper provides evidence that Streaming SQL approaches have found the need to move towards that direction and are having trouble in their way.</p>
<p>For instance, one of the queries used in the paper as an example of a query that StreamBase cannot solve (but Oracle can) is the following: correlate the stream that contains the total number of cars on the road for each time interval with the stream that contains the total average speed of the cars on the road for each time interval in order to detect the situation where the avergae speed is below 45 and the total number of cars is two or more. This query can be very easily and more robustly solved if you order the events by causality rather than by time, that is, if you have each position report update the average speed stream and the total number of cars stream and then you causally relate each position report to the new average speed event and the new total number of cars event that it generates; then the query is just a matter of detecting all report speeds that are causally related both to an average speed event below 45 and a total number of cars event of two or more (notice that this approach is more robust than Oracle&#8217;s time-based one because it works without requiring derived streams to be synchronized with the report speed stream)</p>
<p>Conclusions:</p>
<ul>
<li>Event Processing is a generalization of Stream Processing (as the paper shows)</li>
<li>Event Processing requires providing the ability to the user of creating custom relationships among events and then define patterns/queries using those custom relationships.</li>
<li>Causality is more often than not a more robust and easier criteria to order events than time or order of arrival.</li>
<li>Event Processing Languages should support causality.</li>
</ul>
<p>Regards,<br />
PatternStorm</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 05 Sep 2008 10:25:35 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/sql">sql</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/sql approaches insist">sql approaches insist</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/cars stream">cars stream</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/stream">stream</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/average speed event">average speed event</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/event">event</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/sql languages">sql languages</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/languages">languages</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/cars event">cars event</category>
      <source url="http://www.thecepblog.com/2008/09/05/streaming-sql-approaches-insist-in-ignoring-causality-by-patternstorm/">Streaming SQL Approaches Insist in Ignoring Causality by PatternStorm</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Security Supper Club Next Friday 22nd]]></title>
      <link>http://www.securityratty.com/article/4ce81d0aa6566e8a88ce425fc25552c4</link>
      <guid>http://www.securityratty.com/article/4ce81d0aa6566e8a88ce425fc25552c4</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[We are holding a security supper club next Friday at Belgo Centraal, Covent Garden. Belgian Beer, Steak Frites and security chat. It doesnt get better. Leave your cars at home and get the train. I...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[We are holding a security supper club next Friday at Belgo Centraal, Covent Garden. Belgian Beer, Steak Frites and security chat. It doesn&#8217;t get better. Leave your cars at home and get the train. I have a table for 10 reserved and 3 definite&#8217;s (Bob, Yeomans and me).&#160; 
If you want to join us mail [...]]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 12 Aug 2008 07:59:06 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/security supper club">security supper club</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/belgo centraal">belgo centraal</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/belgian beer">belgian beer</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/friday">friday</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/steak frites">steak frites</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/security chat">security chat</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/yeomans">yeomans</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/table">table</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/cars">cars</category>
      <source url="http://securitybuddha.com/2008/08/12/security-supper-club-next-friday-22nd/">Security Supper Club Next Friday 22nd</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Random Stupidity in the Name of Terrorism]]></title>
      <link>http://www.securityratty.com/article/c81bd0a4e004add0a54874f8bf604a84</link>
      <guid>http://www.securityratty.com/article/c81bd0a4e004add0a54874f8bf604a84</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[An air traveller in Canada is first told by an airline employee that it is &quot;illegal&quot; to say certain words, and then that if he raised a fuss he would be falsely accused: When we boarded a little...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[An air traveller in Canada is first <a href="http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20080627.blatch28/BNStory/specialComment/home">told</a> by an airline employee that it is "illegal" to say certain words, and then that if he raised a fuss he would be falsely accused:

<blockquote>When we boarded a little later, I asked for the ninny's name. He refused and hissed, "If you make a scene, I'll call the pilot and you won't be flying tonight."</blockquote>

More on the British <a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/06/23/police_photographer_stops/">war on photographers</a>.

A British man is forced to give up his <a href="http://uk.news.yahoo.com/skynews/20080624/tuk-bus-spotter-labelled-a-paedophile-45dbed5.html">hobby</a> of photographing busses due to harrassment.

<blockquote>The credit controller, from Gloucester, says he now suffers "appalling" abuse from the authorities and public who doubt his motives.

The bus-spotter, officially known as an omnibologist, said: "Since the 9/11 attacks there has been a crackdown.

"The past two years have absolutely been the worst. I have had the most appalling abuse from the public, drivers and police over-exercising their authority.

Mr McCaffery, who is married, added: "We just want to enjoy our hobby without harassment.

"I can deal with the fact someone might think I'm a terrorist, but when they start saying you're a paedophile it really hurts."</blockquote>

Is <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/07/02/israel.bulldozer/">everything</a> illegal and damaging now terrorism?

<blockquote>Israeli authorities are investigating why a Palestinian resident of Jerusalem rammed his bulldozer into several cars and buses Wednesday, killing three people before Israeli police shot him dead.

Israeli authorities are labeling it a terrorist attack, although they say there is no clear motive and the man -- a construction worker -- acted alone. It is not known if he had links to any terrorist organization.</blockquote>

Boston public school locked down after someone <a href="http://www.boston.com/news/odd/articles/2008/06/25/school_locked_down_after_ninja_sighted_in_woods/">saw</a> a ninja:

<blockquote>Turns out the ninja was actually a camp counselor dressed in black karate garb and carrying a plastic sword.

Police tell the Asbury Park Press the man was late to a costume-themed day at a nearby middle school.</blockquote>

And finally, not terrorism-related but a fine newspaper headline:  "<a href="http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5h1AqbvSMYPxJrla6-Fgym8WIzEsgD91KNJD00">Giraffe helps camels, zebras escape from circus</a>":

<blockquote>Amsterdam police say 15 camels, two zebras and an undetermined number of llamas and potbellied swine briefly escaped from a traveling Dutch circus after a giraffe kicked a hole in their cage.</blockquote>

Are llamas really that hard to count?<div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=eQI3GJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=eQI3GJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=tEUVdJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=tEUVdJ" border="0"></img></a>
</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 03 Jul 2008 08:57:04 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/police">police</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/israeli police shot">israeli police shot</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/giraffe">giraffe</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/terrorist">terrorist</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/israeli authorities">israeli authorities</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/giraffe helps camels">giraffe helps camels</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/authorities">authorities</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/boston public school">boston public school</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/terrorist organization">terrorist organization</category>
      <source url="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/07/random_stupidit.html">Random Stupidity in the Name of Terrorism</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Grande Theft Auto... What Was He Thinking?]]></title>
      <link>http://www.securityratty.com/article/5fc9689d682ba6a01acf0996732651bd</link>
      <guid>http://www.securityratty.com/article/5fc9689d682ba6a01acf0996732651bd</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Well, it didnt happen to me- but heres another J! True Security Story for you
I went to the salon today to get my nails did and was greeted with quite a ruckus. The entire staff is Vietnamese- no big...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Well, it didn&#8217;t happen to me- but here&#8217;s another J! True Security&nbsp;Story for you&#8230; </strong></p><p>I went to the salon today to &#8216;get my nails did&#8217; and was greeted with quite a ruckus. The entire staff is Vietnamese- no big surprise there- but the owners and most employees speak English extremely well and so everyone is always chit-chatting throughout the salon. </p><p>The wife side of the husband-wife team was especially giddy as she&nbsp;shared a little gem of a story with me today&#8230; and I didn&#8217;t feel&nbsp;I&#8217;d be doing you justice to keep it to myself.&nbsp;</p><p>They (the salon staff) all live in one of the larger cities here in NC. One of their friends (a middle-aged guy) was out shopping Monday and was sitting in his car in a parking lot during a coming- or going- to a store.&nbsp;A young girl (mid-20&#8217;s) came up to his car and motioned to ask for use of his cell phone. </p><p><em>Now, at this point in the story, I could have told you the rest&#8230; </em></p><p><span class="full-image-float-right"><img style="width: 141px; height: 125px" alt="photo_girlcell.jpg" src="http://www.securityuncorked.com/storage/photo_girlcell.jpg?__SQUARESPACE_CACHEVERSION=1215058444622" /></span>He opened the window a bit and the young lady asked to borrow his phone for a moment to call a family member. Turns out she had some car troubles and needed a ride. Being the nice gentleman that he is, he lent her the phone and she took a couple of steps away to make the call. Only&#8230; she didn&#8217;t stop. Evidently she got about 4 cars down the row&nbsp;before our chivalrous guy got out of the car and gave chase. </p><p>When he got in reach, she pushed him down to the ground and - <em>yep</em> - ran back to <em>his</em> car, phone still in hand&#8230; and drove away. </p><p>He now has no car and no phone. So, ironically enough, <em>he</em> then had to approach a stranger and politely ask for the use of their cell to phone home and let the group know he was bamboozled. A few tears were shed, but his wife assured him it would be fine and he shouldn&#8217;t be scared. (No, I&#8217;m not making that up). </p><p><em>I was giggling right along with her (and the guy&#8217;s wife, who happened to be there). </em></p><p>Moments later I thought to myself, &#8220;<em>I hope that doesn&#8217;t happen to me</em>!&#8221; Almost in the same instant I realized&#8230; it probably wouldn&#8217;t. I&#8217;ve been a bit of a paranoid freak since I was little, thanks probably in most part to having two ex-military intelligence parents. For all my life I&#8217;ve been raised with <a class="offsite-link-inline" href="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/03/the_security_mi.html" target="_blank">&#8216;the security mindset&#8217;</a>&nbsp;as <a class="offsite-link-inline" href="http://www.schneier.com/" target="_blank">Schneier</a>&nbsp;refers to it. </p><p>Always suspicious&#8230; always calculating&#8230; always aware&#8230; and certainly never underestimating a situation. </p><p>And so then I had to muse&#8230; WHAT WAS HE THINKING leaving the car running and unlocked to go after the siren with the cell? For the sake of politeness, I kept my question to my &#8216;inside voice&#8217;, but I do have to wonder why you&#8217;d sacrifice the security of a vehicle for a $50 cell phone.</p><p><strong>The moral of the story&#8230;&nbsp; There are two</strong>. 1) Involve someone with a &#8216;security mindset&#8217; and 2) Your security is only as strong as your people. A sweet damsel in distress&#8230; social engineering at it&#8217;s finest&#8230; </p><p># # #</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 03 Jul 2008 00:05:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/phone home">phone home</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/phone">phone</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/cell phone">cell phone</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/security mindset">security mindset</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/true security story">true security story</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/car troubles">car troubles</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/story">story</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/car">car</category>
      <source url="http://www.securityuncorked.com/security-uncorked/2008/7/3/grande-theft-auto-what-was-he-thinking.html">Grande Theft Auto... What Was He Thinking?</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Wee-Fi: Car-Fi, Boston Ferry-Fi, Thai-Fi]]></title>
      <link>http://www.securityratty.com/article/2c859bc4acfb354040b0928482e21bd1</link>
      <guid>http://www.securityratty.com/article/2c859bc4acfb354040b0928482e21bd1</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Chrysler offers automotive Internet access as 2009 model option: All its newest cars and trucks will, for an undisclosed price, act as cellular relays over Wi-Fi. The news was leaked and details...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img src="http://wifinetnews.com/images/weefi.jpg" align="right" border="0" hspace="5" /><a href="http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2008/06/chrysler-to-tur.html?cid=120125120#comments"><strong>Chrysler offers automotive Internet access as 2009 model option:</strong></a> All its newest cars and trucks will, for an undisclosed price, act as cellular relays over Wi-Fi. The news was leaked and details should be available tomorrow. The LA Times writer notes that while only passengers should use the Internet while the car is in motion, there's no way to prevent the driver from surfing. Except common sense. Yeah, that'll work. (The writer has confused his megas and kilos; the likely EVDO Rev. A service that will power this system runs at 600 Kbps to 1.4 Mbps downstream and 350 to 550 Kbps upstream, according to the cell operators.)</p>

<p><a href="http://www.metrobostonnews.com/us/article/2008/06/25/03/0515-66/index.xml"><strong>Boston ferries gain Wi-Fi:</strong></a> The MTBA has put Internet access on its 11 commuter boats that serve 4,500 daily riders. Ridership is way up this year.</p>

<p><a href="http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5g_cp1eD_monzp7gY9odfRlPpw0cw"><strong>Bangkok builds slow Wi-Fi network, free for first year:</strong></a> The details are a bit sketchy, but the government has built a 15,000-hotspot network that offer 64 Kbps connections, and will be free (with an access card) for the first year. The government is handing out 500,000 such cards at shopping malls before this week's launch.</p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 25 Jun 2008 09:43:23 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/kbps upstream">kbps upstream</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/kbps">kbps</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/times writer notes">times writer notes</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/writer">writer</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/kbps connections">kbps connections</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/internet">internet</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/internet access">internet access</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/000-hotspot network">000-hotspot network</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/evdo rev">evdo rev</category>
      <source url="http://wifinetnews.com/archives/008378.html">Wee-Fi: Car-Fi, Boston Ferry-Fi, Thai-Fi</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Security Through Obscurity]]></title>
      <link>http://www.securityratty.com/article/267a33943412c423b8545ae3d6d4d048</link>
      <guid>http://www.securityratty.com/article/267a33943412c423b8545ae3d6d4d048</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Sometimes security through obscurity works : Yes, the New York Police Department provided an escort, but during more than eight hours on Saturday, one of the great hoards of coins and currency on the...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Sometimes security through obscurity <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/16/nyregion/16coins.html?_r=1&oref=slogin">works</a>:</p>

<blockquote>Yes, the New York Police Department provided an escort, but during more than eight hours on Saturday, one of the great hoards of coins and currency on the planet, worth hundreds of millions of dollars, was utterly unalarmed as it was bumped through potholes, squeezed by double-parked cars and slowed by tunnel-bound traffic during the trip to its fortresslike new vault a mile to the north.

<p>In the end, the move did not become a caper movie.</p>

<p>“The idea was to make this as inconspicuous as possible,” said Ute Wartenberg Kagan, executive director of the American Numismatic Society. “It had to resemble a totally ordinary office move.”</p>

<p>[...]</p>

<p>Society staff members were pledged to secrecy about the timing of the move, and “we didn’t tell our movers what the cargo was until the morning of,” said James McVeigh, operations manager of Time Moving and Storage Inc. of Manhattan, referring to the crew of 20 workers.</blockquote></p>

<p>From my book <a href="http://www.schneier.com/book-beyondfear.html"><i>Beyond Fear</i></a>, pp. 211-12:</p>

<blockquote>At 3,106 carats, a little under a pound and a half, the Cullinan Diamond was the largest uncut diamond ever discovered. It was extracted from the earth at the Premier Mine, near Pretoria, South Africa, in 1905. Appreciating the literal enormity of the find, the Transvaal government bought the diamond as a gift for King Edward VII. Transporting the stone to England was a huge security problem, of course, and there was much debate on how best to do it. Detectives were sent from London to guard it on its journey. News leaked that a certain steamer was carrying it, and the presence of the detectives confirmed this. But the diamond on that steamer was a fake. Only a few people knew of the real plan; they packed the Cullinan in a small box, stuck a three-shilling stamp on it, and sent it to England anonymously by unregistered parcel post.

<p>This is a favorite story of mine. Not only can we analyze the complex security system intended to transport the diamond from continent to continent­the huge number of trusted people involved, making secrecy impossible; the involved series of steps with their associated seams, giving almost any organized gang numerous opportunities to pull off a theft­but we can contrast it with the sheer beautiful simplicity of the actual transportation plan. Whoever came up with it was really thinking­and thinking originally, boldly, and audaciously.</p>

<p>This kind of counterintuitive security is common in the world of gemstones. On 47th Street in New York, in Antwerp, in London: People walk around all the time with millions of dollars’ worth of gems in their pockets. The gemstone industry has formal guidelines: If the value of the package is under a specific amount, use the U.S. Mail. If it is over that amount but under another amount, use Federal Express. The Cullinan was again transported incognito; the British Royal Navy escorted an empty box across the North Sea to Amsterdam -- ­where the diamond would be cut­ -- while famed diamond cutter Abraham Asscher actually carried it in his pocket from London via train and night ferry to Amsterdam.</blockquote></p><div class="feedflare">
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</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 18 Jun 2008 09:13:26 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/diamond">diamond</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/cullinan diamond">cullinan diamond</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/complex security system">complex security system</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/uncut diamond">uncut diamond</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/move">move</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/ordinary office move">ordinary office move</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/cullinan">cullinan</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/huge security">huge security</category>
      <source url="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/06/security_throug_1.html">Security Through Obscurity</source>
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