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    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: cultural]]></title>
    <link>http://www.securityratty.com/tag/cultural</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Wed, 13 Aug 2008 04:08:43 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Localizing Cybercrime - Cultural Diversity on Demand Part Two]]></title>
      <link>http://www.securityratty.com/article/6fa5c311a11504a21120c6a907e03041</link>
      <guid>http://www.securityratty.com/article/6fa5c311a11504a21120c6a907e03041</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[It's where you advertise your services, and how you position yourself that speak for your intentions, of course, &quot;between the lines&quot;. There's a common misunderstanding that in order for a malware...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SSv52TmaA2I/AAAAAAAACec/W3ErlbR-fSo/s1600-h/translation_service_cybercrime.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SSv52TmaA2I/AAAAAAAACec/W3ErlbR-fSo/s200/translation_service_cybercrime.JPG" /></a> It's where you advertise your services, and how you position yourself that speak for your intentions, of course, "between the lines". There's a common misunderstanding that in order for a malware campaigner or scammer to launch a localized attack speaking the native language of their potential victims, they need to speak the local language. This misconception is largely based on the fact that a huge number of people remain unaware on how core strategic business practices have been in operation across the cybercrime underground for the last couple of years.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/02/localizing-cybercrime-cultural.html">Outsourcing the localization process</a> (translation services for spam/phishing/malware campaigns) has been happening for a while, courtsy of DIY servics ensuring complete anonymity of their customers. Interestingly, the translators may in fact be unaware that the advertising channels the service is using is directly attracting everyone from the bottom to the top of the cybercriminal food chain as a customer. Sometimes, it's services like this that open a new market segment covering an untapped opportunity, with this particular service already pointing out that it's charging cheaper than their competitors.<br />
<br />
"<i>We offer our services in translation. We are only competent translators profile higher education. Service is working with all types of texts. Languages available at this time of Russian, English, German. Average translation of the text takes up to 10 hours (usually much faster) through the full automation of the order and payment. <b>Just want to note that we do not keep any logs on IP and does not require registration</b>. In addition you can remove your order from the database after his execution. In addition to running more than 1000 translations already, we can use all the lessons learned to be more effective in our services. Prices vary depending on the complexity of the topic covered.</i><br />
<br />
<i><b>Prices and deadlines:  </b><br />
* Standard - the deadline is not more than 24 hours. Prices depend on the direction and guidance from the 'Order'.&nbsp;</i><br />
<i>* Term - work on your translation begins precedence. The price of the 50% more than the standard translation. Prices also depend on the direction and guidance from the 'Order'. <br />
<br />
The cost of the transfer depends on the amount of work. The workload is measured in symbols. In calculating the characters are shown letters and numbers. Punctuation do not count. Minimum order 100 characters.</i>"<br />
<br />
I'm particularly curious how is a contractor(translator) going to react to a situation when a large scale malware campaign speaking several different languages tell a fake story that the contractor might have recently translated for them. With the employer positioning itself as a fully legitimate company, whereas its customers requesting localized version of texts for the spam/phishing/malware campaigns are the "usual suspects", the contractors would continue allowing cybercriminals the opportunity to build more authenticity within their campaigns.<br />
<br />
<b>Related posts:</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/01/e-crime-and-socioeconomic-factors.html">E-crime and Socioeconomic Factors</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/mpack-and-icepack-localized-to-chinese.html">MPack and IcePack Localized to Chinese</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/icepack-exploitation-kit-localized-to.html">The Icepack Exploitation Kit Localized to French</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/firepack-exploitation-kit-localized-to.html">The FirePack Exploitation Kit Localized to Chinese</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/09/localizing-open-source-malware.html">Localizing Open Source Malware</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/04/localized-fake-security-software.html">Localized Fake Security Software</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/03/localized-bankers-malware-campaign.html">A Localized Bankers Malware Campaign</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/11/lonely-polinas-secret.html">Lonely Polina's Secret</a> (Localized malware campaign)<div class="feedflare">
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</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/465119206" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 25 Nov 2008 05:55:21 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/translation">translation</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/standard translation">standard translation</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/average translation">average translation</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/translation services">translation services</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/malware campaign">malware campaign</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/bankers malware campaign">bankers malware campaign</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/prices">prices</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/services">services</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/prices vary">prices vary</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/465119206/localizing-cybercrime-cultural.html">Localizing Cybercrime - Cultural Diversity on Demand Part Two</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[The Future of Ephemeral Conversation]]></title>
      <link>http://www.securityratty.com/article/1474b03de8a1d60cdf0aa28759ddce93</link>
      <guid>http://www.securityratty.com/article/1474b03de8a1d60cdf0aa28759ddce93</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[When he becomes president, Barack Obama will have to give up his BlackBerry. Aides are concerned that his unofficial conversations would become part of the presidential record, subject to subpoena and...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>When he becomes president, Barack Obama will have to <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/16/us/politics/16blackberry.html">give up</a> his BlackBerry.  Aides are concerned that his unofficial conversations would become part of the presidential record, subject to subpoena and eventually made public as part of the country's historical record.</p>

<p>This reality of the information age might be particularly stark for the president, but it's no less true for all of us.  Conversation used to be ephemeral.  Whether face-to-face or by phone, we could be reasonably sure that what we said disappeared as soon as we said it. Organized crime bosses worried about phone taps and room bugs, but that was the exception.  Privacy was just assumed.</p>

<p>This has changed.  We chat in e-mail, over SMS and IM, and on social networking websites like Facebook, MySpace, and LiveJournal.  We blog and we Twitter.  These conversations -- with friends, lovers, colleagues, members of our cabinet -- are not ephemeral; they <a href="http://www.schneier.com/essay-109.html">leave their own electronic trails</a>.</p>

<p>We know this intellectually, but we haven't truly internalized it.  We type on, engrossed in conversation, forgetting we're being recorded and those recordings might come back to haunt us later.</p>

<p>Oliver North learned this, way back in 1987, when messages he thought he had deleted were saved by the White House PROFS system, and then subpoenaed in the Iran-Contra affair.  Bill Gates learned this in 1998 when his conversational e-mails were provided to opposing counsel as part of the antitrust litigation discovery process.  Mark Foley learned this in 2006 when his instant messages were <a href="http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/BrianRoss/story?id=2509586">saved and made public</a> by the underage men he talked to.  Paris Hilton learned this in 2005 when her cell phone account was <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/19/AR2005051900711.html">hacked</a>, and Sarah Palin learned it earlier this year when her Yahoo e-mail account was hacked.  Someone in George W. Bush's administration learned this, and <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/04/13/white.house.email/index.html">millions of e-mails</a> went mysteriously and conveniently missing.</p>

<p>Ephemeral conversation is dying.</p>

<p>Cardinal Richelieu famously said, :If one would give me six lines written by the hand of the most honest man, I would find something in them to have him hanged."  When all our ephemeral conversations can be saved for later examination, different rules have to apply.  Conversation is not the same thing as correspondence.  Words uttered in haste over morning coffee, whether spoken in a coffee shop or thumbed on a Blackberry, are not official pronouncements.  Discussions in a meeting, whether held in a boardroom or a chat room, are not the same as answers at a press conference.  And privacy isn't just about having something to hide; it <a href="http://www.schneier.com/essay-114.html">has enormous value</a> to democracy, liberty, and our basic humanity.</p>

<p>We can't turn back technology; electronic communications are here to stay and <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NSA_warrantless_surveillance_controversy">even our voice conversations are threatened</a>.  But as technology makes our conversations less ephemeral, we need laws to step in and safeguard ephemeral conversation.  We need a comprehensive data privacy law, protecting our data and communications regardless of where it is stored or how it is processed. We need laws forcing companies to keep it private and delete it as soon as it is no longer needed.  Laws requiring ISPs to store e-mails and other personal communications are exactly what we don't need.</p>

<p>Rules pertaining to government need to be different, because of the <a href="http://www.schneier.com/essay-208.html">power differential</a>.  Subjecting the president's communications to eventual public review increases liberty because it reduces the government's power with respect to the people.  Subjecting our communications to government review decreases liberty because it reduces our power with respect to the government.  The president, as well as other members of government, need some ability to converse ephemerally -- just as they're allowed to have unrecorded meetings and phone calls -- but more of their actions need to be subject to public scrutiny.</p>

<p>But laws can only go so far.  Law or no law, when something is made public it's too late.  And many of us like having complete records of all our e-mail at our fingertips; it's like our offline brains.</p>

<p>In the end, this is cultural.</p>

<p>The Internet is the greatest generation gap since rock and roll.  We're now witnessing one aspect of that generation gap: the younger generation chats digitally, and the older generation treats those chats as written correspondence.  Until our CEOs blog, our Congressmen Twitter, and our world leaders send each other LOLcats &ndash; until we have a Presidential election where both candidates have a complete history on social networking sites from before they were teenagers&ndash; we aren't fully an information age society.</p>

<p>When everyone leaves a public digital trail of their personal thoughts since birth, no one will think twice about it being there.  Obama might be on the younger side of the generation gap, but the rules he's operating under were written by the older side.  It will take another generation before society's tolerance for digital ephemera changes.</p>

<p>This essay <a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122722381368945937.html">previously appeared</a> on <ui>The Wall Street Journal</a> website (not the print newspaper), and is an update of <a href="http://www.schneier.com/essay-129.html">something I wrote previously</a>.</p><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=jPWiN"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=jPWiN" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=hlUTN"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=hlUTN" border="0"></img></a>
</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Nov 2008 11:06:41 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/ephemeral conversation">ephemeral conversation</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/conversation">conversation</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/safeguard ephemeral conversation">safeguard ephemeral conversation</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/ephemeral">ephemeral</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/ephemeral conversations">ephemeral conversations</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/conversations">conversations</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/generation">generation</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/generation gap">generation gap</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/public scrutiny">public scrutiny</category>
      <source url="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/11/the_future_of_e.html">The Future of Ephemeral Conversation</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Will Code Malware for Financial Incentives]]></title>
      <link>http://www.securityratty.com/article/30eebfa1383ce3a671879e2f1f0af37d</link>
      <guid>http://www.securityratty.com/article/30eebfa1383ce3a671879e2f1f0af37d</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[A couple of hundred dollars can indeed get you state of the art undetectable piece of malware with post-purchase service in the form of automatic lower detection rate for sure, but what happens when...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SSLQOaWm71I/AAAAAAAACdM/nHHgxqAJn-4/s1600-h/malware_hire_sample_1.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SSLQOaWm71I/AAAAAAAACdM/nHHgxqAJn-4/s200/malware_hire_sample_1.JPG" /></a>A couple of hundred dollars can indeed get you state of the art <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/coding-spyware-and-malware-for-hire.html">undetectable piece of malware with post-purchase service</a> in the form of automatic lower detection rate for sure, but what happens when the vendors of such releases start vertically integrating just like everyone else, and start offering OS-independent spamming, flooding, modifications and tweaking of popular crimeware kits in the very same fashion? The quality assurance process gets centralized into the hands of experienced programmers that have been developing cybercrime facilitating tools for years.<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SSLcUHXGAoI/AAAAAAAACdU/wnzsUHFHSrg/s1600-h/malware_hire_sample_2.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SSLcUHXGAoI/AAAAAAAACdU/wnzsUHFHSrg/s200/malware_hire_sample_2.JPG" /></a>It's interesting to monitor the pricing schemes that they implement. For instance, the modularity of a particular malware, that is the additional functions that a buyer may want or not want, increase or decrease the price respectively. Others, tend to leave the price open topic by only mentioning the starting price for their services and they increasing it again in open topic fashion.<br />
<br />
Let's take look at some recently advertised (translated) "malware coding for hire" propositions, highlighting some of the latest developments in their pricing strategies :<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SSMEwnRgU6I/AAAAAAAACdc/bFEBpsTalQQ/s1600-h/malware_hire_sample_3.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SSMEwnRgU6I/AAAAAAAACdc/bFEBpsTalQQ/s200/malware_hire_sample_3.JPG" /></a><b>Proposition 1</b> : <br />
"<i>Programs and scripts under the following categories are accepted : </i><br />
<i>grabbers; spamming tools for forums, spamming tools for social networking sites, modifications of admin panels for (popular crimeware kits), phishing pages</i><br />
<br />
<i>Platform: software running on MAC OS to Windows  </i><br />
<i>Multitasking: have the capacity to work on multiple projects</i><br />
<i>Speed and responsibility: at the highest level  </i><br />
<i>Pre-payment for new customers: 50% of the whole price, 30% pre-pay of the whole price for repreated customers  </i><br />
<i>Support: Paid  </i><br />
<i>Rates: starting from 100 euros</i><br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SSMGg5E49_I/AAAAAAAACds/lWtlV3eYu4s/s1600-h/malware_hire_sample_4.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SSMGg5E49_I/AAAAAAAACds/lWtlV3eYu4s/s200/malware_hire_sample_4.JPG" /></a><i>If, after speaking ultimate price, you decide to add to your order something else - the price change. Prepare the job immediately, which will understand what to do and how much it will cost you, if you have any suggestions for a price, then lays them immediately and not after the work is completed. If you order something that requires parsing your logs, and their continued use, you agree to provide "a significant portion of the logs, so that after putting the project did not raise misunderstandings due to the fact that some logs are no longer "fresh", because of their "uniqueness". In this case, for the finalization of the project will be charged an additional fee.</i>"<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SSMKeg8y5SI/AAAAAAAACd0/ekeV4Us8PwY/s1600-h/malware_hire_sample_5.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SSMKeg8y5SI/AAAAAAAACd0/ekeV4Us8PwY/s200/malware_hire_sample_5.JPG" /></a>This is an example of an "open topic pricing scheme" with the vendor offering the possibility to code the malware or the tool for any price above 100 euro based on what he perceives as features included within worth the price.<br />
<br />
<b>Proposition 2</b>:<br />
"<i>Starting price for my malware is 250 EUR. Additional modules like P2P features, source code for a particular module go for an additional 50 EUR. If you're paying in another currency the price is 200 GBP or 395 dollars. I sell only ten copies of the builder so hurry up. The trading process is simple - a password protected file with the malware is sent to you so you can see the files inside. You then sent the money and I mail you back the password. If you don't like this way you lose.&nbsp;</i><br />
<br />
<i>I can also offer you another deal, I will share the complete source code in exchange to access to a botnet with at least 4000 infected hosts because I don't have time to play around with me bot right now.</i> <br />
<br />
This proposition is particularly interesting because the seller is introducing basic understanding of exchange rates, but most of all because he's in fact offering a direct bargain in the form of access to a botnet in exchange for a complete source code of his malware bot. Both propositions are also great examples that vendors engage by keeping their current and potential customers up-to-date with <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/04/botnet-masters-to-do-list.html">TODO lists of features to come</a> next to the usual CHANGELOGS, and, of course,&nbsp; establish trust by allowing potential customers to take a peek at the source code of the malware they're about to purchase.<br />
<br />
<b>Related posts:</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/coding-spyware-and-malware-for-hire.html">Coding Spyware and Malware for Hire </a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/03/underground-economys-supply-of-goods.html">The Underground Economy's Supply of Goods and Services</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/dynamics-of-malware-industry.html">The Dynamics of the Malware Industry - Proprietary Malware Tools</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/using-market-forces-to-disrupt-botnets.html">Using Market Forces to Disrupt Botnets</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/multiple-firewalls-bypassing.html">Multiple Firewalls Bypassing Verification on Demand</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/managed-spamming-appliances-future-of.html">Managed Spamming Appliances - The Future of Spam</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/02/localizing-cybercrime-cultural.html">Localizing Cybercrime - Cultural Diversity on Demand</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/01/e-crime-and-socioeconomic-factors.html">E-crime and Socioeconomic Factors</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/12/russias-fsb-vs-cybercrime.html">Russia's FSB vs Cybercrime</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/08/malware-as-web-service.html">Malware as a Web Service</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/09/localizing-open-source-malware.html">Localizing Open Source Malware</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/04/quality-and-assurance-in-malware.html">Quality and Assurance in Malware Attacks</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2006/09/benchmarking-and-optimising-malware.html">Benchmarking and Optimising Malware</a><div class="feedflare">
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</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/457569401" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 18 Nov 2008 10:57:55 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/malware">malware</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/code">code</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/source malware">source malware</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/malware attacks">malware attacks</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/malware bot">malware bot</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/proprietary malware tools">proprietary malware tools</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/source code">source code</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/complete source code">complete source code</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/tools">tools</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/457569401/will-code-malware-for-financial.html">Will Code Malware for Financial Incentives</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[The Lingua Franca of Information Security]]></title>
      <link>http://www.securityratty.com/article/b5c44a5069d38d8c7271f85b5c6955c6</link>
      <guid>http://www.securityratty.com/article/b5c44a5069d38d8c7271f85b5c6955c6</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Working across the EMEA region and being employed by an American-headquartered company, Im fortunate (and occasionally unfortunate!) to encounter the many cultural differences which unite and divide...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Working across the EMEA region and   being employed by an American-headquartered company, I&rsquo;m fortunate (and   occasionally unfortunate!)&nbsp;to encounter the many cultural differences which   unite and divide us. Today for example, I&rsquo;m speaking at our EMC Forum in Moscow,   earlier in the week I was in Sweden, and just last week I was with customers and   colleagues in the somewhat sunnier climes of Dubai. It&rsquo;s interesting then to   note what changes, but perhaps more importantly <B>the many more things that stay   the same as you talk information security strategy throughout the   region&hellip;...</b></p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 23 Oct 2008 20:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/emea region">emea region</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/region">region</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/sunnier climes">sunnier climes</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/week">week</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/emc forum">emc forum</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/cultural differences">cultural differences</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/divide">divide</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/company">company</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/dubai">dubai</category>
      <source url="http://www.rsa.com/blog/blog_entry.aspx?id=1373">The Lingua Franca of Information Security</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Integrating Event/Incident and Problem Management]]></title>
      <link>http://www.securityratty.com/article/fbba6395d7eaad30dc65321fe9f0fd16</link>
      <guid>http://www.securityratty.com/article/fbba6395d7eaad30dc65321fe9f0fd16</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Change, Change, Change. What needs to change as IT organizations move towards sophisticated virtualized infrastructure ? Event/Incident and Problem Management integration of course
We have been...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Change, Change, Change. What needs to change as IT organizations move towards sophisticated <a href="http://blog.taragana.com/index.php/archive/virtualization-technologies-full-virtualization-versus-para-virtualization/" target="_blank">virtualized infrastructure</a>? Event/Incident and Problem Management integration of course!</p>
<p>We have been conducting polls of our customers and of IT professionals at technology trade shows for the past two years and the results are in: Pulling together all of the management pieces and processes is even more crucial in a virtualized environment.</p>
<p>So what does this mean for you? You will need to refine your <a href="http://blog.evergreensys.com/2008/01/10/meeting-tough-customers-over-incident-management/" target="_blank">incident and problem management</a> processes with new technologies in order to reduce downtime and maintain end user performance. But of course even the most basic technologies are not well integrated even in today’s world.</p>
<p>I recently participated in a <a href="Gartner%20Conference" target="_blank">Gartner Conference</a> and watched to my amazement a real-time electronic survey of the audience. To my disbelief, the audience, filled with 300+ people from Fortune 2000 companies provided real-time responses to the question:</p>
<p><em>What level of integration does your IT org have between event management and service desk applications?</em></p>
<ul>
<li>None: 10%</li>
<li><strong>Manual Phone call from IT ops to IT service desk staff member: 46%</strong></li>
<li>Manual click button on event manager to open trouble ticket: 20%</li>
<li>Automated event management system automatically opens trouble ticket without requiring human oversight or approval: 24%</li>
</ul>
<p>Unbelievable… still very few of the survey respondents have yet to formalize problem management systems with event management systems. For 56% of the audience the process is still manual!</p>
<p>Another interesting real-time survey question at the Gartner Conference was:</p>
<p><em>Who in your organization is responsible for critical problem processes and resolution?</em></p>
<ul>
<li>IT Service Desk 13%</li>
<li>IT Operations 49%</li>
<li>Process Team 12%</li>
<li>Other 9%</li>
<li>Responsibility not formalized 17%</li>
</ul>
<p><a href="http://blogs.technet.com/virtualization/archive/2008/10/10/Guest-post_3A00_-virtualization-requires-the-proper-perspective-.aspx" target="_blank">Virtualization adoption</a> and the speed with which things change in a virtualized environment require automation and will transform <a href="http://servicexen.wordpress.com/2008/07/02/implementing-service-management-processes-in-small-and-medium-companies/" target="_blank">Incident and Problem Management</a>. Clearly with <a href="http://tarrysingh.blogspot.com/2008/10/microsoft-to-train-thousands-in.html" target="_blank">this new technology we are required to re-think</a> Organizational, Behavioral and Cultural Challenges required to take advantage of the opportunities that virtualization provides.</p>
<p>Incident and problem management processes and metrics must bridge organizational silos that have been the norm within IT. With virtualization, people have to work more closely together in the different silos than ever before. IT leaders need to break down the walls between the technology-centric silo mentalities.</p>
<p>Business Imperative Action Plan:</p>
<ol>
<li>What can you do<strong> today</strong>? &#8211;Understand the impact of virtualization on incident and problem mgt. workload, provide technology training for helpdesk/service desk staff.</li>
<li>What can you do in the <strong>next 12 months</strong>?</li>
</ol>
<p>Formalize problem management processes, metrics and personnel.<br />
Invest in tools and processes for systems on virtualized servers.<br />
Long term: On the Radar Screen!<br />
Instill teamwork into all groups responsible for the <a href="http://servicexen.wordpress.com/2008/07/02/implementing-service-management-processes-in-small-and-medium-companies/" target="_blank">virtualized environment</a> service and support. Map components and configuration items directly to end user services.</p>
<p>Final Thoughts: Know the management pieces and ensure that they fit together. It’s great to buy new technology, but be demanding to ensure that your vendors show you have they will help to link all these pieces together - Change, Inventory, Incident, Problem, Server, Capacity, Performance, Configuration, Event, and Integrated Workflow.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 14 Oct 2008 14:00:59 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/management">management</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/event management systems">event management systems</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/event">event</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/management processes">management processes</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/management pieces">management pieces</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/management systems">management systems</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/management integration">management integration</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/event management system">event management system</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/systems">systems</category>
      <source url="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/integrating-eventincident-and-problem-management/10/2008">Integrating Event/Incident and Problem Management</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Cisco survey: Cultural differences can complicate IT security when work goes offshore]]></title>
      <link>http://www.securityratty.com/article/7f4115ddaf120f29e3df7f32ae888077</link>
      <guid>http://www.securityratty.com/article/7f4115ddaf120f29e3df7f32ae888077</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Companies that are globalizing or outsourcing work to offshore locations shouldn't overlook behavioral and cultural differences when setting their IT security plans, according to Cisco...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Companies that are globalizing or outsourcing work to offshore locations shouldn't overlook behavioral and cultural differences when setting their IT security plans, according to Cisco survey.<br style="clear: both;"/>
    <a style='font-size: 10px; color: maroon;' href='http://www.pheedo.com/hostedMorselClick.php?hfmm=v3:d4e17368d855e9a4bfca142c338201ea:LMSe0HIS%2BjE5Jkzhn3Mkwv7VAu3JwnhMz3JSgTtoObT9qfrGSZErgRy33zr%2BGfhD3%2B81vywSrUtG'><img border='0' title='Add to digg' alt='Add to digg' src='http://www.pheedo.com/images/mm/digg.gif'/></a>
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<img src="http://www.pheedo.com/feeds/tracker.php?i=06c7ea751bd694ce7ae95dad158987f8" style="display: none;" border="0" height="1" width="1" alt=""/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Oct 2008 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/cisco survey">cisco survey</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/cultural differences">cultural differences</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/security plans">security plans</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/overlook behavioral">overlook behavioral</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/offshore locations">offshore locations</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/companies">companies</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.computerworld.com/click.phdo?i=06c7ea751bd694ce7ae95dad158987f8">Cisco survey: Cultural differences can complicate IT security when work goes offshore</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Business In Thailand - Part 1: The Challenge]]></title>
      <link>http://www.securityratty.com/article/ea0ac16a8a09729fec092a6a2c0a7e21</link>
      <guid>http://www.securityratty.com/article/ea0ac16a8a09729fec092a6a2c0a7e21</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Recently someone asked about business in Thailand.Here is my first post on this topic
First of all, I learned the Thai alphabet nearly 20 years ago, so I have have a pretty good foundation for the...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Recently someone asked about business in Thailand.  Here is my first post on this topic:</p>
<p>First of all, I learned the Thai alphabet nearly 20 years ago, so I have have a pretty good foundation for the Thai language.   I can read (slowly) and speak better than 99.99+ percent of all foreigners in Thailand; so, I thought it was time to redirect my career to a &#8220;new challenge&#8221; in the business climate of Thailand.   </p>
<p>This was no small decision.  Your career changes dramatically when you give up a successful consulting practice in the US and dive into business in a foreign land for a new challenge.  I can frankly tell you that often the challenge is sometimes overwhelming.    It is quite difficult as a foreigner to do business in Thailand.</p>
<p>First of all, it is not legal for foreigners to own land in Thailand.  Foreigners can &#8221;own&#8221; land using a variety of legal loopholes, proxy owners and shell companies; but all of this is risky and not advised.  Foreigners lose a lot of money coming to Thailand and attempting to buy land.  Some get lucky, but the entire process of foreigners buying and selling land is quite risky.</p>
<p>Foreigners can own condos, under certain conditions, but this results in  inflated prices for condos in Thailand that are traded in an artificial market place.   Condos that are up-to-par with condos in the US can easily cost more than condos in major cities in the US.  Hence, the cost of living is not as cheap as some might believe.</p>
<p>Business can best be described as &#8220;protectism&#8221; where the government has placed many barriers to entry to foreigners working in Thailand.     Every foreigner must have a work permit and these work permits are expensive and time consuming to maintain.   If you own a business you must pay high professional service fees for auditors to perform annual and semiannual audits even if your business has no income yet.   Firms in Thailand charge thousands of dollars for these &#8221;audits&#8221;.      </p>
<p>In addition, if you operate a business, you must have a place of business, so you are forced to lease office space.   Foreigners from the US must be paid a minimum of 50,000 Thai Baht per month, so the government will take 10 percent of that each month as their share of tax withholdings.   Therefore, to start a company, you will pay a lot of money in startup fees, permits, tax, leases, visas, etc.  The entire system is designed to secure money from you, even if you do not have a penny of incoming revenue.</p>
<p>Of course, generating incoming revenue can be quite difficult in a climate of protectionism.   In Thailand, it is easy when you are spending money.  When you are trying to generate income from Thailand, as a foreigner the challenge can seem overwhelming at times.   Many foreigners here give up because the barriers to business here are very high.</p>
<p>On top of all these challenges, which I have not described in detail, is the overall global business slowdown combined with a climate of political instability, which I am sure you have seen in the news.  </p>
<p>Most people I know say it is better to be a tourist here.   Being a tourist is completely different.  Money flows from you, so life in Thailand is fun and friendly, complimentary to the &#8220;Land of Smiles&#8221; you have heard about.     However, when you are working to have money flow the other direction, flow to you versus away from you, you don&#8217;t see the &#8220;Land of Smiles&#8221; as tourists experience.</p>
<p>Without getting into too many details, I can simply say that a foreigner doing business in Thailand experiences protectionism and, to a certain degree, discrimination, and sometimes I wonder if coming here for a &#8220;business challenge&#8221; was a good idea.    I was seeking a &#8220;new challenge&#8221; and I got more than I bargained for!</p>
<p>In a future post on business in Thailand I will discuss issues regarding how little value is placed in intellectual property in Thailand and how this adversely impacts professional services.    I will also touch on how this lack of regard for intellectual property impacts a consulting practice.   Also, I will touch on some cultural differences in how Thais appear to view teamwork, which is very different than in the US.</p>
<p> </p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 04 Sep 2008 10:16:36 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/challenge">challenge</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/business">business</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/thailand">thailand</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/business challenge">business challenge</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/global business slowdown">global business slowdown</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/thailand chargethousands">thailand chargethousands</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/foreigners">foreigners</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/money">money</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/money flows">money flows</category>
      <source url="http://www.thecepblog.com/2008/09/04/business-in-thailand-part-1-the-challenge/">Business In Thailand - Part 1: The Challenge</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Banker Malware Targeting Brazilian Banks in the Wild]]></title>
      <link>http://www.securityratty.com/article/4c146364a5e5366271bb42a4f795af8d</link>
      <guid>http://www.securityratty.com/article/4c146364a5e5366271bb42a4f795af8d</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Despite the ongoing customerization of malware, and the malware coding for hire customer tailored services, certain malware authors still believe in the product concept, namely, they build it and wait...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SKldLvANUBI/AAAAAAAACC8/4JM_2PVEVY4/s1600-h/banker_malware_brazil_banks.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SKldLvANUBI/AAAAAAAACC8/zzcjUAMw61E/s200-R/banker_malware_brazil_banks.jpg" /></a>Despite the ongoing customerization of malware, and the malware coding for hire customer tailored services, certain malware authors still believe in the product concept, namely, they build it and wait for someone to come. In this underground proposition for a proprietary banker malware targeting primarily Brazillian bank, the author is relying on the localized value added to his malware forgetting a simply fact - that the most popular banker malware is generalizing E-banking transactions in such a way that it's successfully able to hijack the sessions of banks it hasn't originally be coded to target in general.<br />
<br />
<b>Banks targetted in this banker malware :</b><br />
<i>Bank Equifax<br />
Bank Itau<br />
Bank Check<br />
Bank Vivo<br />
Bank Banrisul<br />
Tim Bank Brazil<br />
Bank Nossa Caixa<br />
Bank Santander Banespa<br />
Bank Infoseg<br />
Bank Paypal <br />
Bank Caixa Economica Federal<br />
Bank Bradesco<br />
Bank Northeast<br />
Royal Bank<br />
Bank Itau Personnalite<br />
Bank PagSeguro<br />
Australia Bank<br />
Credicard Citi Bank<br />
Credicard Bank Itau<br />
Rural Bank</i><br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SKlgsZBqOLI/AAAAAAAACDE/kN2MQLJqjls/s1600-h/banker_malware_brazil_banks1.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SKlgsZBqOLI/AAAAAAAACDE/niBpSaKVaTE/s200-R/banker_malware_brazil_banks1.jpg" /></a>Taking into consideration the fact that not everyone would be willing to pay a couple of thousand dollars for a <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/11/metaphisher-malware-kit-spotted-in-wild.html">banker malware kit targeting banks the customer isn't interested in at the first place</a>, malware authors have long been tailoring their propositions on the basis of modules. Adding an additional module for stealtness increases the prices, as well as an additional module forwarding the process of updating the malware binary to the "customer support desk". Moreover, stripping the banker kit from modules in which the customer doesn't have interest, like for instance exclude all Asian banks the kit has already built-in capabilities to hijack and log transactions from, decreases its price.<br />
<br />
In a truly globalized IT underground, Brazillian cybercriminals tend to prefer using the <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/04/crimeware-in-middle-zeus.html">market leading tools courtesy of Russian malware authors</a>, so this localized banker malware with its basic session screenshot taking capabilities and accounting data logging has a very long way to go before it starts getting embraced by the local underground.<br />
<br />
<b>Related posts:</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/twitter-malware-campaign-wants-to-bank.html">The Twitter Malware Campaign Wants to Bank With You</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/11/targeted-spamming-of-bankers-malware.html">Targeted Spamming of Bankers Malware</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/03/localized-bankers-malware-campaign.html">A Localized Bankers Malware Campaign</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/76service-cybercrime-as-service-going.html">76Service - Cybercrime as a Service Going Mainstream</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/03/underground-economys-supply-of-goods.html">The Underground Economy's Supply of Goods and Services</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/dynamics-of-malware-industry.html">The Dynamics of the Malware Industry - Proprietary Malware Tools</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/using-market-forces-to-disrupt-botnets.html">Using Market Forces to Disrupt Botnets</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/multiple-firewalls-bypassing.html">Multiple Firewalls Bypassing Verification on Demand</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/managed-spamming-appliances-future-of.html">Managed Spamming Appliances - The Future of Spam</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/02/localizing-cybercrime-cultural.html">Localizing Cybercrime - Cultural Diversity on Demand</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/01/e-crime-and-socioeconomic-factors.html">E-crime and Socioeconomic Factors</a><b>&nbsp;</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/08/malware-as-web-service.html">Malware as a Web Service</a><b>&nbsp;</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/coding-spyware-and-malware-for-hire.html">Coding Spyware and Malware for Hire</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/are-stolen-credit-card-details-getting.html">Are Stolen Credit Card Details Getting Cheaper?</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/neosploit-team-leaving-it-underground.html">Neosploit Team Leaving the IT Underground</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/zeus-crimeware-kit-vulnerable-to.html">The Zeus Crimeware Kit Vulnerable to Remotely Exploitable Flaw</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/pinch-vulnerable-to-remotely.html">Pinch Vulnerable to Remotely Exploitable Flaw</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/dissecting-managed-spamming-service.html">Dissecting a Managed Spamming Service</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/managed-spamming-appliances-future-of.html">Managed "Spamming Appliances" - The Future of Spam</a><div class="feedflare">
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      <pubDate>Mon, 18 Aug 2008 03:01:03 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/banker malware">banker malware</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/banker malware kit">banker malware kit</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/kit">kit</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/popular banker malware">popular banker malware</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/malware">malware</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/bank itau personnalite">bank itau personnalite</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/bank itau">bank itau</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/malware authors">malware authors</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/russian malware authors">russian malware authors</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/368038328/banker-malware-targetting-brazilian.html">Banker Malware Targeting Brazilian Banks in the Wild</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Security is bigger than finding and fixing bugs]]></title>
      <link>http://www.securityratty.com/article/9c8ebf47be004fc532a7e7de3eceed48</link>
      <guid>http://www.securityratty.com/article/9c8ebf47be004fc532a7e7de3eceed48</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Ive been catching up on various security-related articles that Ive been meaning to read, and the following article was on the list...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<P>I’ve been catching up on various security-related articles that I’ve been meaning to read, and the following article was on the list <A href="http://www.itnews.com.au/News/73635,google-shares-its-security-secrets.aspx">http://www.itnews.com.au/News/73635,google-shares-its-security-secrets.aspx</A> about Google’s “security secrets.” <BR>&nbsp;<BR>Quoting from the article: </P>
<BLOCKQUOTE>
<P>“In order to keep its products safe, Google has adopted a philosophy of 'security as a cultural value'. The programme includes mandatory security training for developers, a set of in-house security libraries, and code reviews both by Google developers and outside security researchers."</P></BLOCKQUOTE>
<P>I think it is great that Google has a security program they are willing to talk about and I could not agree more with the ‘security as a cultural value’ philosophy. But isn’t there something really fundamental missing here? Design? There is a lot more to software engineering other than coding and testing. <BR>&nbsp;<BR>The SDL has a very large set of implementation-related requirements, but there are many design-related requirements also.</P>
<P>Computer security experts have known since the early 1970s that you have to get the design right; and our experiences with the SDL over the last 5 years have taught us that you need to consider security and privacy (but remember, you have to ship too!) very early in the design phase and have a consistent end-to-end process if you truly hope to reduce vulnerabilities and create more secure software. This is how the SDL is helping to create ‘security as a cultural value’ at Microsoft. </P>
<P>We’ve seen a general trend downward in security vulnerabilities in Microsoft products, and the IBM X-Force 2008 mid-year <A href="http://www-935.ibm.com/services/us/iss/xforce/midyearreport/xforce-midyear-report-2008.pdf" mce_href="http://www-935.ibm.com/services/us/iss/xforce/midyearreport/xforce-midyear-report-2008.pdf">report</A> backs the assertion that we’re making progress; according to the report Microsoft’s share of total vulnerabilities decreased from 3.7% in 2007 (1st place) to 2.5% (that’s 2.5% for <STRONG><U>all</U></STRONG> Microsoft products; a more appropriate comparison might be Windows vs Linux vs Mac OSX, or SQL Server vs Oracle vs DB2) in the first 6 months of 2008 (3rd place.) This is an encouraging signal that the SDL is working on a large scale… of course, it might also show that vulnerability researchers are moving to easier targets, which, to me shows the SDL is working too.<BR>&nbsp;<BR>What do you think?<BR></P><img src="http://blogs.msdn.com/aggbug.aspx?PostID=8867829" width="1" height="1">]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 14 Aug 2008 16:09:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/security researchers">security researchers</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/security vulnerabilities">security vulnerabilities</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/computer security experts">computer security experts</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/googles security secrets">googles security secrets</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/in-house security libraries">in-house security libraries</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/security program">security program</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/microsoft products">microsoft products</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/sdl">sdl</category>
      <source url="http://blogs.msdn.com/sdl/archive/2008/08/14/security-is-bigger-than-finding-and-fixing-bugs.aspx">Security is bigger than finding and fixing bugs</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[76Service - Cybercrime as a Service Going Mainstream]]></title>
      <link>http://www.securityratty.com/article/35bdaf104e9aecf7703834d959f39050</link>
      <guid>http://www.securityratty.com/article/35bdaf104e9aecf7703834d959f39050</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Disintermediating the intermediaries in the cybercrime ecosystem, ultimately results in more profitable operations. Controversial to the concept of outsourcing, some cybercriminals are in fact so...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SKKs5L3ihpI/AAAAAAAACBs/vEaSMC2S8nI/s1600-h/76service.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SKKs5L3ihpI/AAAAAAAACBs/qhgjQh39ej8/s200-R/76service.JPG" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>Disintermediating the intermediaries in the cybercrime ecosystem, ultimately results in more profitable operations. Controversial to the concept of outsourcing, some cybercriminals are in fact so self-sufficient, that the stereotype of a mysterious 76service server offered for rent could in fact easily cease to exist in an ecosystem so vibrant that literally everyone can partion their botnet and start offering access to it on a multi-user basis. Evil? Obviously. Extending the lifecycle of a proprietary malware tool? Definitely.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lw9IeuKkNbc">The infamous 76service</a>, a cybercrime as a service web interface where customers basically collect the final output out of the banking malware botnet during the specific period of time for which they've purchases access to the service, is going mainstream, with 76Service's Spring Edition apparently leaking out, and cybercriminals enjoying its interoperability potential by introducing different banking trojans in their campaigns. <br />
<br />
In this post, I'll discuss the 76service's spring.edition that has been combined with a <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/11/metaphisher-malware-kit-spotted-in-wild.html">Metaphisher banking malware</a>, an a popular <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/04/crimeware-in-middle-zeus.html">web malware exploitation kit</a>, with two campaigns currently hosting 5.51GB of stolen banking data based on over 1 million compromised hosts 59% of which are based in Russia. Screenshots courtesy of an egocentric underground show-off.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.cio.com/article/print/135500">Some general info on the 76service</a> :<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SKKyWAXgYGI/AAAAAAAACB0/JXHZFuBb6Rs/s1600-h/76service1.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SKKyWAXgYGI/AAAAAAAACB0/2qZfVy6YfU8/s200-R/76service1.JPG" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>"<i>Subscribers could log in with their assigned user name and     password any time during the 30-day project. They’d be     met with a screen that told them which of their bots was     currently active, and a side bar of management options. For     example, they could pull down the latest drops—data     deposits that the Gozi-infected machines they subscribed to     sent to the servers, like the 3.3 GB one Jackson had     found. A project was like an investment portfolio. Individual     Gozi-infected machines were like stocks and subscribers bought     a group of them, betting they could gain enough personal     information from their portfolio of infected machines to make a     profit, mostly by turning around and selling credentials on the     black market. (In some cases, subscribers would use a few of     the credentials themselves). Some machines, like some stocks, would under perform and     provide little private information. But others would land the     subscriber a windfall of private data. The point was to     subscribe to several infected machines to balance that risk,     the way Wall Street fund managers invest in many stocks to     offset losses in one company with gains in another.</i>"<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SKKy5q1ebVI/AAAAAAAACB8/uGe8GuhDvRg/s1600-h/76service2.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SKKy5q1ebVI/AAAAAAAACB8/88IxypeBf74/s200-R/76service2.JPG" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>The 76service empowers everyone who is either not willing to spend time and resources for building and maintaining a botnet, launching campaigns, and SQL injecting hundreds of thousands of sites in order to take advantage of the long tail of malware infected sites that theoretically can outpace the traffic that could come from a SQL injected high-profile site.<br />
<br />
Next to the spring.edition, <a href="http://secureworks.com/research/threats/gozi/">the winter edition's price starts from $1000 and goes to $2000</a>, which is all a matter of who you're buying it from, unless of course you haven't come across leaked copies :<br />
<br />
"<i>Assuming that the dealer offering what he claimed was the 76service kit was correct, the profit is not only in the kit, but in selling value added services like exploitation, compromised servers/accounts, database configuration, and customization of the interface. Prices start between $1000 to $2000 and go up based on added services. The underground payment methods generally involve hard-to-track virtual currencies, whose central authority is in a jurisdiction where regulation is liberal to non-existent, and feature non-reversible transactions. The individual or group called "76service" was easy to track down on the Web, but not in person.</i>" <br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SKLUyA7g9LI/AAAAAAAACCE/nl-OA3FHPs0/s1600-h/76service3.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SKLUyA7g9LI/AAAAAAAACCE/8zS6gcoEdvk/s200-R/76service3.JPG" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>It's interesting to monitor how services aiming to provide specific malicious services are vertically integrating by expanding their portfolio of related services -- taka a spamming vendor that will offer the segmented email databases, the advanced metrics, and the localization of the spam messages to different languages -- or letting the buyer have full control of anything that comes out of a particular botnet for a specific period of time in which he has bought access to it. For instance, DDoS for hire matured into botnet for hire, which evolved into today's "What type of stolen data do you want?" for hire mentality I'm starting to see emerging, next to the usual interest in improving the metrics and thereby the probability for a more succesful campaign. <br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SKLa2TO4yAI/AAAAAAAACCM/4s3Mkgb-NOY/s1600-h/metafisher1_ukstories.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SKLa2TO4yAI/AAAAAAAACCM/Bt7wKW7IPcE/s200-R/metafisher1_ukstories.jpg" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>Ironically, this cybercrime model is so efficient that the people behind it cannot seem to be able to process all of the stolen data, which like a great deal of underground assets loses its value if not sold as fast as possible. The result of this oversupply of stolen data are the increasing number of services selling raw logs segmented based on a particular country for a specific period of time.<br />
<br />
Time for a remotely exploitable vulnerability in yet another malware kit about to go mainstream? Definitely, unless of course backdooring it and releasing it doesn't achieve the obvious results of controlling someone else's cybercrime ecosystem.<br />
<br />
<b>Related posts:</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/03/underground-economys-supply-of-goods.html">The Underground Economy's Supply of Goods and Services</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/dynamics-of-malware-industry.html">The Dynamics of the Malware Industry - Proprietary Malware Tools</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/using-market-forces-to-disrupt-botnets.html">Using Market Forces to Disrupt Botnets</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/multiple-firewalls-bypassing.html">Multiple Firewalls Bypassing Verification on Demand</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/managed-spamming-appliances-future-of.html">Managed Spamming Appliances - The Future of Spam</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/02/localizing-cybercrime-cultural.html">Localizing Cybercrime - Cultural Diversity on Demand</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/01/e-crime-and-socioeconomic-factors.html">E-crime and Socioeconomic Factors</a><b>&nbsp;</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/08/malware-as-web-service.html">Malware as a Web Service</a><b>&nbsp;</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/coding-spyware-and-malware-for-hire.html">Coding Spyware and Malware for Hire</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/are-stolen-credit-card-details-getting.html">Are Stolen Credit Card Details Getting Cheaper?</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/neosploit-team-leaving-it-underground.html">Neosploit Team Leaving the IT Underground</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/zeus-crimeware-kit-vulnerable-to.html">The Zeus Crimeware Kit Vulnerable to Remotely Exploitable Flaw</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/pinch-vulnerable-to-remotely.html">Pinch Vulnerable to Remotely Exploitable Flaw</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/dissecting-managed-spamming-service.html">Dissecting a Managed Spamming Service</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/managed-spamming-appliances-future-of.html">Managed "Spamming Appliances" - The Future of Spam</a><br />
<br />
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      <pubDate>Wed, 13 Aug 2008 04:08:43 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/76service">76service</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/service">service</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/malware">malware</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/malware kit">malware kit</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/cybercrime">cybercrime</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/malware botnet">malware botnet</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/botnet">botnet</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/mysterious 76service server">mysterious 76service server</category>
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      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/363878623/76service-cybercrime-as-service-going.html">76Service - Cybercrime as a Service Going Mainstream</source>
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