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  <channel>
    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: email]]></title>
    <link>http://www.securityratty.com/tag/email</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Tue, 11 Nov 2008 11:54:46 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[What is a Wise Risk Decision Worth? or ISO 27001 KPIs Follow Up]]></title>
      <link>http://www.securityratty.com/article/4c9a85007f78452901952cf859ffd96d</link>
      <guid>http://www.securityratty.com/article/4c9a85007f78452901952cf859ffd96d</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[So yesterday I asked readers to comment on thoughts I had that came from a question asked on the ISO 27001 Google Group
How I can communicate the value of an ISO implementation to non-security...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>So yesterday I asked readers to comment on thoughts I had that came from a question asked on the ISO 27001 Google Group:</p>
<blockquote><p>&#8220;How I can communicate the value of an ISO implementation to non-security management?&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>This question came to me after one of the posters on the ISO Google Group asked about KPIs for ISO implementation.  Got great responses in <a href="http://riskmanagementinsight.com/riskanalysis/?p=525#comment-33917"><strong>email, blog comments</strong></a>, and on Twitter from current/former CISO folks and consultants and analysts.  Some really great thought and effort, by the way - <strong>thank you</strong>.  It&#8217;s really great to be able to have these sorts of conversations online.</p>
<p>First, I have to point out some resources Brian Honan linked to from Gary Hinson, just because they&#8217;re so cool.  Gary has invested gobs of time and effort to become one of the defacto resources on the ISO (you might also want to read or re-read <strong><a href="http://www.noticebored.com/html/metrics.html">Gary&#8217;s web post on the 7 myths of metrics</a></strong>).   Brian links to an <a href="http://www.iso27001security.com/ISO27k_implementation_guidance_1v1.pdf">implementation guidance document(pdf)</a> and a <a href="http://www.iso27001security.com/ISO27k_security_metrics_examples.pdf">metrics example(pdf)</a> document.</p>
<p>As full of awesomeness as they are, though, these are simply metrics &#8220;mapped&#8221; to the ISO (i.e. the ISO isn&#8217;t a pre-requisite for generating this information).  They are not KPI&#8217;s that express the value of ISO implementation.  Problem is the metrics created here still require some level of &#8220;translation&#8221; in order to create some value statement that data owners can understand.  As <strong><a href="http://www.myrcurial.com/">Myrcurial</a></strong> twittered me &#8220;<span class="entry-content">27001 is orthoganal to process&#8221; meaning (I hope) that metrics have their foundation in events that are generated by processes.  27001 by itself was never meant to create metrics (see above), and so we&#8217;re asking a question the ISO can&#8217;t answer.  But the desire, the need to measure still exists.  To that extent we can google &#8220;ISO compliance&#8221; (whatever that means) and if something can be certifiable or deemed &#8220;compliant&#8221; we can and are &#8220;measuring&#8221;.  But does that have value?</span> Rybolov (<strong><a href="http://www.guerilla-ciso.com/">my favorite Guerilla CISO</a></strong>) wrote:</p>
<blockquote><p><em>&#8220;Whatever you do, don’t start measuring percentage of compliance. Eventually, that’s what all metrics efforts around a framework devolve into.&#8221;</em></p></blockquote>
<p>I have to agree.  Being ISO &#8220;compliant/certified&#8221; has little expressive business value <em>prima facia</em>. I find that one KPI that absolutely asserts value when expressed properly is risk - and similarly  <strong><a href="http://layer8.itsecuritygeek.com//layer8">Shrdlu</a></strong> wrote:</p>
<blockquote><p><em>&#8220;I really have no idea. I personally wouldn’t try to justify an ISO implementation by itself. If I could show traceability on how it affected our overall security risk, then that’s what I’d do.&#8221;</em></p></blockquote>
<p>And that&#8217;s a delightful answer.  That &#8220;traceability&#8221; (geeze-louise Shrdlu - what a word!) is absolutely what I&#8217;m after here.  How do I get that?  <span class="entry-content"> </span></p>
<p><span class="entry-content">If you&#8217;re going to do something with corporate budget (time, money - and goodness knows an ISO implementation is time &amp; money) you better be able to communicate the value.  And while the zealotry for ISO implementation differs from person to person, I have yet to come across someone who says that ISO adoption is totally without value.  It&#8217;s just not apparent what that value of adoption is and how we can measure (metrics) and express it (KPIs).<br />
</span></p>
<p>Jenean Paschalidis wrote what he thought that value was in a very nice email in which he puts a qualitative name on the value of adoption:</p>
<blockquote><p><em>&#8220;Transparency and accountability-this is what all executive/senior management (the company) is on the hook for. ISO provides that. If you want to understand and have confidence in your operations as supported by security (because you will know the who, what, where, when, why and how of a system (human, technical etc.) and you want to be able to trace back why a decision (risk-vetted) had been made - then adoption of this best international practice will assist in providing these answers.&#8221;</em></p></blockquote>
<p>So working with our above thoughts a little here - if we agree with Shrdlu that the only value of an ISO implementation can only be expressed if we can say how said implementation affected our overall security risk - and we agree with Jenean that the primary benefit is an ability to have confidence in operations as supported by security, then&#8230;.</p>
<p><em><strong>The value of the ISO should be expressed as a KPI or set of KPIs that cleary explain how the confidence it generates helps us understand (and then reduce) our risk. </strong></em></p>
<p>If risk is a probability issue,  ISO adoption helps generate confidence in our predictive analytics.  The dollar value the ISO generates (the ultimate KPI) is part of the cost of being able to make wise risk decisions.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">So what is that (making wise risk decisions) worth to you?</span></strong></p>
<p style="text-align: center;">
<p><strong><span style="color: #003300;">SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS</span></strong><em><span style="color: #003300;"><br />
</span></em></p>
<p>First, it occurs to me that this is a real shame.  In a sense, an inability to generate a quantitative value statement for ISO use is simply more witch-doctory (<em>&#8220;use it because we, the wise men of the tribe say you should&#8221;</em>).  In some future version, the ISO should include some mechanism for measuring and expressing the worth of adoption to the organization (a better reason to use the ISO than &#8220;because we said so&#8221;).</p>
<p><span style="color: #003300;">Second, It should be noted that of Jack Jones&#8217; 3 true value statements from which all metrics/KPIs should point to - we&#8217;re only talking about one of those value statements - the ability to reduce risk.  Using the ISO in an organization most certainly could create operational efficiencies (help us do more with less) - but the ISO isn&#8217;t a standard that creates operational efficiencies as a primary goal, nor does it give implicit direction on how to create operational efficincies.    The ISO folks do, however, play fast and loose with the idea of &#8220;risk&#8221; and &#8220;risk management&#8221; so it&#8217;s within this context that I interpreted our conversation.</span></p>
<p>Finally if you&#8217;re going to hire someone to help you with ISO adoption in your organization, the deliverables you ask for in your RFP/SOW/what-have-you should include quantitative (probability) statments about risk reduction and the creation of operational efficiencies.  If the firms answering can&#8217;t tell you what value their work will be to your company, then drop me a note and I&#8217;ll gladly point you to some friends of RMI&#8217;s that know FAIR &amp; all our Risk Management frameworks and also do great ISO work.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 03 Dec 2008 12:47:11 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/iso">iso</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/iso google">iso google</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/iso adoption">iso adoption</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/iso implementation">iso implementation</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/iso folks">iso folks</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/iso adoption helps">iso adoption helps</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/risk">risk</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/google iso compliance">google iso compliance</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/iso implementation differs">iso implementation differs</category>
      <source url="http://riskmanagementinsight.com/riskanalysis/?p=527">What is a Wise Risk Decision Worth? or ISO 27001 KPIs Follow Up</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Online Finance Flaw: TIAA-CREF XSS & Potential CSRF]]></title>
      <link>http://www.securityratty.com/article/5978268eaad37c626521f5473142a03e</link>
      <guid>http://www.securityratty.com/article/5978268eaad37c626521f5473142a03e</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Before discussing a TIAA-CREF security flaw, allow me to clarify my &quot;terms of engagement
Prior to offering analysis of any security flaws in online financial services, be assured I have engaged the...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Before discussing a <a href="http://www.tiaa-cref.org/" target="_blank">TIAA-CREF</a> security flaw, allow me to clarify my "terms of engagement". <br />Prior to offering analysis of any security flaws in online financial services, be assured I have engaged the service provider and offered what I believe to a reasonable amount of time to remedy this issue. Specifically, a minimum of two weeks and three unique contact attempts are made. Should the vendor offer a timeline in which the issue will be resolved, so long as it is not months or years, I will wait until they are ready to deploy the fix, then discuss the vulnerability. If I am not in receipt of a reply other than generic customer service replies, I will follow the two week standard, then discuss the issue.<br /><br />TIAA-CREF, or the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association - College Retirement Equities Fund, is a respected, widely utilized provider of numerous financial products and services. The TIAA-CREF site is ranked <a href="http://www.alexa.com/search?q=tiaa-cref.org" target="_blank">26,148</a> on <a href="http://www.alexa.com" target="_blank">Alexa.com</a> at the time of this writing.<br /><br />I'll first direct you to the TIAA-CREF <a href="http://www.tiaa-cref.org/about/inside/topics/security.html" target="_blank">Security</a> page, where they discuss the expected elements like identity theft, spoofing, tips, and my favorite, phishing.<br />Here's where the trouble begins. Obviously, most phishing occurs when some miscreant creates a fake page and attempts to lure victims via email. <br /><span style="font-weight:bold;">The severity of phishing risks are greatly increased by the introduction of a cross-site scripting (<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site_scripting" target+"_blank">XSS</a>) vulnerability in a site that is of high value to phishing attackers.</span> <br />With such a vulnerability available, the prospect of success for a phisher are much higher given that the malicious URL they would craft could include the actual target domain, rather than a faked misrepresentation. A simple script insertion at the vulnerable variable would then allow the attacker to redirect victims to a maliciously crafted logon page in the context of the vulnerable site.<br />Sad side note: when you search <span style="font-style:italic;">security</span> at the TIAA-CREF site, the above mentioned Security page is not returned in the results as I write this. <br />However, the resulting search URL serves as the starting point for our discussion of the flaw:<br /><span style="font-style:italic;">http://www.tiaa-cref.org/explore/portlets/search.jsp?query=security&strtfrm=1&totpresults=75&srchtype=4&sc=1&frmsite=0</span><br />The vast majority of non-search input variables on the TIAA-CREF site offer reasonable XSS protections, likely a blacklist method that redirects you to the following language when common XSS strings are noted, particularly where it counts at logon pages.<br /><span style="font-weight:bold;">Due to the presence of characters known to be used in Cross Site Scripting attacks, access is forbidden. This web site does not allow Urls which might include embedded HTML tags.<span style="font-style:italic;"></span></span> <br />Unfortunately, this methodology was not deployed globally, and thus the following online finance flaw.<br />All input variables used in TIAA-CREF's search.jsp script are vulnerable to XSS.<br />Utilized by an attacker, this could have a much more significant impact on TIAA-CREF customers who fall victim to a now more convincing social engineering effort.<br />Here's the site before script insertion:<br /><br /><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_kVOWaY1TAF0/STb14rWuuOI/AAAAAAAAAFk/ydVDLZjjwNI/s1600-h/tiaa-cref-before.png" target="_blank"><img style="cursor:pointer; cursor:hand;width: 320px; height: 166px;" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_kVOWaY1TAF0/STb14rWuuOI/AAAAAAAAAFk/ydVDLZjjwNI/s320/tiaa-cref-before.png" border="0" alt=""id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5275674367570655458" /></a><br /><br />Here's the site after script insertion:<br /><br /><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_kVOWaY1TAF0/STb2X3oLzeI/AAAAAAAAAFs/FBGmafHFZ2o/s1600-h/tiaa-cref-after.png" target="_blank"><img style="cursor:pointer; cursor:hand;width: 320px; height: 198px;" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_kVOWaY1TAF0/STb2X3oLzeI/AAAAAAAAAFs/FBGmafHFZ2o/s320/tiaa-cref-after.png" border="0" alt=""id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5275674903441034722" /></a><br /><br />Further, certain parts of the site, including the <a href="https://www.account3000.com/tiaacref/TFALogin.asp" target="_blnak">Trust Company</a> logon page, show potential signs of cross-site request forgery (<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site_request_forgery" target="_blank">CSRF</a>) in that they accept updates via GET or allow submittal with the referrer stripped.<br /><br />Lessons learned:<br />1) Don't assume all is well even though a site may offer examples of how attentive they are to security.<br />2) Never log on to an online financial service offering (or anything else for that matter) via a link sent to you in an email. Period.<br />3) Take all steps at your disposal to ensure you are logging in to and transacting with the actual site you intended to utilize. Don't depend on security badges and SSL certificates as your sole means of confirmation.<br />4) If you note something of concern at a site you utilize, advise them immediately and demand repair or clarification until you're satisfied. <br /><br />Please feel free to send <a href="http://www.tiaa-cref.org/about/contact/index.html?tc_lnk=toputlity" target="_blank">feedback</a> to TIAA-CREF as I have per my "terms of engagement" above. Hopefully they'll resolve this issue soon, on behalf of customers in their care.<br /><br />Up next in our series, two of the top five banks mentioned in Javelin Strategy & Research's <span style="font-style:italic;">Banking Identity Safety Scorecard</span> are vulnerable to similar issues.<br /><br /><a href="http://del.icio.us/post?url=http://holisticinfosec.blogspot.com/2008/12/online-finance-flaw-tiaa-cref-xss.html&title=Online%20Finance%20Flaw:%20TIAA-CREF%20XSS%20&%20Potential%20CSRF " title="Online Finance Flaw: TIAA-CREF XSS & Potential CSRF ">del.icio.us</a> | <a href="http://digg.com/submit?phase=2&amp;url=http://holisticinfosec.blogspot.com/2008/12/online-finance-flaw-tiaa-cref-xss.html" title="Online Finance Flaw: TIAA-CREF XSS & Potential CSRF ">digg</a> | <a href="http://slashdot.org/submit.pl?url=http://holisticinfosec.blogspot.com/2008/12/online-finance-flaw-tiaa-cref-xss.html">Submit to Slashdot</a>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 03 Dec 2008 06:42:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/tiaa-cref">tiaa-cref</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/site">site</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/cross-site">cross-site</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/tiaa-cref site">tiaa-cref site</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/tiaa-cref security flaw">tiaa-cref security flaw</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/flaw">flaw</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/tiaa-cref security page">tiaa-cref security page</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/security page">security page</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/cross site">cross site</category>
      <source url="http://holisticinfosec.blogspot.com/2008/12/online-finance-flaw-tiaa-cref-xss.html">Online Finance Flaw: TIAA-CREF XSS &amp; Potential CSRF</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Rock Phish-ing in December]]></title>
      <link>http://www.securityratty.com/article/d1eddfe52ced7cf231d9526475837380</link>
      <guid>http://www.securityratty.com/article/d1eddfe52ced7cf231d9526475837380</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Nothing can warm up the hearth of a security researcher than a batch of currently active Rock Phish domains, fast-fluxing by using U.S based malware infected hosts as infrastructure provider. What is...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/STUqs5QOkBI/AAAAAAAACfw/_V_hnn5FsvY/s1600-h/rock_phishing_december_2008_4.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/STUqs5QOkBI/AAAAAAAACfw/_V_hnn5FsvY/s200/rock_phishing_december_2008_4.png" /></a>Nothing can warm up the hearth of a security researcher than a batch of currently active Rock Phish domains, fast-fluxing by using U.S based malware&nbsp; infected hosts as infrastructure provider. What is this assessment of currently active Rock Phish campaign aiming to achieve? In short, prove that the people that were Rock Phish-ing at the beginning of the year, are exactly the same people that continue Rock Phish-ing at the end of the year, thereby pointing out that as long as they're not where they're supposed to be, they are not going to stop innovating and working on a higher average online time for their campaigns.<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/STUurE2no7I/AAAAAAAACf4/knoqvo5_Ruk/s1600-h/rock_phishing_december_2008.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/STUurE2no7I/AAAAAAAACf4/knoqvo5_Ruk/s200/rock_phishing_december_2008.png" /></a>What's particularly interesting about this campaign, is that compared to previous ones targeting multiple brands, the thousands of malware infected hosts and domains are targeting Alliance &amp; Leicester and Abbey National only.<br />
<br />
Active Rock Phish Domains in fast-flux :<br />
<b>stgsfw7sr .com<br />
q06ciwt60 .com<br />
jnlyf96v4 .com<br />
neegzlh35 .com<br />
7azwmrsg5 .com<br />
pn3ekq976 .com<br />
2coxi8sb6 .com<br />
d8ri1iz5d .com<br />
&nbsp;</b><br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/STUwghNYQnI/AAAAAAAACgI/26zVuduDrUQ/s1600-h/rock_phishing_december_2008_5.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/STUwghNYQnI/AAAAAAAACgI/26zVuduDrUQ/s200/rock_phishing_december_2008_5.png" /></a><b>ki7wvgauf .com<br />
5nt5r3keh .com<br />
5nt29884j .com<br />
bgoryomek .com<br />
a725jv8ik .com<br />
fke5nnp8m .com<br />
stgsfw7sr .com<br />
10c0ka49t .com<br />
zp304ju3z .com<br />
j0rykafwn .cn<br />
2j1f .net<br />
<br />
confirm-updates .com<br />
paypal.confirm-updates .com<br />
user-data-confirmation .com<br />
paypal.user-data-confirmation .com<br />
capitalone.updating-informations .com</b><br />
<br />
Sample sub-domain structure :<br />
<b>mybank.alliance-leicester.co.uk.7azwmrsg5 .com<br />
mybank.alliance-leicester.co.uk.bgoryomek .com<br />
mybank.aliance-leicester.co.uk.stgsfw7sr .com<br />
mybank.alliance-leicester.co.uk.zp304ju3z .com<br />
mybank.alliance-leicester.co.uk.5nt29884j .com<br />
mybank.aliance-leicester.co.uk.bgoryomek .com<br />
mybank.alliance-leicester.co.uk.bgoryomek .com<br />
mybank.aliance-leicester.co.uk.stgsfw7sr .com<br />
mybank.alliance-leicester.co.uk.stgsfw7sr .com<br />
mybank.aliance-leicester.co.uk.zp304ju3z .com<br />
mybank.alliance-leicester.co.uk.zp304ju3z .com<br />
myonlineaccounts2.abbeynational.co.uk.pn3ekq976 .com<br />
myonlineaccounts1.abeynational.com.pn3ekq976 .com</b><br />
<br />
<a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/STUwTom6U0I/AAAAAAAACgA/EPxpvWuWNnY/s1600-h/rock_phishing_december_2008_3.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/STUwTom6U0I/AAAAAAAACgA/EPxpvWuWNnY/s200/rock_phishing_december_2008_3.png" /></a>DNS servers for the campaigns :<br />
<b>ns1.thecherrydns .com<br />
ns2.thecherrydns .com <br />
ns3.thecherrydns .com <br />
ns4.thecherrydns .com <br />
ns5.thecherrydns .com <br />
ns6.thecherrydns .com <br />
<br />
ns10.realgoodnameserver .com<br />
ns1.realgoodnameserver .com<br />
rens2.realgoodnameserver .com<br />
rns3.realgoodnameserver .com<br />
ns4.realgoodnameserver .com<br />
ns8.realgoodnameserver .com<br />
<br />
ns6.myboomdns .com<br />
ns4.myboomdns .com</b><br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/STUw5WuMSYI/AAAAAAAACgQ/VgFTgLTJK58/s1600-h/rock_phishing_december_2008_7.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/STUw5WuMSYI/AAAAAAAACgQ/VgFTgLTJK58/s200/rock_phishing_december_2008_7.png" /></a><b>Domains registrant :</b><br />
Name : Pan Wei wei<br />
Organization : Pan Wei wei<br />
Address : BaoChun Rd. 27, No. 3, 1F, Apt. 1903<br />
City : Bejing<br />
Province/State : Beijing<br />
Country : CN<br />
Postal Code : 100176<br />
Phone Number : 010-010-58022118-58022118<br />
Fax : 86-010-58022118-58022118<br />
Email : 127@126.com<br />
<br />
These well known Rock Phish campaigners, have been naturally multitasking on several different underground fronts throughout the year. For instance, their <b>2j1f .net</b> is known to have been <a href="http://www.bobbear.co.uk/morganinvestment.html">hosting money mule company's site</a>, and also, it was used in a previously analyzed <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/phishing-campaign-spreading-across.html">phishing campaign that was spreading across Facebook</a> in June. Need more evidence on the consolidation that's been ongoing for over an year and half now? An infamous money mule recruiting company (<b>Cash-Transfers Inc.</b>) was also taking advantage of the <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/money-mule-recruiters-use-asproxs-fast.html">fast-flux network offered by the ASProx botnet masters</a> in July.<br />
<br />
As a firm believer in that "the whole is greater than the sum of its parts", the popular "sitting duck" cybercrime infrastructure hosting model will be either replaced by a cybercrime infrastructure relying entirely on legitimate services, or one where the average malware infected Internet user would be temporarily used as a hosting provider.<br />
<br />
If millions were made by using the "sitting duck" hosting model, how many would be made using the others, given that they would inevitably increase the average online time for a malicious campaign?<br />
<br />
<b>Related Rock Phish research :</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/09/209-host-locked.html">209 Host Locked</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/12/2091-host-locked.html">209.1 Host Locked</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/11/661-host-locked.html">66.1 Host Locked</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/07/confirm-your-gullibility.html">Confirm Your Gullibility</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/assessing-rock-phish-campaign.html">Assessing a Rock Phish Campaign</a><br />
<br />
<b>Related fast-flux research : </b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/fast-flux-spam-and-scams-increasing.html">Fast-Flux Spam and Scams Increasing</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/fast-fluxing-yet-another-pharmacy-scam.html">Fast Fluxing Yet Another Pharmacy Scam</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/09/storm-worms-fast-flux-networks.html">Storm Worm's Fast Flux Networks</a><br />
<b> </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/11/managed-fast-flux-provider.html">Managed Fast Flux Provider</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/10/managed-fast-flux-provider-part-two.html">Managed Fast Flux Provider - Part Two</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/obfuscating-fast-fluxed-sql-injected.html">Obfuscating Fast Fluxed SQL Injected Domains</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/storm-worm-hosting-pharmaceutical-scams.html">Storm Worm Hosting Pharmaceutical Scams</a><br />
<a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1122">Fast-Fluxing SQL injection attacks executed from the Asprox botnet</a><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=kNW2O"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=kNW2O" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=zUymO"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=zUymO" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=gesYo"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=gesYo" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=RrC8o"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=RrC8o" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=w0L7O"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=w0L7O" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=hj0KO"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=hj0KO" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=P9KQo"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=P9KQo" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/472451974" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 02 Dec 2008 04:12:31 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/fast flux networks">fast flux networks</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/fast">fast</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/fast-flux spam">fast-flux spam</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/fast-flux">fast-flux</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/fast flux provider">fast flux provider</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/mybank">mybank</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/fast-flux research">fast-flux research</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/rock phish-ing">rock phish-ing</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/provider">provider</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/472451974/rock-phish-ing-in-december.html">Rock Phish-ing in December</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Fourteen]]></title>
      <link>http://www.securityratty.com/article/73e2f5bbd0d3a35e2885b12071151835</link>
      <guid>http://www.securityratty.com/article/73e2f5bbd0d3a35e2885b12071151835</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[You didn't even think for a second that the supply of typosqutted domains serving packed and triple crypted to the point where the binary is not longer executing, fake security software domains is...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SS6gDFZUyYI/AAAAAAAACek/i5D-GnO-3xw/s1600-h/microav_rogue_november.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SS6gDFZUyYI/AAAAAAAACek/i5D-GnO-3xw/s200/microav_rogue_november.png" /></a>You didn't even think for a second that the supply of typosqutted domains serving packed and triple crypted to the point where the binary is not longer executing, fake security software domains is declining? With the upcoming holidays and the usual peak of web traffic, malicious activity on all fronts is prone to increase during December. <b>YEWGATE LTD</b>, <b>Sawert Alliance</b>, and <b>Sagent Group</b>, personal favorites affiliate participants in a revenue sharing program for serving fake security software, try to maintain a decent rhythm in their typosquatting process, always worth taking a peek at. The very latest rogue security software additions include :<br />
<br />
<b>micro-antiv2009 .com</b> (91.208.0.223)<br />
<b>micro-antivir2009 .com</b><br />
<b>micro-antivirus-2009 .com </b><br />
<b>micro-av-2009 .com</b><br />
<br />
<i>Sawert Alliance<br />
Peltonen Martti&nbsp; <b>seodancer@gmail.com</b><br />
33 New Road, Upper Flat<br />
Belize City<br />
Belize<br />
Tel: +7.9602578790</i><br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SS6gYmAzMwI/AAAAAAAACes/C-aMLs7jDR0/s1600-h/spyware_remover_rogue_november.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SS6gYmAzMwI/AAAAAAAACes/C-aMLs7jDR0/s200/spyware_remover_rogue_november.png" /></a></div><b>avmyscan .com</b> (91.203.92.186; 78.157.143.184)<br />
<b>go-your-scan .com</b><br />
<b>bestproscan .com</b><br />
<b>avproscan .com</b><br />
<b>goyourscan .com</b><br />
<b>iabestscan .com</b><br />
<b>avmyscan .com</b><br />
<b>best-scan-pro .com</b><br />
<b>avscan-pro .com</b><br />
<b>bestscanner-pro .com</b><br />
<b>avscanpro .com</b><br />
<b>iascannerpro .com</b><br />
<br />
<i>Jaroslav Voltz<br />
Email: <b>mensfult@gmail.com</b><br />
Organization: Private person<br />
Address: Biskupsk 9<br />
City: Praha<br />
State: Praha<br />
ZIP: 11000<br />
Country: CZ<br />
Phone: +420.2224811382</i><br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SS6g2pEJdbI/AAAAAAAACe0/Xt2MaDdDgvk/s1600-h/sagent_group_rogue.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SS6g2pEJdbI/AAAAAAAACe0/Xt2MaDdDgvk/s200/sagent_group_rogue.png" /></a><b>virus-labs2009 .com</b> (66.232.113.62)<br />
<b>virus-trigger .com<br />
virusresponse2009 .com<br />
virusresplab .com<br />
virus-response .com</b><br />
<br />
<i>Roman Spitsikov<br />
Uus-Sadama 12&nbsp; <br />
Tallinn, Tallinn 10120<br />
Estonia<br />
<b>Roman.Spitsikov@gmail.com</b></i><br />
<br />
<b>virusremover2008plus .com</b> (77.245.61.80; 93.190.139.229)<br />
<br />
<i>Sagent Group&nbsp; (<b>sergbelo@gmail.com</b>)<br />
Brignal Solutions<br />
P.O. Box 3469 Geneva Place, Waterfront drive <br />
Road town,&nbsp;&nbsp; BVI<br />
BZ<br />
+1.14193017015</i><br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SS6g-80BKPI/AAAAAAAACe8/33Am0K6PBKI/s1600-h/sagent_group_rogue_2.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SS6g-80BKPI/AAAAAAAACe8/33Am0K6PBKI/s200/sagent_group_rogue_2.png" /></a><b>antivirus-pro-scan.com</b> (84.243.197.183)<br />
<b>anti-virus-defence.com</b><br />
<b>protection-livescan.com</b><br />
<br />
<i>Aleksey Kononov <b>cndomainz@yahoo.com</b></i><br />
<i>+74954538435 fax: +74954538435</i><br />
<i>ul. Yakimanskay 34-56</i><br />
<i>Moskva Moskovskay oblast 112745</i><br />
<i>ru</i><br />
<br />
<b>rapidantivir .com</b><b> </b>(91.208.0.220)<b><br />
rapidantivirus-2009 .com<br />
securityscanner2009 .com<br />
rapidantivirus2009 .com<br />
rapid-antivir .com<br />
extraantivir .com<br />
rapid-antivirus .com<br />
rapidantivirus .com</b><br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SS6hQRW910I/AAAAAAAACfE/Z4g-Irniuz0/s1600-h/sqscan_rogue_november.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SS6hQRW910I/AAAAAAAACfE/Z4g-Irniuz0/s200/sqscan_rogue_november.JPG" /></a><i>Sawert Alliance<br />
Peltonen Martti&nbsp; <b>seodancer@gmail.com</b><br />
33 New Road, Upper Flat<br />
Belize City<br />
Belize<br />
Tel: +7.9602578790</i><br />
<br />
<b>sgscanner .com</b> (116.50.14.185)<br />
<b>sguardscan .com<br />
scansguard .com<br />
getsg2008 .com</b><br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SS6hbmiwmxI/AAAAAAAACfM/XnmEK9R5m30/s1600-h/virus_response_rogue_november.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SS6hbmiwmxI/AAAAAAAACfM/XnmEK9R5m30/s200/virus_response_rogue_november.png" /></a><i>Vrenk Tihomil<br />
Email: <b>gray444371@gmail.com</b><br />
Organization: Private person<br />
Address: Kolodvorska 73, Sl3270 Lasko<br />
City: Lasko<br />
State: LaskoLasko<br />
ZIP: Sl1355<br />
Country: SI<br />
Phone: +386.14588324</i><br />
<br />
<b>adwaredeluxe .com</b> (64.40.118.8) (private whois)<br />
<b>antivirusadvanced .com<br />
antivirusadvance .com<br />
spydestroy .com<br />
spywareremoval .ws</b><br />
<br />
Shipping them in batches means exposing them in batches.<br />
<br />
<b>Related posts:</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/11/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security_12.html">A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Thirteen</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/11/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security.html">A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Twelve</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/10/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security_28.html">A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Eleven</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/10/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security_22.html">A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Ten</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/10/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security_16.html">A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Nine</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/10/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security.html">A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Eight</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/09/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security_30.html">A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Seven</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/09/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security_24.html">A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Six</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/09/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security.html">A  Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Five</a> <br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security_25.html">A  Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Four</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security_20.html">A  Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Three</a><b> </b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security.html">A  Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Two</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/12/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security.html">Diverse  Portfolio of Fake Security Software</a><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=9h0BN"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=9h0BN" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=x78xN"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=x78xN" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=SX1Dn"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=SX1Dn" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=n7eun"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=n7eun" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=xmqRN"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=xmqRN" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=4Ga4N"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=4Ga4N" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=5Lo1n"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=5Lo1n" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/467329268" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 27 Nov 2008 04:47:55 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/fake security software">fake security software</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/diverse portfolio">diverse portfolio</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/sawert alliance">sawert alliance</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/road town">road town</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/martti seodancergmail">martti seodancergmail</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/upper flat">upper flat</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/city">city</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/road">road</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/sl3270 lasko">sl3270 lasko</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/467329268/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security_27.html">A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Fourteen</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Another link spammer]]></title>
      <link>http://www.securityratty.com/article/4dd72baf5933c49893c38cadde935c82</link>
      <guid>http://www.securityratty.com/article/4dd72baf5933c49893c38cadde935c82</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Yet another link spammer is cluttering up my in-box. Youd think that after exposing this one , and this one , and this one , theyd know better
The latest set of miscreants operates under the brand...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Yet another link spammer is cluttering up my in-box. You&#8217;d think that after exposing <a href="http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2007/01/07/human-rights-and-biophysics-strange-similarities/">this one</a>, and <a href="http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2007/08/30/the-interns-of-privila/">this one</a>, and <a href="http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2007/12/20/fatal-wine-waiters/">this one</a>, they&#8217;d know better.</p>
<p>The latest set of miscreants operates under the brand &#8220;<a href="http://www.goodeyeforlinks.com" rel="nofollow">goodeyeforlinks.com</a>&#8221; and claim to &#8220;use white hat SEO techniques in order to get high quality, do-follow links to your website&#8221;. They also claim to be &#8220;professional&#8221; which in this case must mean you pay for their services, since sending out bulk unsolicited email is anything but professional.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, although their long term aim may indeed be to make money from legitimate, albeit foolish, businesses seeking a higher profile, the sites they have been promoting so far are anything but legitimate. In fact they&#8217;ve been fake sites covered with Google adverts (so-called &#8220;<a href="http://www.sabahan.com/2006/06/26/how-mfa-made-for-adsense-sites-make-money/">Made for AdSense</a>&#8221; (MFA) sites).</p>
<p>They started by asking me to link to &#8220;<a href="http://www.entovation.net" rel="nofollow">entovation.net</a>&#8221; which they claim is &#8220;page rank 3&#8243;. In fact it is page rank 3 (!) and a blatant copy of <a href="http://www.acentesolutions.com/">http://www.acentesolutions.com</a> which appears entirely genuine (albeit only page rank 1). They have also been promoting &#8220;<a href="http://www.poland-translation-services.com" rel="nofollow">poland-translation-services.com</a>&#8220;, which claims to be a site offering &#8220;A large team of 2,500 translators specializing in each sector, located in over 30 countries&#8221; &#8230;</p>
<p>However, this site is clearly fake as well. I haven&#8217;t tracked down where it all comes from, but much of <a href="http://poland-translation-services.com/Translate-a-Document.html" rel="nofollow">this page</a> comes from <a href="http://www.intowords.com.ar/espanol/traducciones/traducciones-de-espanol-ingles.html">this Argentinian page</a>, the text of which has been pushed through <a href="http://www.google.com/language_tools?hl=en">Google&#8217;s Spanish to English translation tools</a>&#8230;  which sadly (for example) renders </p>
<blockquote><p>
Comentarios: Se considera foja al equivalente a 500 palabras. Si el documento a traducir es menor a una foja, se lo considerará como una foja.
</p></blockquote>
<p>into </p>
<blockquote><p>
Comments: foja is considered the equivalent of 500 words. If the document is translated to a lesser foja, we will consider as a foja.
</p></blockquote>
<p>which makes the 2500 translators look more than a little bit <a href="http://www.cartoonbank.com/item/124224">foolish</a>!</p>
<p>The fake websites are hosted by <a href="http://www.euroaccess.nl/">EuroAccess Enterprises Ltd.</a> in The Netherlands (which is also where the email spam has been sent from). I&#8217;m not alone in receiving this type of email, further examples can be found <a href="http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/openbsd/2008-09/1548.html">here</a>, and <a href="http://www.projecthoneypot.org/ip_89.248.172.66">here</a>, and <a href="http://dansdata.blogsome.com/2008/10/16/i-do-like-a-good-link-spam-in-the-morning/">here</a>, and <a href="http://avvoblog.com/2008/11/10/linkbrokers-gone-wild/">here</a>, and <a href="http://www.nabble.com/Link-exchange-with-page-rank-4--Hotel-site-td19973368.html">here</a>, and <a href="http://www.allvoices.com/contributed-news/1522559">here</a>, and even <a href="http://blogpintura.wordpress.com/#comment-5">here (in Spanish)</a>.</p>
<p>EuroAccess have a fine ticketing system for abuse complaints&#8230; so I&#8217;m able to keep track of what they&#8217;re doing about my emails drawing their attention to the fraudsters they are hosting. I am therefore fully aware that they&#8217;ve so far marked my missives as &#8220;Priority: Low&#8221;, and nothing else is recorded to have been done&#8230; However, the tickets are still &#8220;Status: Open&#8221;, so perhaps a little publicity will encourage them to reassess their prioritisation.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sun, 23 Nov 2008 16:45:45 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/argentinian page">argentinian page</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/page">page</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/foja">foja</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/lesser foja">lesser foja</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/page rank">page rank</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/considera foja">considera foja</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/link spammer">link spammer</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/link">link</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/fake">fake</category>
      <source url="http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2008/11/23/another-link-spammer/">Another link spammer</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Links for 2008-11-20 [del.icio.us]]]></title>
      <link>http://www.securityratty.com/article/f0421d3d712a177576a6940fd9181128</link>
      <guid>http://www.securityratty.com/article/f0421d3d712a177576a6940fd9181128</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Got SIEM? - Part IV eIQviews Customers tend to use SIEM technologies for more reactive efforts, such as post-event forensics, rather than as a true correlation solution to determine unusual behavior...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<ul>
<li><a href="http://blog.eiqnetworks.com/2008/11/20/got-siem-part-iv/">Got SIEM? - Part IV &laquo; eIQviews</a><br/>
Customers tend to use SIEM technologies for more reactive efforts, such as post-event forensics, rather than as a true correlation solution to determine unusual behavior or policy violations before they have a chance to affect systems and data.</li>
<li><a href="http://siemblog.com/?p=13">SIEM Blog &raquo; Unrestricted Data Collection for Maximum Compliance and Forensic Visibility</a></li>
<li><a href="http://beastorbuddha.com/2008/11/19/so-we-own-your-client-database-and-everything-important-to-you/">Beast Or Buddha &raquo; Blog Archive &raquo; So we own your client database and everything important to you&hellip;</a><br/>
Web Developer: “Just because you can do that doesn’t mean we have a major problem like you say it is. It’s just you that did it!”
SG dude: “Well more than likely, others have….we didn’t do anything fancy…”.
Web Developer: “Well nothing has ever happened so it’s just you guys!”
SG dude: “You have no logging”.
Web Developer: “We’ve never been hacked!”</li>
<li><a href="http://ondlp.com/2008/10/13/my-wife-finally-knows-what-i-do/">On Data Loss Prevention (DLP) &raquo; My Wife Finally Knows What I Do</a></li>
<li><a href="http://securosis.com/2008/11/10/the-two-kinds-of-security-threats-and-how-they-affect-your-life/">The Two Kinds Of Security Threats, And How They Affect Your Life | securosis.com</a><br/>
We get money for noisy threats, and get called paranoid freaks for trying to prevent quiet threats (which can still lose our organizations a boatload of money, but don’t interfere with the married CEO’s ability to flirt with the new girl in marketing over email).</li>
<li><a href="http://www.csoonline.com/article/461422/Marcus_Ranum_on_Network_Security">Marcus Ranum on Network Security - CSO Online - Security and Risk</a><br/>
The real best practices have been the same since the 1970s: know where your data is, who has access to what, read your logs, guard your perimeter, minimize complexity, reduce access to &quot;need only&quot; and segment your networks.</li>
</ul><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog/~4/460414088" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 20 Nov 2008 21:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/data">data</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/data collection">data collection</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/web developer">web developer</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/siem">siem</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/data loss prevention">data loss prevention</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/siem blog">siem blog</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/security threats">security threats</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/network security">network security</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog/~3/460414088/anton18">Links for 2008-11-20 [del.icio.us]</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Just Love This: Noisy vs Quiet from Rich]]></title>
      <link>http://www.securityratty.com/article/5b13607c4ea355a79b9b366f3adb21fd</link>
      <guid>http://www.securityratty.com/article/5b13607c4ea355a79b9b366f3adb21fd</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[OMG, some people (usually ex-Gartner... for whatever mystical reason) have this uncanny ability to present information in a way that just triggers an avalanche of insight. Here is an example: &quot; The...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[OMG, some people (usually ex-Gartner... for whatever mystical reason) have this uncanny ability to present information in a way that just triggers an avalanche of insight.  Here is an example: "<a href="http://securosis.com/2008/11/10/the-two-kinds-of-security-threats-and-how-they-affect-your-life/" rel="bookmark" title="Permanent Link to The Two Kinds Of Security Threats, And How They Affect Your Life">The Two Kinds Of Security Threats, And How They Affect Your Life </a>" from Rich Mogul.<br /><br />Some <a href="http://securosis.com/2008/11/10/the-two-kinds-of-security-threats-and-how-they-affect-your-life/">quotes</a>:  "We get money for noisy threats, and get called paranoid freaks for trying to prevent quiet threats (which can still lose our organizations a boatload of money, but don’t interfere with the married CEO’s ability to flirt with the new girl in marketing over email)."<br /><br />and<br /><br />"Slice up your budget and see how much you spend preventing noisy vs. quiet threats. It’s often our own little version of security theater."<br /><br />and<br /><br />"The problem is, noisy vs. quiet may bear little to no relationship to your actual risk and losses, but that’s just human nature."<br /><br />Overall, a MUST <a href="http://securosis.com/2008/11/10/the-two-kinds-of-security-threats-and-how-they-affect-your-life/">read</a>.<br /><br />God, please, send us some credible <a href="http://www.securitymetrics.org/content/Wiki.jsp">security metrics</a>... please.<div class="blogger-post-footer">About me: http://www.chuvakin.org</div><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?a=Raf0N"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?i=Raf0N" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?a=fKCxN"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?i=fKCxN" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?a=VLpzN"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?i=VLpzN" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog/~4/460247667" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 20 Nov 2008 14:50:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/quiet">quiet</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/prevent quiet threats">prevent quiet threats</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/noisy">noisy</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/quiet threats">quiet threats</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/noisy threats">noisy threats</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/credible security metrics">credible security metrics</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/uncanny ability">uncanny ability</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/human nature">human nature</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/mystical reason">mystical reason</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog/~3/460247667/just-love-this-noisy-vs-quiet-from-rich.html">Just Love This: Noisy vs Quiet from Rich</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Raffys Visualization Book]]></title>
      <link>http://www.securityratty.com/article/f4265f82839e3f66c8b6b3a78d7fa468</link>
      <guid>http://www.securityratty.com/article/f4265f82839e3f66c8b6b3a78d7fa468</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Here is my long-overdue book review for Applied Security Visualization by Raffy Marty
First, here is what my early endorsement for the book said (can be found on the inside cover of the book
Amazingly...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Here is my long-overdue book review for <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Applied-Security-Visualization-Raffael-Marty/dp/0321510100">“Applied Security Visualization“&#160; by Raffy Marty</a>.</p>  <p>First, here is what my early endorsement for the book said (can be found on the inside cover of the book):</p>  <p>“Amazingly useful (and fun to read!) book that does justice to this&#160; somewhat esoteric subject - and this is coming from a long-time&#160; visualization skeptic! What is most impressive that&#160; this book is&#160; actually 'hands-on-useful,&quot; not conceptual, with examples usable by&#160; readers in their daily jobs. Chapter 8 on insiders is my favorite!”</p>  <p>What else do I think of the book, apart from the fact that it is awesome? :-)</p>  <p>First, I have to admit that I used to argue with Raffy about usefulness of visualization. I was burned by having to look at bad “visualization” tools and would take <em>an ugly, meaningful table over an ugly, meaningless picture</em> any day now. Thus, I was a visualization skeptic. Buy you know what? The book does justice to visualization really well, and it explains when to use it and when not to use it.</p>  <p>The book gives just the right amount of visualization theory, which is not onerous to read at all (unlike some other books), as well as other visualization basics. The fun starts at Chapter 4, where he covers&#160; the process from data to useful pictures. This actually explains why some visualization are useful and some are not; if you just jam data into a graphing program, there is a good chance that it would not be too useful. If you follow the ideas from Ch4, it is more likely to be useful.</p>  <p>Ch5 and 6 cover network data analysis: logs, packets, flows. This is what most people usually try to visualize; this book goes beyond “worms and scans” into nice visuals of email traffic, wireless and even vulnerability data (I found the latter slightly confusing). Ch7 covers “compliance”, which, in this case, covers all sorts of fun things, from risk assessment to database log visualization.&#160; As I said, Ch8 is my favorite: I agree that insider tracking MAY be the area where visualization tools and approaches beat others. In Ch9, the book covers a few visualization tools; obviously, including the author’s AfterGlow.</p>  <p>So, to summarize, get the book if you have any connection to security AND data analysis. In fact, it is very likely that if you are doing security, you’d have to do data analysis at some point and so will benefit from reading the book. And, yes, it does come with a CD full of visualization tools (DAVIX).</p>  <p>BTW, I am posting it <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Applied-Security-Visualization-Raffael-Marty/dp/0321510100">at Amazon</a> as well.</p>  <div class="blogger-post-footer">About me: http://www.chuvakin.org</div><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?a=wgwyN"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?i=wgwyN" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?a=ADZPN"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?i=ADZPN" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?a=N8CKN"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?i=N8CKN" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog/~4/460098463" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 20 Nov 2008 11:40:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/visualization">visualization</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/visualization tools">visualization tools</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/bad visualization tools">bad visualization tools</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/book">book</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/database log visualization">database log visualization</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/security visualization">security visualization</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/long-time visualization skeptic">long-time visualization skeptic</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/long-overdue book review">long-overdue book review</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/book covers">book covers</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog/~3/460098463/raffys-visualization-book.html">Raffys Visualization Book</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Dissecting the Latest Koobface Facebook Campaign]]></title>
      <link>http://www.securityratty.com/article/86c70e5d2e4da8aa581ee9216947ac9a</link>
      <guid>http://www.securityratty.com/article/86c70e5d2e4da8aa581ee9216947ac9a</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[The latest Koobface malware campaign at Facebook , is once again exposing a diverse ecosystem worth assessing in times of active migration to alternative ISPs tolerating or conveniently ignoring the...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SRrlN5c-LfI/AAAAAAAACb8/oG5zfHxekJ4/s1600-h/koobface_facebook_redirections.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SRrlN5c-LfI/AAAAAAAACb8/oG5zfHxekJ4/s200/koobface_facebook_redirections.JPG" /></a>The latest <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=2146">Koobface malware campaign at Facebook</a>, is once again exposing a diverse ecosystem worth assessing in times of active migration to alternative ISPs tolerating or conveniently ignoring the malicious activities courtesy of their customers. The -- now removed -- binaries that the dropper was requesting were hosted at the American International Baseball Club in Vienna, indicating a compromise.<br />
<br />
us.geocities .com/adanbates84/index.htm<br />
<b>lostart .info/js/js.js</b> (79.132.211.51)<br />
<b>off34 .com/go/fb.php</b> (79.132.211.51)<br />
<b>youtube-spyvideo .com/youtube_file.html</b> (58.241.255.37)<br />
<b>ahdirz .com/movie1.php?id=638&amp;n=teen</b> (208.85.181.69)<br />
<b>top100clipz .com/m6/movie1.php?id=638&amp;n=teen</b> (208.85.181.67)<br />
<b>hq-vidz .com/movie1.php?id=638&amp;n=teen</b> (208.85.181.68)<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SRwwNw6BKZI/AAAAAAAACcU/_coWTkcVuVM/s1600-h/koobface_facebook_activex.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SRwwNw6BKZI/AAAAAAAACcU/_coWTkcVuVM/s200/koobface_facebook_activex.png" /></a>The dropper then phones back home to : <b>f071108 .com/fb/first.php</b> (79.132.211.50) with the binaries hosted at a legitimate site that's been compromised :<br />
<br />
<b>aibcvienna.org/youtube/ bnsetup24.exe</b><br />
<b>aibcvienna.org/youtube/ tinyproxy.exe </b><br />
<br />
Related fake Youtube domains participating :<br />
<b>catshof .com </b>(79.132.211.51)<br />
<b>youtube-spy .info </b>(94.102.60.119)<br />
<b>youtubehof .net </b>(218.93.205.30)<br />
<b>youtube-spyvideo .com </b>(58.241.255.37)<br />
<b>yyyaaaahhhhoooo.ocom .pl </b>(67.15.104.83)<br />
<b>youtube-x-files .com </b>(94.102.60.119) <br />
<br />
The development of cybercrime platforms utilizing legitimate infrastructure only, has always been in the works. With spamming systems relying exclusively on the automatically registered email accounts at free web based providers, to the automatic bulk registration of hundreds of thousands of domains enjoying a particular domain registrar's weak anti-abuse policies, it would be interesting to monitor whether <a href="http://www.renesys.com/blog/2008/09/internet_vigilantism_1.shtml">marginal thinking</a> or <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/10/cost-of-anonymizing-cybercriminals.html">improved OPSEC relying on compromised hosts</a> will be favored in 2009.<br />
<br />
<b>Related posts:</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/fake-youtube-site-serving-flash.html">Fake YouTube Site Serving Flash Exploits</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/facebook-malware-campaigns-rotating.html">Facebook Malware Campaigns Rotating Tactics</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/phishing-campaign-spreading-across.html">Phishing Campaign Spreading Across Facebook</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/11/large-scale-myspace-phishing-attack.html">Large Scale MySpace Phishing Attack</a><span style="font-weight: bold;"><br />
</span><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/12/update-on-myspace-phishing-campaign.html">Update on the MySpace Phishing Campaign</a><span style="font-weight: bold;"><br />
</span><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/01/myspace-phishers-now-targeting-facebook.html">MySpace Phishers Now Targeting Facebook</a><span style="font-weight: bold;"><br />
</span><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/myspace-hosting-myspace-phishing.html">MySpace Hosting MySpace Phishing Profiles</a><span style="font-weight: bold;"></span><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=b95SN"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=b95SN" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=eLeKN"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=eLeKN" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=7mCXn"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=7mCXn" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=gPM0n"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=gPM0n" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=2GlmN"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=2GlmN" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=aavTN"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=aavTN" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=NgiDn"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=NgiDn" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/451825134" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 13 Nov 2008 05:08:12 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/facebook">facebook</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/campaign">campaign</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/myspace">myspace</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/myspace phishers">myspace phishers</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/facebook malware campaigns">facebook malware campaigns</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/koobface malware campaign">koobface malware campaign</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/scale myspace">scale myspace</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/php">php</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/fake youtube domains">fake youtube domains</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/451825134/dissecting-latest-koobface-facebook.html">Dissecting the Latest Koobface Facebook Campaign</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Teaching the Elderly about Scams and Security]]></title>
      <link>http://www.securityratty.com/article/e41572ac9f794d144e3f8f9e4d564c20</link>
      <guid>http://www.securityratty.com/article/e41572ac9f794d144e3f8f9e4d564c20</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[People were being scammed long before email and malware entered into daily use and its still happening offline as well as online. So what to do if you know that someone you love is being victimized...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>People were being scammed long before email and malware entered into daily use &#8212; and it&#8217;s still happening offline as well as online. So what to do if you know that someone you love is being victimized and scammed?</p>
<p>That&#8217;s the question the Consumerist asked readers today, with a story about a <a rel="nofollow" target="_blank" href="http://consumerist.com/5083442/she+grifters-scam-granddad-for-10000%252B-a-month">Florida grand-dad </a>whose gardener is supposedly fleecing him for over $10k / month, allegedly to help an ailing friend:</p>
<blockquote><p>Shaun says his 80+-year old grandfather, Steve, is being scammed out of over $10,000 a month. It seems Steve recently hired a female gardener who introduced him to a &#8220;wealthy friend,&#8221; and now he&#8217;s loaning them money to pay for groceries, cable, home upkeep, and, get this, bodyguards to protect her from an ex-husband and son who to want to kill her. When the family tries to intervene, Steve says the family is trying to put him in a nursing home and steal his money. Shaun is at a loss. How can he help his grandfather, who doesn&#8217;t want to be helped?</p></blockquote>
<p>Another question that might be relevant in the IT Security community is, are the elderly more prone to these scams, and if so why? In the tech world it&#8217;s widely assumed that the older generation just has a harder time learning and grasping how to use technology so may not understand what is risky and what isn&#8217;t.</p>
<p>But perhaps there&#8217;s a deeper problem, either with some form of dementia and paranoia in the older years, or just a purer vulnerability associated with being alienated from the new, cutting edge and modern world as we age, or some kind of unwillingness to be suspicious because of the need to have caring people around you?</p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 11 Nov 2008 11:54:46 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/steve">steve</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/steve recently hired">steve recently hired</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/female gardener">female gardener</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/friend">friend</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/home">home</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/gardener">gardener</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/home upkeep">home upkeep</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/wealthy friend">wealthy friend</category>
      <category domain="http://www.securityratty.com/tag/shaun">shaun</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/itsecurity/~3/450086772/">Teaching the Elderly about Scams and Security</source>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
