<![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: command]]> http://www.securityratty.com/tag/command Mon, 11 Aug 2008 15:35:55 +0000 iRatty Engine http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss <![CDATA[Is Rock Phish cybergang set for a comeback?]]> http://www.securityratty.com/article/8370aa031a7cb6076a96831b3d8587c0 http://www.securityratty.com/article/8370aa031a7cb6076a96831b3d8587c0 Add to digg Add to StumbleUpon Add to Twitter Add to Slashdot
]]> Fri, 05 Sep 2008 09:00:00 +0000 apparent effort control server asprox botnet attacks boost ability command Is Rock Phish cybergang set for a comeback? <![CDATA[Copycat Web Malware Exploitation Kits are Faddish]]> http://www.securityratty.com/article/ba56aabae03bad418cbbf5ae497d3769 http://www.securityratty.com/article/ba56aabae03bad418cbbf5ae497d3769
For the cheap cybercriminals not wanting to invest a couple of thousand dollars into purchasing a cutting edge web malware exploitation kit -- a pirated copy of which they would ironically obtained several moths later -- with all the related and royalty free updates coming with it, there are always the copycat malware kits like this one offered for $100.

Taking into consideration the proprietary nature of some of the kits, the business model of malware kits was mostly relying on their exclusive nature next to the number, and diversity of the exploits included in order to improve the infection rate. This simplistic assumption on behalf of the coders totally ignored the possibility of their kits leaking to the general public, or copies of the kits ending up as a bargain in particular underground deal where the once highly exclusive kit was offered as a bonus.

"Me too" web malware kits were a faddish way to enjoy the popularity of web malware kits like MPack and Icepack and try to cash in on that popularity by coming up average kits lacking any significant differentiation factors in the process. But just like the original and proprietary kits, whose authors didn't envision the long term growth strategy of integrating different services into their propositions or the kits themselves, the authors of copycat malware kits didn't bother considering the lack of long-term growth strategy for their releases. Branding in respect to releasing a Firepack malware kit to compete with Icepack which was originally released to compete with Mpack, has failed to achieve the desired results as well.

And with malware kits now a commodity, and underground vendors excelling in a particular practice with the long term objective to vertically integrate in their area of expertise -- think spammers offering localization of messages into different languages and segmented email databases from a specific country -- would we witness the emergence of managed cybercrime services charging a premium for providing fresh dumps of credit card numbers, PayPal, Ebay accounts or whatever the buyer is requesting?

That may well be the case in the long term.

Related posts:
Web Based Botnet Command and Control Kit 2.0
DIY Botnet Kit Promising Eternal Updates
Pinch Vulnerable to Remotely Exploitable Flaw
The Zeus Crimeware Kit Vulnerable to Remotely Exploitable Flaw
The Small Pack Web Malware Exploitation Kit
Crimeware in the Middle - Zeus
The Nuclear Grabber Kit
The Apophis Kit
The FirePack Exploitation Kit Localized to Chinese
MPack and IcePack Localized to Chinese
The Icepack Exploitation Kit Localized to French
The FirePack Exploitation Kit - Part Two
The FirePack Web Malware Exploitation Kit
The WebAttacker in Action
Nuclear Malware Kit
The Random JS Malware Exploitation Kit
Metaphisher Malware Kit Spotted in the Wild
The Black Sun Bot
The Cyber Bot
Google Hacking for MPacks, Zunkers and WebAttackers
The IcePack Malware Kit in Action
]]> Wed, 03 Sep 2008 03:18:08 +0000 malware kits web malware kits kits copycat malware kits proprietary kits term long-term growth strategy icepack icepack exploitation kit Copycat Web Malware Exploitation Kits are Faddish <![CDATA[The Number Of Infected Machines In Botnets Quadrupled In Last 3 Months]]> http://www.securityratty.com/article/daaca7f9bc4f75d386d4221ce644ee3e http://www.securityratty.com/article/daaca7f9bc4f75d386d4221ce644ee3e Tue, 02 Sep 2008 18:49:12 +0000 figures based control servers botnet networks botnet infections shadowserver foundation zombie pcs months variety entropy The Number Of Infected Machines In Botnets Quadrupled In Last 3 Months <![CDATA[Anton Security Tip of the Day #16: Virtually There - Journey Into VMWare ESX Log Analysis]]> http://www.securityratty.com/article/f1bc531055cb81363944693871c78d6a http://www.securityratty.com/article/f1bc531055cb81363944693871c78d6a Following the new "tradition" of posting a security tip of the week (mentioned here, here ; SANS jumped in as well), I decided to follow along and join the initiative. One of the bloggers called it "pay it forward" to the community.

So, Anton Security Tip of the Day #16: Virtually Screwed - Journey Into VMWare ESX Log Analysis

CISecurty guide for VMWare (here) and DISA STIG for virtual machines (here) both mandate collection and analysis of VM platform logs; none goes into enough details on what to look for in logs. Let's try to shed some light on security-focused log analysis of VMWare ESX v. 3.x logs.

First, at least until ESXi becomes the default choice, one needs to keep in mind that ESX as "Linux-inside" and thus diving into /var/log will not reveal any "alien technology" (well, not much :-)). However, one of the most useful logs is /var/log/hostd.N which is not a descendant of Linux standard logs. Extensive VM event records are written into this file.

Let's focus on various types of logins to the ESX platform and identify logs that indicate a successful and failed attempts to log in. Here are a few useful examples to analyze:

Successful logins:

  • May 30 09:20:42 esx2 su(pam_unix)[9405]: session opened for user root by jhonny(uid=1626)

This is a classic Linux root login message; you can watch for these by searching VMWare ESX logs for "session AND opened AND user AND root."  Notice the user name of the user who switched to root.

  • May 30 09:20:34 esx2 sshd(pam_unix)[9364]: session opened for user jhonny by (uid=0)

This is also a classic Linux message for a normal (non-root) user login.

  • [2008-05-25 06:57:48.774 'ha-eventmgr' 111639472 info] Event 40645 : User jhonny@1.1.1.1 logged in

This is a VMWare -specific application login to ESX. You can track such events by username, by event ID or by keywords "event AND logged AND user" (if you are using search)

Failed logins:

  • May 30 09:20:31 esx2 sshd[9356]: Failed password for jhonny from 1.1.1.1 port 54773 ssh2

Another classic Linux message from the ESX system; a failure to login due to incorrect password.

  • May 27 12:06:59 esx2 sshd[4756]: Failed password for illegal user jonny from 1.1.1.1 port 30594 ssh2

A message indicating a failure to login due to incorrect username (note a typo).

  • May 25 07:03:48 esx1 sudo:     jhonny : 3 incorrect password attempts ; TTY=pts/0 ; PWD=/var/log ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/bin/bash

This ESX Linux platform message should also be familiar to Linux/Unix admins: it indicates multiple sudo password failures; look for such messages in the logs.

BTW, do you need to be reminded to track NOT only failed, but also successful login events?!

Overall, you must prepare for the future by learning to analyze  VMWare logs, just like you handled "legacy OS", such as Linux/Unix and Windows.

As I said before, I am tagging all the tips on my del.icio.us feed; here is the link: All Security Tips of the Day.

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About me: http://www.chuvakin.org
]]> Mon, 25 Aug 2008 08:11:00 +0000 vmware vmware esx analyze vmware logs analyze vmware esx logs esx security tip anton security tip user Anton Security Tip of the Day #16: Virtually There - Journey Into VMWare ESX Log Analysis <![CDATA[Web Based Botnet Command and Control Kit 2.0]]> http://www.securityratty.com/article/4f945955ba8a424fe6b9352583602062 http://www.securityratty.com/article/4f945955ba8a424fe6b9352583602062
The average web based command and control kit for a botnet consisting of single user, single campaign functions only, has just lost its charm, with a recent discovery of a proprietary botnet kit whose features clearly indicate that the kit's coder know exactly which niches to fill - presumably based on his personal experience or market research into competing products.

What are some its key differentiation factors? Multitasking at its best, for instance, the kits provides the botnet master with the opportunity to manage numerous different task such as several malware campaigns and DDoS attacks simultaneously, where each of these gets a separate metrics page.  

Automation of malicious tasks, by setting up tasks, and issuing notices on the status of the task, when it was run and when it was ended. Just consider the possibilities for a scheduling malware and DDoS attacks for different quarters.  

Segmentation in every aspect of the tasks, for instance, a DDoS attacks against a particular site can be scheduled to launched on a specific date from infected hosts based in chosen countries only.  

Customized DDoS in the sense of empowering the botnet master with point'n'click ability to dedicate a precise number of the bots to participate, which countries they should be based in, and for how long the attack should remain active. Quality and assurance in DDoS attacks based on the measurement of the bot's bandwidth against a particular country, in this case the object of the attack, so theoretically bots from neighboring countries would DDoS the country in question far more efficiently.  

Historical malware campaign performance, is perhaps the most quality assurance feature in the entire kit, presumably created in order to allow the person behind it to measure which were the most effective malware and DDoS campaigns that he executed in the past. From an OSINT perspective, sacrificing his operational security by maintaing detailed logs from previous attacks is a gold mine directly establishing his relationships with previous malware campaigns.

Bot Description:  
1. Completely invisible Bot work in the system.
2. Not loads system.
3. Invisible in the process.
4. Workaround all firewall.
5. Bot implemented as a driver.
Functions Bot (constantly updated): 
1. Downloading a file (many options).
2. HTTP DDoS (many options, including http authentication).
The web interface 
-- Convenient manager tasks.
-- Every task can be stopped, put on pause, etc. ...
-- Interest and visual scale of the task.  
-- A task manager for DDoS and Loader
    
-- For DDoS tasks
Bots involved in DDoS 'f.
Condition of the victim (works, fell).
2. Bots manager
-- Displays a list of bots (postranichno).
-- Obratseniya date of the first and last.
-- ID Bot.
-- Country Bot.
-- Type Bot.
-- The status Bot (online / offline).
-- Bot bandwidth to different parts of the world (europe, asia).
-- The possibility of removing bots
-- When you click on ID Bot loadable still a wealth of information about it
3. Statistics botneta
-- Statistics both common and build Bot.
-- Information on the growth and decline botneta dates (and build).
-- Bots online
-- All bots
-- Dead bots.

4. Statistics botneta country
-- All countries to work on 
-- New work by country 
-- Online work from country to country
-- Dead bots by country
5. Detailed history botneta 
6. Convenient user-friendly interface adding teams
8. Admin minimal server loads
-- Use php5/mysql
Upcoming features :
1. Form grabber (price increase substantially), for old customers will be charged as an upgrade
2. Public key cryptography
3. Clustering campaigns and DDoS attacks

Despite it's proprietary nature, it's quality and innovative features will sooner or later leak out for everyone to take advantage of, a rather common lifecycle for the majority of proprietary malware kits in general.

Related posts:
]]> Fri, 22 Aug 2008 10:02:15 +0000 ddos attacks based ddos attacks malware previous malware campaigns ddos attacks simultaneously botnet country country bot ddos Web Based Botnet Command and Control Kit 2.0 <![CDATA[DIY Botnet Kit Promising Eternal Updates]]> http://www.securityratty.com/article/c280e95d4aabb245987b5dc2c799185b http://www.securityratty.com/article/c280e95d4aabb245987b5dc2c799185b
Among the main differences between a professional botnet command and control kit, and one that's been originally released for free, is the quality and the clearly visible experience of the kit's programmer in the professional one.

A Chinese hacking group is offering the moon, and asking for nothing. And in times when a cybercriminal can even monetize his conversation with a potential customer by telling him he's actually consulting them and barely talking, is this for real and how come? This "Robin Hood approach" on behalf of the group could have worked an year ago, when greedy cybercriminals were still charging hundreds of thousands of dollars for their sophisticated banker malwares. Today, most of them leaked in such a surprising, and definitely not anticipated on behalf of the malware coders way, that not only they stopped offering support and abandoned their releases, but what used to be available only to those willing to open their virtual pocket and transfer some virtual currency, is available to everyone making such free botnet kits irrelevant - mostly due to their simplicity speaking for zero quality assurance we can see in professional kits.

Once the dust settles on this populist underground release, its potential users would once again return to their localized copies of web based botnet command and control kits.
]]> Tue, 19 Aug 2008 23:53:16 +0000 professional professional kits kit professional botnet command quality assurance populist underground release control kit quality robin hood approach DIY Botnet Kit Promising Eternal Updates <![CDATA[Air Force Suspends Cyber-Command]]> http://www.securityratty.com/article/c8c069ffe7406fff2cd0d29323e121f4 http://www.securityratty.com/article/c8c069ffe7406fff2cd0d29323e121f4 Wow:

The provisional, 8,000-man Cyber Command has been ordered to stop all activities, just weeks before it was supposed to be declared operational.
]]> Mon, 18 Aug 2008 02:46:07 +0000 000-man cyber command operational stop activities weeks provisional Air Force Suspends Cyber-Command <![CDATA[Looking Up Exchange Error Codes Easily]]> http://www.securityratty.com/article/827517dbfb064ed2e5f859fc793ea17e http://www.securityratty.com/article/827517dbfb064ed2e5f859fc793ea17e The Exchange Server Error Code Look-up tool (Err) is a command line tool which looks up the error using Exchange's internal tables and puts out details, if available. For example:
C:\temp\Err>err 0x80070003 # for hex 0x80070003 / decimal -2147024893 : COR_E_DIRECTORYNOTFOUND corerror.h # MessageText: # The specified path couldn't be found. # 1 matches found for "0x80070003"
Thanks to Microsoft's Neil Carpenter for pointing out this tool in his blog. He says this was an internal Microsoft tool now made available to the public. It's not clear from the description how many Windows non-Exchange codes this may cover. Probably a lot.]]> Thu, 14 Aug 2008 03:46:02 +0000 internal microsoft tool microsoft tool tool exchange temperrerr 0x80070003 0x80070003 command line tool err 0x80070003 exchange log file Looking Up Exchange Error Codes Easily <![CDATA[Air Force Suspends Controversial Cyber Command]]> http://www.securityratty.com/article/6db6ac13ebe02f7105be52e4c6da5a0c http://www.securityratty.com/article/6db6ac13ebe02f7105be52e4c6da5a0c
]]> Wed, 13 Aug 2008 10:47:00 +0000 air force 000-man cyber command controversial effort cyberspace operational stop activities provisional suspend Air Force Suspends Controversial Cyber Command <![CDATA[The Russia vs Georgia Cyber Attack]]> http://www.securityratty.com/article/8a00d5d19f0f12447cb8a837ccb009d4 http://www.securityratty.com/article/8a00d5d19f0f12447cb8a837ccb009d4
Last month's lone gunman DDoS attack against Georgia President's web site seemed like a signal shot for the cyber siege to come a week later. Here's the complete coverage of the coordination phrase, the execution and the actual impact of the cyber attack so far - "Coordinated Russia vs Georgia cyber attack in progress" :

"Who’s behind it? The infamous Russian Business Network, or literally every Russian supporting Russia’s actions? How coordinated and planned the cyber attack is, and do we actually have a relatively decent example of cyber warfare combining PSYOPs (psychological operations), and self-mobilization of the local Internet users by spreading “For our motherland, brothers!” or “Your country is calling you!” hacktivist messages across web forums. Let’s find out, in-depth. With the attacks originally starting to take place several weeks before the actual “intervention” with Georgia President’s web site coming under DDoS attack from Russian hackers in July, followed by active discussions across the Russian web on whether or not DDoS attacks and web site defacements should in fact be taking place, which would inevitably come as a handy tool to be used against Russian from Western or Pro-Western journalists, the peak of DDoS attack and the actual defacements started taking place as of Friday."

Some of the tactics used :
distributing a static list of targets, eliminate centralized coordination of the attack, engaging the average internet users, empower them with DoS tools; distributing lists of remotely SQL injectable Georgian sites; abusing public lists of email addresses of Georgian politicians for spamming and targeted attacks; destroy the adversary’s ability to communicate using the usual channels -- Georgia's most popular hacking portal is under DDoS attack from Russian hackers.

Some of the parked domains acting as command and control servers for one of the botnets at 79.135.167.22 :
emultrix .org
yandexshit .com
ad.yandexshit .com
a-nahui-vse-zaebalo-v-pizdu .com
killgay .com
ns1.guagaga .net
ns2.guagaga .net
ohueli .net
pizdos .net
googlecomaolcomyahoocomaboutcom.net

Actual command and control locations :
a-nahui-vse-zaebalo-v-pizdu .com/a/nahui/vse/zaebalo/v/pizdu/
prosto.pizdos .net/_lol/

Consider going through the complete coverage of what's been happening during the weeked. Considering the combination of tactics used, unless the conflict gets solved, more attacks will definitely take place during the week.
]]> Mon, 11 Aug 2008 15:35:55 +0000 georgia cyber attack cyber attack attack georgia georgia president russian russian web ddos attack russian hackers The Russia vs Georgia Cyber Attack