The problem is that (Chris’ analysis is) completely impractical. I’ll take a recent, and fairly typical situation as an example. I was taking issue with the manner in which remote access was being provisioned for a third party vendor to connect to a system hosted by one of our European business units. To cut a long story short, it was not only a breach of policy but highly insecure. I wanted the access to be disconnected, the business unit director wanted my risk assessment. And he didn’t want to wait for it.

To quote Chris Hayes, spending time on working out the expected effectiveness of controls, over a given timeframe, as measured against a baseline level of force was not going to pacify an angry Italian fearful that my decision was going to cost him money. He wanted my explanation of the risk and more importantly, what I was going to offer as a solution to keep his business functioning

As Chris is someone who actually does this for a living in a large company, and this is typical of his actual day job, I really find Stuart’s “impractical” comment to be, um, misinformed.

Also, I think Stuart mistakes the purpose of a risk analysis.  The purpose of the risk analysis is not to force someone to be “secure”, but to provide knowledge for decision making.  Using it as a “hammer” to knock in the nail of your personal risk tolerance impairs efficiency and in the long run retards “security” as it creates political resentment.  Seriously, who cares if something might violate policy or not in a pre-implementation discussion?  Policies are not stone tablets handed down from on high, they are state-in-time codification of the data owners risk tolerance.  This risk tolerance changes sometimes, and that’s OK.

To that extent, I appreciate (and I’m sure Chris does, as well) that risk analysis does not create rationality in the data owner.  Someone who sees you as a speedbump on the route to progress they may not be ready to appreciate your point of view even if it is stated in the most rational manner possible.   But it’s worth noting (and Stuart’s example is indicative of this point) that risk analysis does not create rationality in the analyst, either.  If one is being so “security minded” as to ignore the risk tolerance of the business owner - we’re bound to get a reaction similar to that Stuart encountered.  In fact, a practical risk analysis like Chris performed on his blog, done in 30 minutes, should identify the critical point of disagreement between Stuart and the data owner (again, Stuart doesn’t own the data, the agitated Italian does).

But let’s stay rational and open to alternatives to what Chris offers.  Stuart states his approach to risk analysis as:

When I need to document a risk assessment I use a very simple form: list the threats, state the level of vulnerability, list the associated operational costs and potential revenue hits. High, medium, or low risk? Describe the controls and options. Write up who needs to do what, and how much of their time it’s going to take. Job done.

At first glance, I don’t think what Chris has done is any less efficient, and it provides greater insight (using Frequency and Capability instead of just ‘listing the threats’).  But what is key here is that Chris’ approach is consistent and defensible.  Less generous risk geeks and CSO’s I know would have no little difficulty with Stuart’s approach.  But to particularly answer Stuart’s main objection (impracticality) I would offer that with practice, Chris’ work is probably quicker and easier than Stuart’s described process as it eliminates much of the ambiguity an immature risk analysis creates - reducing the need for further discussion and arguments with data owners (regardless of disposition or nationality).

Finally the irony of Stuart’s post is that the reason he had this confrontation may in fact be because he was incapable of bringing a salient model for risk to the table, one that identified the factors that create risk and developed a defensible belief statement concerning risk.   We’ll never know if one would have helped him in this isolated instance, but I can tell you that in organizations like Chris’, good risk models and strong risk anlayses create operational efficiencies, reduce costs, and streamlines intra-departmental communications.

No longer are OS vendors and other large infrastructure technology providers the main source of vulnerabilities. It’s the thousands of applications, produced by thousands of software vendors, that make up this huge 3rd wave. ISS reported that in 2007 that the top five sources of vulnerabilities: Microsoft, Apple, Oracle, IBM, and Cisco, had dropped to supplying us with only 13.6% of our vulnerabilities. 86.4% came from the other thousands of software vendors that supply our computers with a seemingly unending supply of vulnerabilities for attackers to exploit.

In a recent report Microsoft has congratulated itself on doing a good job securing Windows. And by all accounts they have done a good job. But then they state this:

“Unless software development practices change throughout the industry, any improvements in the security of Windows would be meaningless.”

Whoa. Millions of dollars spent on securing the most prevalent piece of software and it could be meaningless? Yes, it’s true. Since attackers typically only need one vulnerability, if it isn’t in the network, and it isn’t in the host configuration, and it isn’t in the OS, they will happily exploit a vulnerability in an application.

At every shift of exploit target the problem has gotten more difficult to solve. Networks had choke points and could be centrally managed. It took a while but eventually host configurations became centrally managed and automated tools could scan configurations. Although OSes were huge and complex beasts with 10’s of millions of lines of code, with enough effort, their vulnerabilities have been largely tamed as Microsoft’s Windows and the Linux kernel track record shows. This was a very substantial, over five year effort, which used some of the most talented security people anywhere.
But now what to do? Instead of a few OSes we now have thousands of applications with vulnerabilities. As Microsoft found out, the attackers don’t go away, they just move on to the next incrementally less juicy vulnerability. In the world of exploits that typically means the vulnerability with the next smallest target population.

Attackers have started with the common client applications that can be found on almost every machine: Acrobat, Flash, RealPlayer, Quicktime, popular antivirus software. And they will continue down the popularity slope until they get to application populations down in the thousands which is getting to fairly small software vendors. Attackers can do this because they can bundle many vulnerabilities together, exploiting the statistical fact that you must have some vulnerable software installed. Compromised web sites have been found attacking visitors with over ten client side exploits preying on multiple versions of vulnerable client software.

The solution to this problem is all software must be written securely, not just the software from the big guys. Small vendors think they aren’t a target just like home users used to think they weren’t a target. People thought, “Why would someone want to attack my home computer?” Then they realized they did home banking, or had a fast internet connection that could be used for DDoS attacks or sending spam. All software vendors need to get the same wakeup call. Attackers don’t want to find a vulnerability in your software to make you look bad. They want any vulnerability. If the population of your software is small they will just bundle your vulnerability together with others in an exploit pack. The days of the average software vendor not having to worry about application security are officially over.

• Corporate desktop image
  
• Outlook 2003
• Symantec AV
• PGP-8.1
  

1. Install PGP-9.6
2. reboot twice per instructions
3. Find that my networking completely doesn't work.

1. regsvr32 /u PGPfsshl.dll
2. Run a Registry merge on c:\WINDOWS\system32\PGPlspRollback.reg
3. Reboot

What’s going on?

“Rubico”, as the hacker called himself, used an automated password recovery tool where he was asked fairly simple questions to identify himself as Gov. Palin [birthday, zip code, etc.]. Rubico found answers to these within 45 minutes on Google and Wikipedia! Wow! Is it really that easy to hack into email or messaging services that the common person uses globally?...]]> Mon, 29 Sep 2008 20:00:00 +0000 email palin free email mccain-palin campaign questions fairly simple questions email account breach gov palin birthday Gov. Palin, Yahoo! Email and SecurityA Call To Action? http://www.securityratty.com/article/9f99d21d694700b803cf34b6f0f0a637 http://www.securityratty.com/article/9f99d21d694700b803cf34b6f0f0a637 Wed, 24 Sep 2008 11:47:43 +0000 account sarah palin fairly trivial task palin email account emailit secret community cra In the News: Hacking Sarah's Email, TSA-Approved Laptop Bags http://www.securityratty.com/article/850f85c1d4f79f75ab94faca2b325146 http://www.securityratty.com/article/850f85c1d4f79f75ab94faca2b325146 It it fairly well established that overt risk tasking, greed and corporate arrogance by financial services companies have destroyed the real estate market and crippled the global economy. Countless millions of folks have lost their homes and life savings. This corporate arrogance and greed was like a “greed virus,” spreading across the world like a plague.

A similar arrogance is happening in CEP-land, where, it seems, each and every financial services event processing application is now a “CEP application” just because someone in capital markets puts “CEP” in the same paragraph. I find it ridiculous that the same market of folks who have helped destroy the global economy are now the world’s self-proclaimed authorities on complex event processing. Amazing, if you really think about it, isn’t it?

I read many posts these days by folks in the capital markets trading world, claiming their message routing application is “CEP,” or their algo trading application is “CEP,” - feeds and speed, typical of what “turns on” the financial services folks. As an editorial note: I recall when I worked for a software company, folks on the same team who worked on Wall Street would look down on folks with many years of IT experience outside of financial services. Some would say “he is only a security guy” in their attempt to put down anyone who does not have trading floor IT experience on their resume. I found it all quite ridiculous and foolish.

My resume, for what it is worth, has a number of financial services companies, including either assessing, architecting or building large scale security systems for S.W.I.F.T, Chase or SBC. This experience does not seem to “count” with the trading floor folks, since security is more about getting things right, not just supporting a form of gaming or gambling with other peoples money, with more feeds and speeds the better.

Of late, as I have watched the CEP/EP space evolve, and unfortunately, I see a similar type of “capital markets virus” spreading into CEP-land. Folks on the trading side of financial services seem to think that whatever they say or do is right, and whatever others outside of the trading side do is wrong. These folks are quick to ridicule others who have far more experience than they do, outside of the trading floor of capital markets.

After all, mostly what they do on the trading side is route orders - and if a little old lady in a small town in Iowa loses her life savings because of a bad investment decision, it means little to the folks on the trading floor, the market folks are into feeds and speed - just keep the beast alive. Place your bet on this market or that one! Away we go, faster and faster!!!!

I am sometimes a little sad to observe the same audacity in the CEP world. Instead of focusing on the hard complex problems that require accuracy, the original set of problems defined when the phrase “complex event processing” was minted, the capital market folks have hijacked the term for their marketing purposes in algo trading and order managment systems. These same people ridicule others who are working to solve the (originally stated) complex event processing problems, problems the capital market traders seemingly cannot understand, since they have never worked on complex network or security management problems.

Nevermind, that these “ultra low latency” systems cannot accurately detect a complex money laundering scheme or an elaborate fraud. Nevermind that these “CEP engines” cannot accuracy insure that Average Joe does not lose his hard earned money in a fraud scheme.

I have no problem with folks in capital markets using the term CEP, but they should not ridicule those in technical areas that are not focused on keeping the “trading beast” alive so people can lose their life savings in a blink of an eye; but instead focused on solving complex problems such as the class of problems called out when the three letter acronym “CEP” was created.

The panel will discuss fourth-generation (4G) networks, including both LTE and WiMax, and discuss what these networks might deliver, as well as how Wi-Fi networks fit into this future.

One of the organizers asked if I'd solicit questions--you can post them below--which they'll try to ask during the panel. The group would then write up responses which could posted in turn here.

The powerhouse that is Kevin Werbach, a professor at The Wharton School, is moderating the event. Werbach has been part of interesting thinking about spectrum for many years, a former editor of Release 1.0, and a former FCC staffer. He'll share the stage with a fairly high-powered crowd, including AT&T's enterprise architect for mobility, the president of NAC, and senior people from Comcast and Sprint Xohm.

The event is part of the Mid-Atlantic Chapter series called MobileMonday, an interesting business group that's trying to provoke discussion and development around mobile technology and access. This particular event is sponsored by local business development organization Select Greater Philadelphia.